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ABSTRACT
During the first decade after the Great War, the 
relationship between Great Britain and Canada underwent 
profound changes: these years were significant in the
transition of the British Empire to Commonwealth. One of 
these changes included Canada's severance from formal imperial 
diplomatic unity. From 1919 to 1928, Canada established the 
same complete control over its external affairs which it 
already enjoyed in its domestic affairs. Canada's break from 
imperial foreign policy was a major factor in Canada's 
evolution from subordinate status with respect to Britain to 
one of equality. As the senior Dominion, the action Canada 
took against Britain, by confronting Britain repeatedly in 
matters of foreign policy, made Canada a leader in the 
transition to Commonwealth.
Events leading to Canada's legal disassociation from 
imperial foreign policy began with Resolution IX of the 
Imperial War Conference of 1917. Although recognition of 
changes in the imperial relationship came with the Balfour 
Declaration of 1926, it was the appointment of the first 
British High Commissioner to Ottawa in 1928 which confirmed 
Britain's participation in a new relationship with Canada. 
Resolution IX acknowledged that circumstances had changed in 
British-Dominion relations. The struggles over imperial 
foreign policy between 1919 and 1928 assisted in establishing 
the principle of equal status between Britain and the 
Dominions. These conflicts contributed to defining the 
evolution of the Anglo-Canadian relationship in its formal, 
legal sense. The Canadian involvement in these encounters has
received a great deal of attention whereas the same cannot be 
said of the British side. Most historical writings have 
assumed that the reactions of Britain were consistently 
conservative and passive. The common supposition was that 
Britain reacted only when pressured by Canada. By reviewing 
these confrontations from the British perspective, this study 
will examine the attitudes of and the interaction among the 
British Cabinet, the Foreign and Colonial Offices in 
formulating a policy toward Canada in this era, and 
demonstrate that the transition to Commonwealth was neither 
inevitable nor smooth.
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INTRODUCTION
Britain and its Dominions: Canada, South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand, entered the First World War united 
members of the British Empire. They left the war still 
officially united. The Great War, however, initiated a series 
of events which ultimately ended the Dominions' role in the 
British Empire and eventually led to the Commonwealth in 1931. 
These events, which dramatically reshaped Britain's relations 
with its Dominions, centred primarily around the conduct of 
Britain's and the Dominions' shared foreign policy, frequently 
referred to as imperial diplomatic unity or imperial foreign 
policy. The struggles over imperial foreign policy began 
during the First World War and ended in 1926 when the Balfour 
Report shattered imperial diplomatic unity and each Dominion 
took control of its own foreign policy.
This study will examine the reaction to the end of 
imperial diplomatic unity among British politicians and 
British civil servants in Whitehall. This study will examine 
and explore British reactions to the end of imperial 
diplomatic unity through an examination of British-Canadian 
relations 1919-1928. Of all the Dominions, Canada, the senior 
Dominion, was the most persistent in testing the boundaries of 
imperial unity. At times, Canada enjoyed the support of other 
Dominions, most notably South Africa and the Irish Free State, 
in its bid to break free from imperial diplomatic unity. No 
other Dominion, however, pursued the matter with Canada's 
single-minded consistency or spearheaded as many precedent- 
setting developments. As the senior Dominion, the impact of
Canada's actions was decisive and far-reaching. Canada forced 
Whitehall to wrestle with issues Britain would have preferred 
to avoid. Canada's importance frequently caused Britain to 
tailor its responses to the attack on diplomatic unity to the 
Canadian context. The British Government recognised the 
centrality of Canada's position and the ramifications of 
Canada's actions. The struggles between Canada and Britain 
more often than not set both the agenda and the pace in the 
transition from Empire to Commonwealth.
British-Canadian relations during 1919-1928 offer an 
insight into Britain's reactions to the breakup of imperial 
diplomatic unity and indeed to the collapse of the British 
Empire. Britain's reaction to these events was influenced by 
the impact imperial diplomatic unity had on Britain's 
international strength. Britain recognized its international 
voice was strengthened by Britain's speaking internationally 
for the nations in the British Empire, especially the 
Dominions, as well as for itself.
The struggles which led to the breakup of imperial 
diplomatic unity were peaceful to the extent that no armed 
confrontations occurred. Peaceful actions and negotiations 
earned the Dominions control of their own foreign policies. 
This peaceful fagade, however, hid the tensions and turmoil 
which accompanied these changes, particularly on the British 
side. This apparently peaceful transition ending the British 
Empire also disguised the progression from one stage of change 
to another. This peaceful transition, although it spared the 
cost of bloodshed, still caused difficulties. The greatest 
difficulty arose because there was no clear break from the old 
imperial relationship to the new relationship. Some of
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Britain's greatest hindrances to building a new alliance with 
Canada arose from the remaining fragments of the old British- 
Canadian relationship. These fragments gave Britain the 
mistaken belief that its old association with Canada remained 
intact and encouraged British denial and illusions in 
accepting the demise of the old relationship was over. 
Britain's denial and illusions prevented it from accepting and 
building a new alliance with Canada. Canada's movement to 
build a new association with Britain exacerbated British 
difficulties as Britain clung to the old relationship. From 
1919 to 1928, Britain's inability to build a new association 
with Canada hampered Britain in its relations with Canada.
After the Imperial Conference of 1917, Canada, and some 
other Dominions were anxious to gain a role in the formulation 
of imperial foreign policy. Canada, however, waited until 
1919 to press its demand for a role in imperial foreign 
policy. Initially, from 1919 to 1922, Canada supported the 
continuance of a unified imperial foreign policy and desired 
a role only in the formulation of this policy. It was not 
until late 1922 that Canada changed its demand to having 
complete control over Canadian foreign policy. Britain failed 
to exploit this Canadian position and missed an opportunity to 
potentially extend the life of imperial diplomatic unity. The 
opportunity did not reoccur.
Dominions, such as Canada, believed the Imperial 
Conference of 1923 marked the end of imperial diplomatic 
unity. The resolutions passed at the Imperial Conference on 
treaty-making powers doomed imperial diplomatic unity. The 
Imperial Conference of 1923 was the turning point in imperial 
diplomatic relations even though not all parties involved
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understood this to be the case. Britain was one such party. 
While Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, viewed the 
Imperial Conference of 1923 as ending imperial diplomatic 
unity, Britain did not. Indeed, it was not until 1926 that 
Britain accepted that imperial diplomatic unity was over. 
Thus, from 1923-26, Britain's views towards the Dominions and 
the imperial diplomatic unity were filled with illusions. All 
the illusions shared the common thread that somehow if Britain 
could conceive the proper scheme for Dominion consultation on 
foreign policy then imperial foreign policy would remain 
intact. It was not until all these various illusions were 
shattered, in great part through the persistence and 
determination of Mackenzie King, that Britain finally accepted 
at the Imperial Conference of 1926 that imperial diplomatic 
unity was over. It was not 1928, however, with the 
appointment of the first British High Commissioner to Canada, 
that Britain took public steps in forging a new relationship 
with Canada.
From 1919-1928, Britain suffered from one key problem: 
the inability to keep pace vwith changes in the imperial 
relationship. This inability to keep pace with change 
characterised Britain's lost years of opportunity from 1919- 
23. During these years, Britain failed to exploit the 
Dominions' good will about imperial diplomatic unity and to 
grant concessions that might have extended the life of 
imperial diplomatic unity. British inability to keep pace 
with change was also a key contributor to Britain's years of 
illusions from 1923-26. During these years, Britain believed 
that imperial unity could be saved. Britain paid a price in 
failing to keep abreast of the latest developments in British-
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Dominion relations. This price was Britain's inability to 
effectively counter some Dominions' determination to end 
imperial diplomatic unity. Britain's later cost came from 
British delays in building new relations with its Dominions. 
The price of Britain's inability to build new relations with 
Canada showed in such matters as Britain having no one in 
Canada from 1926 to 1928 to present and defend British 
interests.
One of the striking realities of this thesis was how 
little influence parliamentary or public opinion exerted 
either in Britain or Canada. The impact of the different men 
in Downing Street, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office 
is significant. The process of disintegration was essentially 
inter-governmental, executive action by a small number of 
politicians and officials, and it is therefore on this that 
this study concentrates.
Many elements contributed to Britain's inability to keep 
pace from 1919-1928 with the changes in British-Dominion 
relations, particularly in British-Canadian relations. Three 
key factors were: the constantly changing personnel in British 
Government; the inability of crucial British Government 
Departments to reach a consensus on imperial relations? and, 
the British lack of understanding about the precedent-setting 
changes.
The first factor which contributed to Britain's 
deficiency was the constantly changing personnel in British 
governing circles. In the years 1919 to 1928, Canada had only 
three Prime Ministers, Sir Robert Borden, Arthur Meighen and 
Mackenzie King. King was Prime Minister almost continuously 
from 1921-28, with the exception of the short-lived
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administration of Arthur Meighen in 1926. As it was practice 
for the Canadian Prime Minister to serve also as Minister of 
External Affairs, a strong link of continuity in Canadian 
policy existed from 1921-1928. In sharp contrast, in Britain, 
the three key government departments which combined to produce 
the policy regarding Canadian involvement in imperial foreign 
policy underwent frequent alterations in leadership. Five 
changes of government1 resulted in four different men 
occupying 10 Downing Street and these included the first 
Labour Prime Minister. The Colonial Office, and the later 
addition of the Dominions Office in 1925, had five 
Secretaries. It was the Foreign Office which proved the most 
consistent in leadership with only three different 
Secretaries. In addition to these changes the older 
generation, such as Lord Milner and Lord Curzon, was replaced 
by the new generation, including L.S. Amery and Sir Austen 
Chamberlain and, of course, the completely new Labour 
Government. Since the number of men involved in the decision­
making process was limited in both countries, it made the 
consistency and resolution of the Canadian approach all the 
more effective against any British initiative. Compared with 
their Canadian counter-parts, British attitudes and policies 
suffered from inconsistency and ambivalence at times due 
largely to turnover in personnel.
A second factor which contributed to Britain's 
difficulties in keeping pace with change was the inability of 
crucial British Government departments to reach a consensus on 
directing imperial relations. The Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office were the two most crucial departments in 
directing the British response to imperial events. Relations
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between these two Offices were rarely cordial. In fact, more 
often than not, the two Offices had extremely strained 
relations which prevented reaching a consensus on imperial 
relations. A final factor was the lack of understanding which 
prevailed in Britain about the motives of such Dominions as 
Canada and precedent-setting changes occurring in imperial 
relations. These factors collectively hindered Britain in 
dealing effectively with challenges to imperial diplomatic 
unity. These factors also thwarted Britain in keeping pace 
with the changes. Thus, while many Dominions, such as Canada, 
accepted that imperial diplomatic unity was over in 1923, 
Britain did not accept these changes until 1926. The process, 
moreover, which finally led Britain to accept its new 
relations with its Dominions was a painful process. It was a 
process characterised by tensions, internal dissension, and 
illusions. This process offers an important perspective on 
understanding British-Canadian relations from 1919-1928.
Over the years, the study of British-Canadian relations 
has undergone several shifts in emphasis, mirroring trends in 
British imperial history. The first approach to studying 
these relations in the 1920s came from what might be termed 
the old imperial historians, such as A.B. Keith2, R.M. 
Dawson3, K. Hancock4 and M. Beloff5, who adhered to a 
constitutional interpretation. This constitutional approach 
not only set the pattern of interpretation, but established 
the belief that these events unfolded inevitably. A counter­
reaction to this approach in understanding the whole character 
of imperial relationships came from several quarters: 
historians such as R. Holland6 and I. Drummond7 emphasised 
examining imperial relations through economic relations, while
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other writers stressed issues assessing the imperial alliance 
through immigration. There were similar and equally 
significant developments among Canadian historians. Older and 
more traditional historians, such as C.P. Lucas and H. Innes, 
as with their imperial counterparts, viewed imperial relations 
in the context of constitutional frameworks and nation- 
building. In more recent decades the fashionable
preoccupations among scholars have centred in Canadian 
domestic history. Although this has given a broader scope to 
Canada's imperial ties, encompassing more matters than solely 
the constitutional issue, it has resulted in the study of 
British-Canadian relations with a Canadian domestic bias.
Two main assumptions underlay the shifts in emphasis 
among both imperial and Canadian historians in studying 
British-Canadian relations. First, the constitutional 
approach appeared too narrow in focus, and second, the 
constitutional interpretation had seemingly been exhaustively 
studied. While the former judgement is correct, the latter is 
not. Nowhere is this more aptly displayed than in P. Wigley's 
monograph, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth (1977)8. 
Utilising British documents, he introduced a new dimension 
which dispelled the theory that Whitehall's thinking on the 
break-up of imperial diplomatic unity was passive and 
homogeneous. He remained true, however, to the constitutional 
interpretation by viewing events through the eyes of the 
'victor', Canada.
In recent years, new interest in decolonisation has been 
growing among historians and some attention has been paid to 
examining the political and constitutional framework in which 
that process occurred. The present study should not therefore
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be viewed as a return to the traditional constitutional 
approach to British-Canadian relations because of its focus on 
the end of imperial diplomatic unity. The ability to draw 
heavily upon British sources, particularly under-utilised 
private papers, affords the opportunity to set the political 
and constitutional framework. British sources also permit the 
examination, hitherto largely ignored, of the British 
perspective and emphasis. This approach has also provided the 
opportunity to tackle some neglected issues such as the roles 
of Canadian High Commissioners and Governors General in the 
1920s. Collectively, these new British perspectives present 
an overlooked, but nonetheless crucial, dimension in 
understanding British-Canadian relations in the 1920s.
1. The collapse of the Lloyd George administration in 1922, 
brought Andrew Bonar Law to power. Ill health, however, 
unexpectedly forced Bonar Law to resign and he was succeeded 
by Stanley Baldwin in 1923. The general election in January 
1924 produced the first Labour government under the leadership 
of Ramsay MacDonald. This government last only ten months and 
in November, Baldwin returned to power where he remained until 
the general election of 1929 yielded another Labour minority 
government.
2. A.B. Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British 
Dominions. 1918-1931. Oxford, 1932.
3. R. M. Dawson, Constitutional Issues in Canada. 1900-1936. 
London, 1936.
--------- , The Development of Dominion Status. 1900-1936.
Oxford, 1936.
4. W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs; The 
Problems of Nationality. London, 1937.
5. M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset. I: Britain's Liberal Empire. 
1897-1921. London, 1969.
17
6. R.F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918- 
1939. London, 1981.
7. I. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire. 1919- 
1939. London, 1972.
8. P. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth. 
Cambridge, 1977.
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CHAPTER ONE
SETTING THE STAGE FOR CHANGE: 1900-1919
The devastation of World War One continued long after the 
signing of the Armistice in November, 1918. The cost in human 
lives and the horrific way this occurred left strong 
impressions upon the young generation for whom the price was 
so high. Just as a generation was almost entirely 
obliterated, so many institutions and symbols of pre-war 
society were either completely destroyed or changed beyond 
recognition. Many empires disappeared completely, while 
numerous new countries were founded and a new international 
power, the United States, emerged.
While the British Empire did not suffer the same fate as 
her former counterparts, she did not escape the war unscathed. 
The war and the contributions made by the Dominions - Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa - abruptly 
strengthened and focused their senses of identity as 
completely self-governing countries. Canada, for her part, 
questioned her relations with the Empire and with Britain, and 
the formulation method of imperial foreign policy more 
forcefully than the other Dominions. This imperial foreign 
policy was the last crucial formal link which held the Empire 
together. Throughout the 1920s, this policy was examined, re­
examined, redefined and eventually broken. The break-up of 
unified imperial policy in the late 1920s ended the formal 
imperial relationship. These developments set the stage for 
the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which ended the British
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Parliament's sovereignty over the Dominions, and began the 
commonwealth connection between Canada and Britain.
Anglo-Canadian Relations: 1900-1914
Divergence in Anglo-Canadian relations was evident at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, as the two countries moved 
in different directions in such crucial areas as economic and 
defence policies. The volume and value of imported goods from 
the United States into Canada had surpassed those of British 
goods as early as 1888. The American edge over British 
imports grew in subsequent years. On the eve of the First 
World War, a staggering difference in trade existed as goods 
from the United States comprised 65% of the Canadian domestic 
imports compared to only 21% imports from British goods.1
Canada's displeasure over her subordinate place to 
Britain in the Empire expressed itself mainly in defence 
policy in the pre-war days. In the first decade of the new 
century, Britain, in its relations with the Dominions, adopted 
a new approach of consultation. The Colonial Conferences, 
begun by Joseph Chamberlain in 1887, against the backdrop of 
Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee celebrations, were initially 
intended to be informal affairs. By the turn of the century, 
these conferences gathered more frequently and more formally 
as the British Government sought 'co-operation by 
Conference'2. The British tried to expand the role of the 
Dominions, through Conference and consultation, in part 
because the arms race with Germany was beginning to assume 
serious dimensions.
The financial strain of supporting the Royal Navy, whose 
responsibility it was to protect the entire Empire, was taking
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its toll on the British treasury. Increasingly, the Treasury 
and the Admiralty looked to the hitherto untapped resources of 
the Dominions to ease the financial burden. The
acknowledgement that cooperation from the Dominions was 
necessary for the continuance of British Naval supremacy 
strengthened Britain's relations with the Dominions. The 
search, between 1900 to 1914 for a new, unified defence policy 
between Canada and Britain in many respects foreshadowed the 
search for a unified imperial foreign policy, in the post-war 
era, especially in Anglo-Canadian relations. The British 
feared that Britain's strong international presence would be 
weakened unless the Dominions supported a unified defence 
policy. This realisation persuaded the British to adjust 
their relations with the Dominions by including consultation 
on defence policy. While the majority of the Dominions were 
content with these arrangements, Canada remained, at times, 
the solitary opponent, unwilling to be locked into a unified 
defence policy. Increasingly, the defence question assumed 
distinct political implications as Canada, under the 
leadership of the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, chose 
to exploit this consultative process as an excuse to lessen 
Canada's support for the Empire and further Canada's 
aspirations for independent status.3 Ultimately, it was 
Laurier's approach which prevailed because the efforts of the 
British resulted, not in increased unity, but in the break-up 
of imperial unity in defence matters.
The beginning of the end of unified defence policy 
started as early as the Colonial Conference of 1902. Lord 
Selborne, as First Lord of the Admiralty, tried to impress 
upon the delegates of the Colonial Conference of that year the
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need for a doctrine of naval strategy with unified control of 
naval forces. He also put forward the British case for 
financial assistance. His plea was sufficient to obtain 
pledges of support for the Royal Navy from the Cape Colony, 
Newfoundland, Australia and New Zealand. Conspicuously absent 
from the list of contributors was Canada, whose Prime Minister 
chose to avoid commitment by speaking vaguely about 
establishing a Canadian Navy.4 This isolated stance, so 
different from the other overseas leaders, became 
characteristic of Laurier in the pre-war naval arrangements.5
Far from being discouraged, British pressure for closer 
imperial links continued at the Colonial Conference of 1907. 
Here, several steps were taken to recognise the growing 
stature of the Dominions. Delegates agreed that all future 
conferences would bear the title 'imperial' instead of 
'colonial'. They also agreed that in future the chair would 
be assumed by the British Prime Minister, where previous 
conferences had been chaired by the Colonial Secretary. 
Finally, they agreed that the self-governing colonies would 
thereafter be addressed as Dominions, a title Canada had held 
since 1867. In addition, a new department, the Dominions 
Department, was created within the Colonial Office. 
Underlying these British concessions was the hope that they 
would expand imperial economic links, and more immediately 
lead to a stronger defence policy and greater financial 
commitment from all Dominions. While New Zealand and 
Australia had attended the conference hoping that further aid 
for Britain would be extracted from the other Dominions, 
Laurier was successful yet again in avoiding the issue.
It is tempting, in hindsight, to disregard the Colonial
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Conference of 1907 as lacking in substantial changes, or to 
interpret these changes as nothing more than cosmetic or at 
best 'minimal'6. The Committee of Imperial Defence (hereafter 
referred to as the C.I.D.) would support the assessment that 
no noticeable gains occurred. Established at the Colonial 
Conference of 1902, it was not until a decision of the 1907 
Conference that the Dominions could refer issues to the C.I.D. 
or indeed even have a representative summoned for a discussion 
of questions raised at a Dominion's request. The Dominions 
never availed themselves of this procedure. The C.I.D., 
despite its failure in practice, reflected a growing British 
consciousness that strengthened unity in imperial policy, in 
this instance defence, required the assistance of the 
Dominions. Britain gave concessions, primarily through 
increased recognition and consultation, to have cooperation 
from the Dominions.7 Unfortunately, when the Dominions' 
support was required in 1909 for imperial defence, British 
efforts made in the interest of unity proved futile.8
Naval rivalry between Germany and Britain produced a 
crisis early in 1909 when it appeared that Britain was falling 
behind Germany in the building of dreadnoughts. As the cries 
mounted within Britain for acceleration of the dreadnought- 
building program, the British Government turned to Dominion 
leaders at a special conference on defence. There, the 
Admiralty outlined two possible options to the Dominions. 
First, it suggested outright financial subsidy of the British 
Navy. Or, second, each Dominion could establish and support 
a fleet to police a designated sphere. For Canada that sphere 
would be the eastern pacific. In an emergency, these fleets 
would come together to be directed as one unit. Laurier
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rejected both schemes and chose instead to establish the 
Canadian Navy, of which he had spoken vaguely and half­
heartedly in previous years. In 1910 Laurier finally 
introduced the Naval Service Bill to establish a Canadian 
Navy. Laurier's decision to build a Canadian Navy was 
motivated mainly by a desire to avoid imperial commitment. If 
it was yet another evasion of a unified, British-based, 
defence policy, at least this time Laurier did not stand 
alone, since Australia also made the decision to create a navy 
of its own. Laurier's rejection of financial aid to the 
British Navy, deeply unpopular in many quarters in Canada, 
proved irreversible. Having defeated Laurier in the general 
election of 1911, Robert Borden and his new Conservative 
Government tried to make a financial contribution to the 
British naval effort through their Naval Bill of 1912. This 
bill, which committed Canada to funding the building of three 
battleships for the Royal Navy, had safe passage through the 
House of Commons, only to be defeated in the Liberal dominated 
Senate.9 Borden, although dissatisfied, let the matter rest 
and thereby solidified the growing consciousness of Canadian 
autonomy and numbered the days for a unified defence policy.
The failure of Borden's Naval Bill of 1912 provides a 
convenient point from which to reflect on British efforts for 
imperial unity and the impact of these efforts upon Anglo- 
Canadian relations. From 1902-12 a pattern of thinking and a 
pattern of interaction between Britain and Canada had begun to 
unfold. Moreover, variations of this pattern appears later in 
the struggle over a unified imperial diplomatic policy.
At each gathering of the overseas leaders during the 
1900s, Britain gave a little more to the Dominions in the
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realm of consultation and involvement in defence policy, while 
stressing the need for their financial support and the 
maintenance, above all, of unity in defence. These tactics 
proved fruitful, initially, since only Canada stood firm in 
its refusal to make financial commitments. Canada chose to 
exploit the British gestures intended to reinforce defence 
unity, as a means of asserting independence from the 
entanglements of imperial policy. Canada's hand, however, was 
forced in 1909 at the height of the Dreadnought crisis. 
Whereas Laurier had so far been able to avoid contributing to 
a British imperial defence policy and building a navy, this 
crisis forced him to create the Canadian Navy. Australia also 
chose to establish its own navy.
It is impossible not to find irony in British decisions 
which provided the means for the break-up of imperial defence. 
Yet, it is difficult to conceive of a more fruitful British 
approach. The sense of a new position in the Empire was 
developing in Canada and for Britain to have ignored this 
would have been disastrous. The British accepted that 
maintaining unity was their key consideration and their only 
hope of achieving unity was through concessions that 
acknowledged the new stature of Canada and other Dominions. 
This solution was a double-edged sword. In the short term, it 
did succeed in maintaining unity in defence. Proof came with 
the Dominions' immediate and unhesitating support at the 
outbreak of the First World War. Even Canada turned over her 
two naval vessels to the Royal Navy to be used as the British 
deemed most appropriate. Consequently, to international 
appearances, in World War One, the Empire was united and acted 
as the one force it had always been. In the long term,
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however, Britain's pre-war efforts did not produce unity in 
defence policy. What remains unclear, however, is how long it 
took before the British Government realised that its 
concessions of consultation had not sustained an imperial 
defence policy. Even if British ministers had immediately 
recognised a new relationship in defence, their confidence 
about the unity of the British Empire remained strong because 
diplomatic unity, the most vital link among the Dominions and 
Britain, was still firmly in the hands of the British Foreign 
Office. The Great War might have suggested that a co­
ordinated defence policy meant unity continued, but it also 
served to speed up the process which severed the last imperial 
link of unified foreign policy.
Imperial Conference of 1911
Sir Wilfrid Laurier attended his last Imperial Conference 
in the spring of 1911, a few months prior to the crushing 
electoral defeat of his government. It was appropriate that 
Laurier was able to enjoy at this conference, if only
symbolically, the progress imperial relations made during his
four terms as Prime Minister. Putting into practice for the 
first time the constitutional resolutions of the Colonial 
Conference of 1907, the Conference met at the Foreign Office 
rather than the Colonial Office. The main sittings were 
presided over by the British Prime Minister, while the
Colonial Secretary acted as a deputy.10
The Imperial Conference of 1911 produced little in the 
way of concrete or significant resolutions, but yielded much 
in the way of symbolic gestures. In these symbolic gestures 
lay the beginnings of a process which in time severed the most
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crucial imperial link: diplomatic unity. In a departure from 
usual practice, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, 
briefed the Dominion leaders on international affairs from the 
perspective of the Foreign Office. It was the first time that 
the Dominions had been brought into the diplomatic arena. 
Grey himself attributed this break from tradition to the 
establishment of separate naval squadrons in the Empire. If 
the Dominion forces and British forces were to act under one 
command then it was essential that a common foreign policy be 
maintained and this, in turn, required more consultation with 
the Dominions so that they 'could know, understand and 
approve. '11
Herbert Asquith, the British Prime Minister, playing to 
public opinion, chose to describe the Imperial Conference of 
1911 as one in which the 'dominions had been admitted into the 
innermost part of the imperial household'. Nevertheless, 
Asquith was firm that Dominion participation would, in 
practice, be strictly limited. He made it clear that the 
British Government would maintain control of foreign policy 
and would not be constrained in the formulation of it,12 A 
remarkable aspect of these pronouncements on foreign policy 
was that they evoked no outrage among the Dominion leaders, 
including Laurier, but were taken as acceptable statements.
Laurier's reluctance to breach imperial diplomatic unity 
was entirely consistent with his thoughts on Canada's imperial 
relations. He aimed to keep Canada out of imperial 
entanglements. Avoiding the web of consultation was a vital 
factor in fostering the cause of Canadian autonomy. British 
relief, that the current mode of formulating foreign policy 
had not been jeopardised, did not lessen discontent and even
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bitterness regarding Laurier's persistent and unrelentingly 
independent stance. Laurier was labelled at the Colonial 
Conference of 1907, by Sir Leander Starr Jameson, Prime 
Minister of Cape Colony, as that 'damned music-master [who] is 
likely to spoil the whole show'13. The sentiment strengthened 
with time. There must have been a degree of relief and of 
hope among his critics when Laurier was defeated by Robert 
Borden and the Conservatives in the general election of 1911.
Borden; a new force in the imperial setting
On 21 September 1911, Canadian voters rejected Laurier's 
bid for a fifth consecutive term as Prime Minister of Canada. 
The election remains one of the most crucial in Canadian 
political history. In 1910, Laurier's Government negotiated 
a reciprocity agreement with the United States which provided 
for free trade for a wide range of natural and manufactured 
products, although the bulk of the agreement concerned 
agricultural goods. The agreement was initially considered a 
coup by the Liberal Government. It was a surprise, therefore, 
when the election of 1911 developed into an unofficial 
referendum which rejected the agreement.14 The beneficiary 
of the Canadian voters' rejection of the free trade agreement 
was Robert Borden, leader of the Conservative party since 
1902. Borden's succession to Laurier ushered in a new phase 
in the development of Anglo-Canadian relations.
As Prime Minister, Borden readily accepted responsibility 
for external relations, which was fortuitous since his term in 
office coincided with a tremendous upheaval in Canada's 
external affairs. Not only did Borden preside over Canada's 
heavy involvement in the First World War, but he was also
28
party to the exhilarating and monumental changes which 
occurred in imperial relations during and just after the war. 
These changes included membership in the council directing the 
war through the Imperial War Cabinet; recognition of the need 
for and commitment to revising the constitutional relations 
between Britain and its Dominions; and, finally, recognition 
of the Dominions in the international arena by their signing 
of the Peace Treaties. Borden played a crucial role in 
redirecting imperial relations and, in doing so, reshaping 
Canada as a nation. It is fitting that one of his last 
accomplishments as Prime Minister was to gain consent from the 
British Government for Canada to place its own representative 
in Washington.
Borden's role has been overshadowed in the evolution of
constitutional relations between Canada and Britain.15
Governing the country between the ministries of Sir Wilfrid
Laurier and Mackenzie King, the two Prime Ministers who have
received most of the attention as progressive and
nationalistic16, Borden has been labelled as an imperialist
with minimal elements of nationalism.17 Even when Borden was
recognised as a determined nationalist, one historian regarded
his adoption of nationalist tendencies as a belated
development caused by being largely ignored by the British
during his visit in 1915. H.A. Wilson writes:
...In 1913, Borden received an enthusiastic 
reception in England. In 1915, he was 
treated with considerably less 
deference...his presence was not
particularly sought, and in many instances 
he was treated as an intruder. A growing 
sense of resentment, stemming from an 
injured pride and fostered by an attitude of 
supercilious indifference on the part of 
certain important English Officials 
concerning Canada's part in the war effort,
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led Borden to reappraise Canada's
relationship with Great Britain. From this 
period on, Borden became more national and 
less imperial in his outlook.18
This interpretation understates the strength of Borden's
nationalism and his role in modifying constitutional relations
with Britain, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs.
Borden started as an imperialist. His conversion to
nationalism came gradually. Initially, his fight against the
trade agreement with the United States represented a
reconfirmation of Canadian allegiance to imperial unity. This
fight, combined with his attempt to secure financial backing
for the Royal Navy in his Navy Bill of 1912, seemed to cast
Borden as an ardent imperialist, in direct contrast to
Laurier. This impression was incorrect. But as time showed,
Borden was equal to Laurier in his ardour as a nationalist,
albeit he possessed a different conception of nationalism. He
did not find it inconsistent that Canada's growth could occur
unhampered within the imperial context. He was convinced that
the only possible future direction for Anglo-Canadian
relations lay in enhanced consultation. This belief was
articulated as early as 1910, during the Naval Service debate,
when he was still Leader of the Opposition. In that debate,
he enunciated his opinion that defence policy and foreign
policy were interlocked and that consultation was required in
both.19 Indeed, of the two issues, Borden placed greater
emphasis on consultation in the field of foreign policy. It
was foreign policy that was to receive special attention from
Borden throughout his premiership.
Although consistent with the historical treatment he 
has received, it is unfortunate that even those historians20
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who acknowledge Borden's successes in forwarding Canada's 
position in foreign affairs have given little time to 
exploring the factors which yielded these achievements. 
Borden's approach to imperial affairs differed sharply from 
Laurier's and King's approaches. Laurier advanced the 
nationalistic cause by procrastination and evasiveness which 
allowed Canada to avoid strengthening its imperial commitment. 
King, who succeeded Laurier as Leader of the Liberal Party in 
1919 and became Prime Minister in 1921, proved a political 
disciple by employing similar tactics. In contrast, however, 
Borden chose to work within the imperial structure. Moreover, 
unlike Laurier, King and his immediate successor in office, 
Arthur Meighen, Borden enjoyed good relations with British 
politicians and officials, both on public and personal levels. 
These ties were such that even after his retirement from 
office Borden maintained a higher volume of personal 
correspondence with British politicians than King did in the 
same period, even though he was by then Prime Minister. These 
solid British contacts were an asset in Borden's exploitation 
of the imperial system to secure agreements and resolutions 
which increased Canada's constitutional status. His strong 
British ties, although reinforced by his frequent presence in 
London during the war years, were established before the 
outbreak of war.
As has already been mentioned, the election of 1911 must 
have brought relief to the British Government that Laurier and 
his assault against imperial unity were replaced by a man of 
apparently strong imperial leanings. An intimation of this 
appeared in a letter written by Rudyard Kipling, the author, 
poet and cousin of Stanley Baldwin, the future Prime Minister,
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to Lord Milner:
Yesterday I was at Sir Max Aitken's 
place sitting in the sunshine while 
telegrams of the results of the Canadian 
elections were handed to me on a lordly 
dish. It's some few years - 7 or 8 - I 
think - since I have been happy, and knowing 
that you also must have rejoiced a little,
I write to you, to remind you
a) that this busts the Laurier-Botha 
liaison in what are called our Imperial 
councils
b) that it sickens Bryce [the British 
Ambassador at Washington] which is always a 
work acceptable to God
c) that Fisher of Australia will now have 
leisure to modify his views on the limited 
ability of Colonies within the Empire, 
because Borden will explicitly repudiate 
Laurier's pronouncement on that subject
d) Australia will be deprived of Big 
Sister's example as an excuse for nibbling 
after American "protection" on her own 
behalf
e) I do believe this smashes the French 
power for good...
f) It is the making of a new Canada 
because the United States will now . .. say 
rude things and that will stiffen Canada's 
national back...
...Seriously don't you think it's the best 
thing that's happened to us in ten years?
I was so resigned to defeat that I didn't
realise what victory meant... anyway it 
should give us five years of breathing space 
and one can do three-quarters of anything in 
that time.21
British optimism that Canada was now being guided safely 
back to the imperial fold was further buoyed by Borden's visit 
to Britain in 1912. The Canadian Prime Minister was warmly 
received and quickly taken into confidence during lengthy 
meetings with Asquith and high-ranking Cabinet ministers, 
including Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. 
Naval matters, which were the focus of discussions during
Borden's stay, made a decided impact on the Canadian Prime
Minister. Nowhere in his government's throne speech in 
November 1911 had there been mention of the naval issue, and
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yet upon his return to Canada his government prepared and 
presented the Naval Aid Bill to the Parliament. As discussed 
earlier, this measure would have provided financial aid to the 
British Royal Navy by financing the building of three 
battleships. It was defeated in the Senate, after some of the 
most bitter debates in both the Senate and the House of 
Commons in Canadian parliamentary history.22
One historian has argued that the defeat of the Naval 
Service Bill caused additional damage to Canada's imperial 
reputation and tarnished Borden's image in Britain.23 
Certainly, the popularity of his imperial policies varied. 
Britain rarely appreciated Borden's determination in 
protecting the interests of Canada, and there was even a note 
of relief among Colonial Office staff when Arthur Meighen, not 
nearly as forthright in imperial matters, succeeded Borden in 
office.24 But Borden's personal popularity in British 
circles, unlike his policies, remained undiminished during his 
Premiership and persisted after his death.25
Borden was regarded not merely as the Dominion leader 
with whom it was agreeable to do business, but also as a 
colleague by British politicians. At a much later date, Sir 
Edward Grigg*, prompted by the problems of the Second World 
War and leadership which were beleaguering Winston Churchill 
in 1941, reflected upon the leadership of the British Empire 
during the First World War. Grigg ranked Borden as one of the 
essential leaders in the British Empire's war effort:
Sir Edward Grigg was Assistant Adjutant General at the 
War Office 1919; Military Secretary to the Prince of Wales on 
his Canadian and Australian tours 1919 and 1920; and, Private 
Secretary to Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George 1921-22.
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I have had the experience of the burden of 
leadership in war, and I cannot forget how 
much I owed to the intimate advice and 
criticism of colleagues like Lord Milner,
Lord Balfour, Field-Marshall Smuts, Sir 
Robert Borden, Lord Carson [? writing 
illegible] and Mr. Bonar Law. These men had 
has as complete a knowledge of all the facts 
as I had myself. They had no administrative 
cases to distract them from the central 
problem on which decisions were required.
They also knew their minds and could hold 
their own against counter-argument and 
eloquence. That War Cabinet was the key to 
the success of our war effort from 1916 to 
1918.26
The politicians, among whom Grigg ranked Borden, also 
respected Borden's capabilities. Balfour, the former British 
Prime Minister, 1902-1905, and Foreign Secretary, 1916-19, 
considered Borden a potential candidate for the British 
Ambassadorship in Washington, at the conclusion of the war. 
Borden was the only non-British person to be placed on this 
list.27 Other indications can be found of the high regard in 
which Borden was held, including a recommendation that Borden 
be consulted in the selecting of Balfour's successor at the 
Foreign Office;28 the possibility that Borden be invited to 
British Cabinet meetings when the United States was being 
discussed;29 and talk of trying to raise funds in Britain to 
assist Borden's re-election campaign in 1917.30 Clearly 
Borden's skills were appreciated.
Yet this does not mean that British politicians viewed 
him as having been co-opted into their system at the expense 
of his loyalties to Canada. It was acknowledged, even then, 
that the reason Borden stood apart from other Dominion leaders 
was his ability to work within the imperial context without 
sacrificing the interests of his country. Lord Milner, the 
Colonial Secretary, wrote to the Duke of Devonshire, the then
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Governor General of Canada, from the Peace Conference:
...Borden is very useful here. He is the 
only one of the Dominion Prime Ministers, 
who, without ceasing to be a good Canadian, 
is capable of taking the wider view and 
whose judgement and influence are really 
useful on Imperial and International 
questions.
He is not a showy man, but he is a man 
of weight. Not provincial, as most of the 
Dominion Ministers still, almost invariably 
are. And he is perfectly straight.31
The balance which Borden maintained in working within the
imperial context without jeopardising Canada's emergence as a
nation appears to border on the impossible. How was it that
he secured so much with a position which, in hindsight,
appears to be marred with inconsistencies and
incompatibilities? The basis of his policy - that a nation's
growth is not stifled by being brought into closer imperial
links - remains implausible. Yet, almost inconceivably, he
increased recognition of Canada's stature during his
Premiership. One reason for this no doubt was that he himself
saw the two concepts as completely compatible. In 1922,
Borden wrote of the imperial vision that he held throughout
his career:
...I have never wavered in the firm and 
constant belief that, within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, Canada will find 
her most commanding influence, her widest 
usefulness, and her highest destiny. With 
that opinion is coupled a fixed and absolute 
conviction that the unity of the Empire 
alone finds its expression in complete 
autonomy and in equality of nationhood. A 
strong Canadian national spirit is entirely 
consistent with a firm purpose to maintain 
our country in a high place with the British 
Commonwealth.32
Underlying Borden's view, however, was the conviction that 
full consultation, particularly in foreign policy, was 
essential. It was this opinion which guided Borden in his
35
imperial relations from the beginning of his term as Prime 
Minister of Canada. It was, moreover, this steadfast 
adherence to the opinion that Canada must be consulted, which 
made him a pivotal person in the evolution of Anglo-Canadian 
relations in the realm of imperial foreign policy.
The intermediate years: 1912-1916
The role of Canada in the formulation of foreign affairs 
held great significance for Borden from his early days in 
office. Borden showed his interest by making himself Minister 
of External Affairs.33 Although the department had been 
established in 1909, in the early years the department was 
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. Officials 
in the department favoured being placed directly under the 
Prime Minister and in 1912 Borden agreed to this reallocation 
of jurisdiction. From 1912 until 1946, therefore, beginning 
with Borden and ending with King, the Canadian Prime Minister 
was also the Minister of External Affairs.
Initially, Borden's own interest in foreign affairs was 
born out of naval defence policy. He viewed naval policy and 
foreign affairs as inseparable, and therefore Canada's naval 
commitment could not be increased without consultation on 
foreign matters. Quickly, however, his attention shifted 
towards securing consultation in foreign policy. In the years 
just prior to the war, he had had no success in securing a 
stronger voice for Canada, chiefly because his position was 
weakened by an inability to make a financial contribution to 
the Royal Navy. Borden's attempts focused on the C.I.D., but 
his vision that this forum could be developed for improved 
consultation received little support in Britain and none among
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the other Dominions. When British officials reminded the 
Dominions that ministerial representation in the C.I.D. was 
welcomed, none came forward. Borden stood alone in desiring 
to use the C.I.D. for improved consultation. Strangely, after 
all his efforts, only twice, in the years of 1913 and 1914, 
did Canada send a representative to a meeting of the C.I.D., 
and at neither meeting was there a matter related to Canada 
discussed.34 On the eve of war, Anglo-Canadian relations 
therefore remained in 'a highly unresolved state'.35
While Borden had failed to secure a Canadian voice in 
imperial foreign policy, he did, in the pre-war years, make an 
appointment in the Department of External Affairs which would 
prove significant in the evolution imperial foreign policy. 
In 1913, he appointed Loring Christie as legal adviser to the 
Department of External Affairs. Christie came to the 
department with an unusual view of Canada. He was a man who 
had spent most of his adult life in the United States. He 
attended Harvard Law School from which he graduated in the top 
three of his class. Unable to secure a post at a law firm in 
Toronto, he worked for a year in New York and then moved to 
the United States Department of Justice. A friend in the 
British Embassy, when he learned that Christie was 
contemplating naturalization in the United States, intervened 
and asked Borden to locate a post for Christie in a law firm, 
either in Montreal or Toronto. The Prime Minister interviewed 
him and at once hired him as the Legal Adviser to the 
Department of External Affairs. Christie was third in command 
at the tiny department where he oversaw administrative and 
financial affairs. Christie quickly superseded Sir Joseph 
Pope, the Under-Secretary, as the most influential member of
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the department.36 Christie shared Borden's conviction that 
Canada deserved a voice in imperial affairs. A man who has 
been described as an 'intellectual in public life'37, Christie 
helped Borden to think through issues and respond in a fashion 
which kept him true to his vision of Canada in the imperial 
setting. Christie's skills became essential during the 
imperial upheaval in the aftermath of the First World War.
The impact of war on imperial relations
When war broke out in 1914, Canada, and indeed all the 
Dominions, came to the immediate assistance of Great Britain. 
The British Empire looked strong and united. The years of 
dissension over defence policy were forgotten in the theatre 
of war, as even Canada virtually wrote Britain a blank cheque 
in its war commitment. This initial enthusiasm was replaced, 
within a matter of months, by frustration. Borden was angered 
that Canada was expected to contribute men and supplies, and 
yet to have no say in the conduct of the war. Even more 
insulting was the fact that Britain gave Canada no 
information. As costs mounted so did Borden's frustration, 
until he was finally provoked to visit Britain in the spring 
of 1915 in an attempt to gain information and a voice in the 
determination of the war strategy. His six weeks' visit, 
however, did little to put matters right. Despite a series of 
meetings with various politicians and officials, Borden still 
lacked relevant information on the war effort, although he was 
pleased with what he believed to be a frank interview with 
David Lloyd George, the Minister of Munitions. But it is 
doubtful whether Lloyd George was full and honest in his 
comments, and in the end Borden returned home with the same
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questions unanswered.38
The second year of the war did not reduce the isolation 
felt in Ottawa. The bitterness felt by the Canadian 
Government was further exacerbated by the behaviour of Andrew 
Bonar Law, the Colonial Secretary. Despite pleas for 
information, presented mainly through George Perley, Canada's 
acting High Commissioner in London, Bonar Law was obstructive. 
A degree of silence from British governing circles was due in 
part to the immense difficulties facing the Asquith 
administration. Asquith's power eroded as he, and the other 
Liberals in his coalition, failed to foresee the needs of 
total warfare. By 1916, Asquith's shortcomings as a wartime 
leader drew serious attacks.39 By 1916 it became clear that 
Asquith was inadequate as a war-time leader. It was not until 
the final weeks of the year, however, that a political 
struggle brought down the Asquith ministry and replaced it 
with a coalition headed by Lloyd George. This marked the 
beginning of new directions in the conduct of the war, but 
also relevant for this story, new directions in imperial 
foreign policy and imperial relationships.
Calling to council: Llovd George and new directions
The early days of the new administration were marked by 
a whirlwind of change. In a drastic step to achieve order and 
decisive action, Lloyd George reduced the British cabinet to 
a handful of men**. Excluded from this inner circle was 
Walter Long, the new Colonial Secretary. Long pleaded with 
Lloyd George that his exclusion would cause 'irreparable
The cabinet contained five members: Lloyd George,
Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Arthur Henderson and Bonar Law.
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damage' to Dominion relations. The Prime Minister assured the 
Colonial Secretary that he realised the Dominions must be 
further involved in the planning of the war and was intending 
to make a statement along these lines. This statement came on 
19 December 1916 in a dramatic announcement that the Dominions 
were finally to be called to council in the first official 
Imperial Conference since 1911. This gathering took on an 
added dimension when agreement was reached that there would be 
a series of sessions between Dominion leaders and the British 
Cabinet, to discuss matters arising out of the war. The name 
'Imperial War Cabinet' was given to these sessions. The 
establishment of this body was an unexpected but significant 
advancement for the Dominions. The Imperial War Cabinet was 
to work in conjunction with the Imperial War Conference and 
provide a forum for the Dominion leaders to discuss other 
matters, apart from the war, chiefly, constitutional issues.
The calling of an Imperial War Cabinet and Imperial War 
Conference pleased Dominions leaders, especially Borden. This 
action appeared directly to refute claims, most notably 
Asquith's in 1911, that foreign policy must remain exclusively 
in the hands of Britain. Lloyd George received generous 
accolades for these concessions designed to provide the 
Dominions with closer involvement in foreign policy. His 
concessions, referred to as 'novel' and 'imaginative', 
intimates that Lloyd George was not only conscious of the 
Dominions' contributions to the war but anxious to grant them 
the recognition which Asquith denied them. One historian 
applauded Lloyd George's repudiation of his predecessor's 
exclusionary policy towards the Dominions' war contribution:
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Lloyd George, in one bold and imaginative 
stroke, not only repudiated such a policy 
but created the machinery through which the 
dominions might achieve the sharing of 
authority in the conduct of foreign
policy.4
Lloyd George explained his reasons in his memoirs. He called
the Dominions to council because he favoured constitutional
advancement for them. 'During the four years of war they [the
Dominions] all had their full share of the hard fighting and
privations...They had all won their right, long before 1917,
to an honoured seat at the War Council of the Empire.'41
Lloyd George has long been an enigma in British political
history. His public image was different from his private
image. To all intents and purposes, Lloyd George appeared to
be interested in the welfare of the Dominions, but this
interest is betrayed by his ignorance of the Dominions as seen
in his description of their constitutional status in 1914:
[in 1914] each of these Dominions was
completely independent of any direction or 
control from Downing Street ...Their 
decision in August, 1914 to throw their 
resources of men and material on the side of 
Britain was as much their own as that of the 
United States of America in April, 1917.42
His statement is incorrect. In 1914 the Dominions had no
control over foreign policy or participation in the
declaration of war. At the outbreak of the First World War
Britain retained the exclusive power to commit the Empire to
war and did so. Just as Lloyd George's knowledge of imperial
affairs was lacking, so too was his real commitment to
constitutional advancement. This lack of commitment the
Dominion leaders did not realise until the post-war years. As
with so many aspects of Lloyd George's actions, the decisive
motives which spurred him to grant these first concessions to
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the Dominions in 1916-1919 may never be fully understood.*** 
Whether committed or not to improving the stature of the 
Dominions, Lloyd George's calling of an Imperial War 
Conference and an Imperial War Cabinet marked the beginning of 
the end for a unified imperial policy.
It was the Imperial War Cabinet that was a Pandora's box 
for the British. Using the word 'cabinet' in the title was 
inappropriate, as this gathering of ministers and delegates 
from various Dominions was neither responsible to one single 
Parliament nor elected by one single group of electorates. As 
it evolved, each Dominion had several representatives at the 
meetings****, whose work was limited since the occasions were 
used primarily as opportunities to relay information to the 
Dominions on specific aspects of the war effort. Although the 
Dominion representatives were given access to Foreign Office 
material, direction of the war rested almost exclusively with 
the five-man British War Cabinet. Even with these 
limitations, in the post-war era the operation of the Imperial 
War Cabinet came to be regarded as the finest hour of imperial 
cooperation and unity. Repeated attempts were made, 
particularly on the British side, to re-create this atmosphere 
and to introduce a mechanism for consultation which followed 
closely the machinery utilised in the Imperial War Cabinet. 
This was an unrealistic pursuit primarily because of the
It has been suggested that Lord Milner, who had long­
standing interests in imperial matters, played a key role in 
persuading the Prime Minister. Vladimir Halperin, Lord Milner 
and the Empire. London, 1952, p.159.
Representing Canada in 1917 were Borden, Sir George
Perley, acting Canadian High Commissioner in London, Robert
Rogers, Minister of Public Works and J.D. Hazen, Minister of
Marine and Fisheries and of Naval Services.
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question of responsibility. If a variation of the Imperial 
War Cabinet was to provide a mechanism for improved
consultation in foreign policy, then it had to be determined
to whom the Imperial War Cabinet was responsible. Resolving 
this riddle became even more complex as the sense of 
independence in Canada, and to a lesser degree in the other 
Dominions, flourished in the 1920s.43
The Imperial War Cabinet was not a viable method of
consultation in peacetime. It did, in wartime, however, allow 
the Dominions to participate in foreign policy through
consultation. This opportunity, although limited, awakened in 
them a new sense of their role in the imperial setting. This 
consciousness was reflected in Resolution IX of the Imperial 
War Conference of 1917 when it was agreed:
The Imperial War Conference are of 
opinion that the readjustment of the 
constitutional relations of the component 
parts of the Empire is too important and 
intricate a subject to be dealt with during 
the War, and that it should form the subject 
of a special Imperial Conference to be 
summoned as soon as possible after the 
cession of hostilities.
They deem it their duty, however, to 
place on record their view that any such 
readjustment, while thoroughly preserving 
all existing powers of self-government and 
complete control of domestic affairs, should 
be based upon a full recognition of the 
Dominions as autonomous nations of an 
Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an 
important portion of the same, should 
recognise the right of the Dominions and 
India to an adequate voice in foreign policy 
and in foreign relations, and should provide 
effective arrangements for, continuous 
consultation in all important matters of 
Imperial concern, and for such necessary 
concerted action, founded on consultation as 
the several Governments may determine.44
The resolution's aspirations to hold a special conference and
maintain continuous consultation in foreign policy were never
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realised. The resolution, while it failed to bring change, 
serves as a marker for the growing divergence in the approach 
of Britain and the various Dominions to changes in imperial 
relations to 1917. The progress that the Dominions believed 
they made in securing a voice in foreign policy was reversed 
in the aftermath of the war. While Canada chose to define an 
'adequate voice' in one fashion, the British chose to define 
it in another manner. The misunderstanding each side had of 
the other's definition increased the conflict in Anglo- 
Canadian relations in the years after 1917.
Versailles: international recognition
There were three pivotal events which convinced Borden 
that Canada and the other Dominions had received an adequate 
voice in imperial foreign policy and appropriate recognition 
in the international arena. The first was the establishment 
of the Imperial War Cabinet, the second was Resolution IX of 
the Imperial War Conference of 1917. It was, however, 
Canada's role in the Peace Conference and resulting treaties 
that satisfied Borden that Canada had finally been given 
adequate international status.
In October 1918, Borden wrote to Lloyd George arguing 
that Canada had a right to participate in the Paris Peace 
Conference. The British Prime Minister agreed and took the 
demand, for two representatives from each Dominion and India, 
to Britain's leading five allies*****. Woodrow Wilson, 
President of the United States, at first took great exception 
to this demand: an indication that he saw the British Empire
The big five allies were: Great Britain, the United 
States, Italy, France and Japan.
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as one entity. He tried to argue that the Dominions were 
eligible for no more than one representative. Lloyd George, 
breaking with his previous course of action in foreign 
matters, refused any commitment until consulting his Dominion 
leaders. Eventually, Canada, Australia, and South Africa 
received two representatives, while New Zealand and India each 
had one representative.45 In the global setting, Dominion 
participation in the peace conference had little impact except 
on various commissions. The large issues, such as the 
settlement with Germany, were resolved almost exclusively by 
the major allies. This lack of input did not appear to 
trouble Borden as his priorities were rooted in the imperial 
setting, and from this perspective, the Paris Peace Conference 
was a great success. The mark of Canada's new stature had 
been confirmed by participation in the formulation of imperial 
policy as a member of the British Empire Delegation. This 
delegation, an extension in structure to the Imperial War 
Cabinet, placed Canada in a position to be consulted and kept 
informed of all the developments at the Conference. It was 
Canada's signature on the Treaty of Versailles that satisfied 
Borden and Loring Christie that Canada's international 
recognition had arrived and with it a new partnership with 
Britain in imperial foreign policy.
It remains highly doubtful that the British drew the same 
conclusion from the events as Borden.46 Certainly, there was 
a shared sense that the structure of the British Empire 
Delegation was both successful and entirely appropriate. It 
was, in the immediately succeeding years, the model that the 
British held up as the best solution for consultation in 
foreign affairs and one they attempted to revert to even when
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it had become outdated. The major divergence of opinion came 
regarding the meaning of Canada's individual signature, and 
indeed those of the other Dominions, on the peace treaty. 
Were the signatures the establishment of a new precedent in 
imperial foreign affairs? Did they confirm that a new 
partnership had been struck? From the Canadian perspective, 
the answer to both was an unqualified yes. From Britain, the 
response was a qualified yes.
The legalities surrounding the Dominions' signatures on 
the treaty remained ambiguous. While Borden signed 'for 
Canada', it was after the signatures of plenipotentiaries from 
the United Kingdom who signed for the whole of the British 
Empire.47 Arguably, the Dominions' signatures held only 
symbolic value, and even that symbolic value was questionable. 
How much recognition did it give the Dominions, particularly 
internationally? Or, as a more immediate concern, how far did 
it bind Britain to the Dominions in future international 
dealings? As the years immediately after the war show, the 
battles supposedly won by the Dominions in foreign affairs had 
to be fought again, with Canada taking the lead. The struggle 
would become such that, at times, the gains made by the 
Imperial War Cabinet and the Paris Peace Conference seemed 
more mirage than reality. Yet there remained one solid 
example of Canada's gains and that was the League of Nations, 
to which Canada gained immediate membership because of her 
signature on the peace treaty. Canada's role in the League of 
Nations during the 1920s, however, was limited and contributed 
little to Canada's fight concerning imperial diplomatic unity. 
At the end of the First World War, therefore, imperial 
relations remained in an ambivalent state.
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CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE CAUSE BACK: 1919-1922
The restoration of peace left Canada and other Dominions 
with high expectations for further constitutional developments 
in their relationship with Britain. The participation granted 
to Dominions in foreign affairs, as in the case of the 
Imperial War Cabinet, Resolution IX of the Imperial War 
Conference of 1917 and Dominion signatures on the peace 
treaty, pointed to even higher levels of participation and 
consultation. These high anticipations were bolstered by the 
continuation of the Lloyd George coalition, which had done so 
much to further Dominion status in the latter years of the 
war. The reality was that these years, 1919-1922, failed to 
secure major advances in the methods of consultation in 
foreign affairs. The failure is striking not only because it 
came on the heels of the remarkable progress made in the war 
years, but also because, in retrospect, the chance for 
imperial unity in foreign policy, as envisioned particularly 
in British circles, clearly reached its apogee in these years. 
These were years of lost opportunity for those keen to 
maintain close imperial unity.
Canada, who had taken the lead so often before in 
challenging the imperial relationship in matters of foreign 
affairs, and would later lead the attack, exhibited her most 
co-operative mood in agreeing to arrangements for cooperation 
which would lock her into imperial unity. Canada's first two 
Prime Ministers in these years, Robert Borden and Arthur 
Meighen, would have agreed, each in his own way, to closer 
imperial unity in foreign policy, with proper attentions to
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consultation. The British failed to capitalise on these 
favourable circumstances and it was not lack of opportunity 
that was to blame. Some writers argue that the close 
consultation required to resolve issues of the day disappeared 
with the dispersal of the Imperial War Cabinet and that the 
restoration of peace removed the urgency to settle the issue. 
This explanation overlooks the fact that in the first four 
years of peace, the Lloyd George coalition handled numerous 
issues, such as the Imperial Conference of 1921, the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance, the Washington Conference, separate 
Canadian representation at Washington and, finally, the Chanak 
Crisis, all of which afforded the occasion for discussion and 
development of the channels for consultation. There were 
various causes of failure, from the interests and the 
personalities of participants, such as Lloyd George, Lord 
Curzon, Lord Milner and Winston Churchill, to shortcomings in 
the Colonial, Foreign and the Cabinet Offices. It is the 
combination of these elements which explains the 
misunderstanding and dissension between Britain and Canada in 
matters of imperial foreign policy. These factors also 
clarify why these became the years of lost opportunity.
Lord Milner in the Colonial Office
The cabinet position of Colonial Secretary never enjoyed 
the same status or power as the posts of Foreign Secretary and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. The lack of prestige and the 
exigencies of party politics often meant that the post was 
filled by men who possessed little interest or knowledge of 
imperial matters. Colonial Secretaries were frequently, 
respected elder statesmen whose political stars had faded. It
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was in light of this practice that the appointment of Lord 
Milner as Colonial Secretary, in January 1919, seemed yet 
another positive indication of Lloyd George's commitment to 
resolving the difficulties surrounding imperial foreign 
policy. Milner's appointment evoked enthusiasm among those, 
both in Britain and overseas, who held imperial interests high 
among their priorities. Not since Joseph Chamberlain had held 
the post had there been comparable confidence that the man 
directing the Colonial Office possessed the necessary interest 
and qualifications.1
The respect which Milner commanded was sincerely felt and 
had been earned as the result of his direct participation in 
imperial matters for most of his adult life. Moreover, his 
appointment as Colonial Secretary represented not only 
personal achievement, but also a triumph for that school of 
imperial thought which found expression in such groups as the 
Round Table Movement. It is difficult not to speak of Milner 
and the Round Table Movement in the same breath. Although the 
Round Table Movement's members were much younger than Milner, 
he was their mentor. Many of the key participants in the 
movement in Britain had, as young men, served under Milner 
when he was High Commissioner for South Africa, 1897-1905. 
His imperial interests and convictions shaped the outlook of 
the majority of these young men, who saw the Empire as an 
under-utilised political force in the continuation of world 
peace. In order to fulfil the Empire's potential as a world 
pace-setter, the Movement placed high among its aims the need 
to maintain and strengthen Britain's imperial unity. The 
Movement actively cultivated members throughout the Empire and 
had a particularly strong organisation in Canada. Its
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objectives included the establishment of a centralised body, 
such as an Imperial Parliament. The aspirations of the group 
appeared to be coming to fruition with imperial cooperation 
displayed during the war and in the peace settlement, and 
certainly with the placement of Milner in the Colonial Office. 
The Movement, however, faltered fatally in the new conditions 
of the 1920s.
The prevailing belief both in British and Canadian 
Governments in the post-war era was that the best hope for 
world peace rested in a partnership between the United States 
and the British Empire. The realities of increased 
nationalism in certain senior dominions, particularly Canada, 
and the emergence of the United States in the world arena, 
made it clear that the British Empire, even if imperial unity 
could be secured, could not alone guarantee world peace. This 
inescapable reality proved a blow to the efforts of the Round 
Table Movement and left its aspirations outdated. Even its 
source of inspiration, Lord Milner, shifted away from the 
Movement in the post-war era as he perceived new solutions to 
the problem of unity. Although the Movement lingered on 
through the 1920s, it was only a negligible force.2
Like Lloyd George, Lord Milner's background made him to 
a large degree an outsider in British political circles. Born 
in Cologne to British parents, his early years were marked by 
a strong German influence, which in later years political foes 
would trot out occasionally against him. Of his first sixteen 
years, he spent only six, from the age of six to twelve, in 
Britain. It was not until the death of his mother that he 
returned to Britain and resumed his education there by 
securing a place at King's College, London. His background
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was neither one of great affluence nor high social 
connections. His success was based purely upon his
intellectual prowess, which was outstanding, and this prowess 
guided him on scholarship to Balliol College, Oxford, where 
his career was brilliant and his awards so numerous that it is 
almost easier to list what he did not win than what he did.3 
His presence and success at Balliol was the turning point in 
Milner's life and opened to him doors of opportunity from 
which, by his circumstances of birth, he would otherwise have 
been excluded. As Milner himself was to state it, 'Balliol 
made me, Balliol fed me.'4
Although Milner was linked with a college which educated 
many of Britain's influential political leaders, his path to 
public life was remarkably convoluted. After failed attempts 
in academia, journalism, law and a bid for a seat in the House 
of Commons, Milner found his niche when he accepted the post 
as Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Lord Goschen, in 1887. The appointment marked the 
beginning of Milner's highly successful public life. From 
there he moved to service in Egypt, then to Chairman of the 
Board of Inland Revenue, from which he resigned to become High 
Commissioner for South Africa during the troubled years, 1897- 
1905, which included the Boer War. He took a long sabbatical 
from public office from 1905 until 1916. His peerage received 
in 1901 enabled Milner to accept a non-elected membership of 
the War Cabinet in 1916.
During his absence from public life, 1905-16, Milner 
maintained a high profile in imperial matters and was an 
ardent supporter of Joseph Chamberlain and his bid for tariff 
reform. Although because of his background Milner was more
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associated with South Africa, he did possess a number of 
links with Canada, and had undertaken an extensive speaking 
tour of Canada in 1912. If his Canadian network and travels 
paled in comparison to those of L.S. Amery, his Under­
secretary in the Colonial Office, they did set him apart from 
the majority of other influential Britons and explain in part 
why he regarded Canada as justified in demanding increased 
status.
Milner's imperial philosophy was marked by an early
recognition of the growing nationalism in the Dominions which
would challenge imperial unity, particularly in the field of
foreign affairs. An even more unique aspect of his imperial
vision was his belief that Britain's only option for resolving
the threat to imperial unity was to enter into 'absolute
equality by partnership' with the Dominions.5 This concept
of imperial relations he had fostered, according to his own
recollections, since his Oxford undergraduate days6, forty-
five years earlier:
In that vision it [the British Empire] 
appeared no longer as a number of infant or 
dependent communities revolving round this 
ancient kingdom but as a world-encircling 
group of related nations, some of them 
destined in time even to outgrow the mother 
country, united on a basis of equality and 
partnership, and united at least mainly by 
moral and spiritual bonds.7
In the summer of 1916, shortly before the collapse of the 
Asquith coalition which brought Milner back into public life, 
the future Colonial Secretary addressed a group of 
representatives from British and Dominion parliaments on the 
present and future direction of imperial relations. His 
speech contained two themes. First, he criticised the manner 
in which the war was being conducted and the lack of an
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adequate voice for the Dominions. Milner used these
criticisms, however, to develop his second theme concerning
the more general course that the British Empire would have to
take if it were to continue as a unified institution. He
stated that the phrase 'self-governing' was a misnomer when
applied to the Dominions, and would remain so as long as
foreign matters, and war and peace remained outside their
control. He also found fault with Britain's assessment of
imperial relations: he said he thought they were blind to the
sentiment actually growing in the Dominions. 'Very
gradually,' explained Milner,
very temperately, but with increasing 
frequency and insistence, the leading 
statesmen of the Dominions have begun 
calling attention to the anomalies of the 
position, and warning us that things cannot 
go on indefinitely as they are, and that if 
the Dominions are going to accept - as they 
are most willing to do, indeed as they are 
actually doing - a substantial share in the 
burden of the Empire, they are entitled and 
they will expect to share also in the 
supreme direction of the Empire's destinies.
Looking ahead, he gave little hope to a peace negotiated
without consultation with the Dominions. His greatest
concern, however, focused on events after the peace
settlement: 'there is, I am sure, even greater cause for
uneasiness, and indeed alarm, if after Peace we are going to
revert to the system by which Imperial policy is left entirely
in the hands of a Government which is responsible only to the
people of these islands.'8 This philosophy, whose ambition
surpassed most of his colleagues, Milner carried with him into
the Colonial Office in 1919.
While his vision remained consistent, from 1916 to 1919
his means of realising it changed. In 1916, reflecting the
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same line of thought as the Round Table Movement, he advocated 
an Imperial Cabinet, filled with representatives from Britain 
and the Dominions which, as the executive of an Imperial 
Parliament, itself an assembly of representatives of 
constituencies throughout the Empire, would supersede the 
British Cabinet in directing imperial matters, primarily those 
of foreign policy. Pleased with the apparent success of the 
consultation achieved within the structure of the British 
Empire Delegation (B.E.D.), Milner advocated by 1919 the 
method of consultation employed with the B.E.D. as the 
appropriate machinery.9
With such clearly defined imperial ideas, there were 
anticipations both in Britain and in the Dominions that 
Milner, as Colonial Secretary, would effect change and bring 
about an equal partnership among Britain and the Dominions. 
As events unfolded, however, nothing particularly 
distinguished Milner's term as Colonial Secretary from those 
of his predecessors. He possessed more skills and interest 
than most of his predecessors to act constructively, and yet 
he failed to do so.
Despite his failure, some studies10 of Milner have been 
generously forgiving, citing the exigencies which removed him 
physically from the Colonial Office and from the Britain. 
Certainly no other Colonial Secretary in the 1920s had such 
external demands placed on him. In his two years in office, 
he was first removed from the daily operations of the 
department because of the peace negotiations in Paris. Then 
from December 1919 to April 1920, and again from November 1920 
until early January 1921, Milner had to turn over the daily 
running of the department to his Under-Secretary, Amery, as he
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was sent on mission to Egypt. Another consideration of equal 
validity is that Milner, by this stage lacked the necessary 
energy to devote to the post.11 Milner would have agreed that 
he was overextended and exhausted. At the time of his 
retirement from the Colonial Office, and indeed from public 
life, he observed: 'With all the odd jobs I have had to do, in 
addition to my regular work, I do not feel that I have done 
justice to the Colonial Office. Indeed, I think that I have 
but little to my credit, in my latest capacity...'12 By 1921, 
feeling the strain, he wrote: 'I am a tired man and unable to 
tackle fresh work with the same zest formerly, a change will 
be to the public advantage. '13
Underlying most of the sympathy given to Milner, which is 
justified by the extenuating circumstances of Milner's term, 
is the belief that had the circumstances been more favourable, 
Milner would have worked harder to transform his advocacy of 
equal partnership within the Empire into actual practice. 
Such an assumption is questionable, as Milner did create a 
sufficiently commanding presence within the Colonial Office, 
and this suggests that his practice of imperial policy fell 
short of what he espoused.
Beginning his term as Colonial Secretary, Milner held the 
preservation of imperial unity as his highest priority. His 
ambitions for securing imperial unity were low-key as dictated 
by the post-war atmosphere. Milner explained to L.S. Amery, 
his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, that Britain faced 'a bad 
re-action in constructive Imperial politics, but if we can 
weather the next year or two without letting everything that 
was achieved during the war go absolutely to pieces, it should 
be possible to rebuild on the foundations then laid.'14 In
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his absence, Milner granted Amery a broad latitude of 
discretion in the conduct of daily business. He did not, 
however, allow Amery's boundless energy and enthusiasm to run 
unchecked. Amery was constantly conceiving schemes to 
increase consultation with the Dominions. Milner stopped all 
such initiatives in the early stages.15 One example, which 
persisted throughout Milner's tenure, was Amery's keenness to 
mount the constitutional conference promised in Resolution IX 
of the Imperial War Conference of 1917.16 In this matter, as 
with Amery's other initiatives, Milner held to the position 
that the initiative rested with the Dominions and therefore 
the Colonial Office should pursue the issue only when 
requested to do so by the Dominions.17
It is questionable how effective Milner's passive stance 
was even in securing his goal of maintaining the new 
Dominions' status achieved in the war and peace negotiations. 
Against the Canadian political environment, Milner's approach 
succeeded only in furthering the cause of the those wishing 
complete self-government. Since the conclusion of the peace 
negotiations, the leadership of the Canadian Government had 
been in a state of flux. Borden remained Prime Minister 
virtually in name alone, as persistent ill health forced 
extended leaves and the daily running of affairs fell to 
others. Borden submitted his resignation in late 1919, but 
retracted it when it became apparent that the coalition 
government would fall under any other leader. Finally, in 
mid-1920, Borden's second resignation stood and Arthur Meighen 
succeeded him as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime 
Minister. Meighen's term was plagued with difficulties as the 
wartime coalition government slowly disintegrated. Even if
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Meighen had not been totally preoccupied by domestic problems, 
he would not have initiated much change in consultation in 
foreign matters. Imperial questions, such as the conduct of 
foreign policy, held little interest for Meighen as he found 
little to question in the imperial relationship. From his 
vantage point, the present status of imperial affairs was more 
than acceptable.18 Between Meighen's complacency and Milner's 
view that the initiative rested with the Dominions, Canada was 
not the menace that it would have been if Borden's ill health 
had not constrained him. As will be seen, it was Borden's 
determination which achieved the decisive concession of 
Canada's right to have a Canadian representative in 
Washington. Apart from this effort, Canada brought no 
significant pressure to bear upon the British Government which 
might have secured substantial changes in the imperial 
relationship. This diminished Canadian presence allowed many 
in Whitehall to ignore the evolution which was imperceptibly 
occurring in the realm of imperial foreign affairs.
It is unrealistic to lay the blame for Canadian inaction 
on Milner, as this clearly did not fall within his 
jurisdiction. But within the realm of British practice, 
Milner failed to maintain the status achieved by the Dominions 
during the war years. To be fair to Milner, he did attempt to 
redefine the duties of the Colonial Office as agreed at the 
1918 Imperial War Cabinet. The reforms, primarily an 
administrative matter, reflected the evolving relationship. 
In 1918, the Dominion premiers were given direct telegraphic 
access to the British Prime Minister. The Dominion leaders 
explicitly made this request, because they wished to restrict 
the authority which the Colonial Office might exercise in
61
their affairs. If the reforms bore witness to the evolution 
of the imperial relationship, then their implementation on the 
British side revealed how little attention was being given to 
the changes. While the cables were now sent directly to Lloyd 
George, they were still decoded in the Colonial Office, and 
responses were usually prepared in that department. This 
practice was encouraged by Milner's predecessor in the 
Colonial Office, Walter Long. Tackling this issue of 
communication was one of Milner's first tasks as Colonial 
Secretary.19
Milner recognised that Lloyd George gave little attention 
to imperial matters, let alone to the contents of these 
telegrams, and so he approached the only man he believed was 
concerned, Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet.20 Milner 
argued that under the agreement of 1918 on communication, it 
was the jurisdiction of the Cabinet Office, not the Colonial 
Office, to be handling these communications. He did not mind 
the Colonial Office being consulted, so long as the Cabinet 
Office accepted responsibility. Although the matter remained 
in abeyance from November 1919 until January 1920, while 
Milner was in Egypt, the Colonial Secretary did meet with a 
degree of success in early January when the Australian Prime 
Minister, W.M. Hughes, requested and obtained a cipher 
separate from the Colonial Office. Canada, for her part, 
continued under the Colonial Office cipher. Milner, also, met 
with success in the small issue of circulating Cabinet papers 
to the Dominions. He forced the task upon the Cabinet Office, 
instead of reducing the Colonial Office to a postal service. 
But even in this matter, it was more of a fine detail, because
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the task of selecting the appropriate papers for circulation 
fell to the Colonial Office staff.21
These administrative reforms were practically all that 
Milner accomplished in implementing changes in the imperial 
relationship. Perhaps if he had had better circumstances, 
more might have been achieved. But even in what he did 
achieve, a line of thinking can be discerned. Milner still 
saw the future of a unified Empire in the form of an equal 
partnership, which could be attained only through increased 
communication between the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office, 
the Dominions and, in time, the Foreign Office.22 
Conspicuously absent from his list of the players was the 
Colonial Office. From the beginning of his term in that 
department, Milner, instead of fighting to protect the status 
of the Colonial Office, appeared to do things to undermine its 
significance in Britain's dealings with the Dominions.23 His 
reasoning may have been that the Cabinet Office, and even the 
Foreign Office, would be forced to deal more and more directly 
with the Dominions in the absence of the Colonial Office, thus 
forging a working partnership. If these were his intentions, 
they fell short of fulfilment and his judgement remains 
questionable. Milner, in his many comments24, made it clear 
he understood that the British had little interest in the 
relationship with the Dominions, but was this the way to raise 
it? Was it wise to have the Colonial Office, the sole 
official voice fighting for the Dominions, step back in the 
hope that in the Colonial Office's void either the Cabinet 
Office, the Prime Minister or the Foreign Office would come 
forward?
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Curzon and the Foreign Office
If it was Milner's intention that the Foreign Office 
would take a stronger lead in consulting the Dominions, then 
he wrongly gauged the prevailing attitudes in that department. 
Under the forceful and unbending leadership of Lord Curzon, 
the Foreign Office showed no major change to reflect the 
supposedly increased role of the Dominions in the formulation 
of policy.
Curzon assumed the post of Foreign Secretary about the 
same time that Milner went to the Colonial Office. Aside from 
the closeness of their ages - Milner was five years older - 
the two men held little in common, either with respect to 
temperament, career paths or imperial vision. From an 
aristocratic background, Curzon decided upon a political 
career while still at Balliol College, and was elected to the 
House of Commons in 1886 where he remained until 1898. During 
his time as a Member of Parliament, he served as a 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary first in the India Office and 
later in the Foreign Office. In 1898, at the breathtakingly 
early age of forty, Curzon became Viceroy of India. His fast- 
rising star faltered in 1905, when he resigned as Viceroy 
under a cloud of political controversy. He returned to 
governing circles in 1915 as Lord Privy Seal, and continued to 
hold numerous positions, including a place in Lloyd George's 
War Cabinet. His succession to Lord Balfour as Foreign 
Secretary in 1919 seemed to be the completion of his 
resurrection from political ashes and reestablished him as a 
man on the move. In any event, Curzon survived successive 
governments and remained as Foreign Secretary until 1924. It 
was the highest office he attained as he was passed over in
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favour of Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister in 1923. His 
career was one that touched but never grasped greatness or, as 
Hankey was to write at the time of Curzon's death, he was 
'second class. Not quite first class.'25
One liability which took its toll on Curzon's career was 
his temperament. Some historians note that by the 1920s, he 
was a political relic who clung to a political mode better 
suited to the Victorian age. 'His intellectual mastery, 
eloquence, argumentative skill and fine draftsmanship, his 
sense of his own importance and that of his country, his 
calculated arrogance, the aristocratic geniality which he 
mistook for tact - these were the qualities, almost indeed a 
caricature of the qualities, of the superior Victorian 
person.'26 These attributes meant that Curzon, unlike Milner, 
did not have an easy manner with people; in fact he was often 
difficult, inconsiderate and at times cruel, particularly to 
his own staff. Although Curzon frequently complained that he 
was over-worked and under-appreciated, he brought these 
difficulties largely on himself as he trusted his staff little 
and insisted upon dealing personally with the bulk of official 
papers. This behaviour took its toll on the Foreign Office 
and contributed to the low morale which developed at this 
time. Other factors included the increased rivalry with the 
Treasury for stature in Cabinet, but more significant was 
Lloyd George's tendency after 1918 to pass over the Foreign 
Office and to direct foreign policy himself. Surprisingly, 
Curzon accepted this implicit demotion, and he did not come 
into conflict with the Prime Minister over matters of 
substance until the Near East crisis in 1922.27
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While Curzon may thus have had little impact on the 
direction of major issues in foreign affairs, he did exercise 
influence in the handling and directing of Dominion 
participation in the formulation of foreign affairs. This 
came to him primarily because of Lloyd George's lack of 
interest in Britain's relations with the Dominions. Despite 
this involvement, the policy generated from the Foreign Office 
during the Curzon era was neither consistent nor particularly 
coherent.
The Foreign Office was torn internally on its approach to 
the involvement that the Dominions were to take in the post­
war era. One factor which hindered attempts to determine a 
new role for the Dominions in foreign affairs was the 
continued belief, which reached into the highest circles, that 
despite all the changes during the war, the execution of 
foreign policy remained the exclusive domain of the British 
Foreign Office. In 1921, E.A. Crowe, the Permanent Under­
secretary at the Foreign Office, wrote: 'For the present, the 
foreign relations of the Empire are still conducted by HMG.'28 
Behind the outward appearances that business continued as 
usual, there existed a feeling, shared by many including 
Curzon, that some change to this relationship would be 
appropriate. Curzon, however, was not prepared to instigate 
any action to this end. He, like Milner and like Churchill 
later, believed that such initiative rested with the 
Dominions.
Curzon's policy that the Dominions must initiate change 
was certainly evident in his dealings with Canada on two 
separate occasions in 1920 and 1921. In both of these 
instances, Curzon hid behind the statement that the impetus
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for change rested with Canada. Curzon used these tactics in 
1920 when the United States Government introduced a United 
States Merchant Marine Bill. The bill's intent was to cut the 
C.P.R. (Canadian Pacific Railway) out of the United States 
coastal trade by requiring such trade to be carried by 
American ships. The Foreign Office, while fully conscious of 
the serious implications of this bill for Canada, decided that 
it was Canada's obligation to initiate any action in response. 
It registered a degree of surprise when the Canadian 
Government did not act on the issue.29
The Foreign Secretary's determination that Canada launch 
changes was fortified in March 1921. A proposed visit by 
Canadian warships to ports in the United States raised the 
question in Britain of who should inform the United States. 
The Admiralty suggested that Canada should contact the United 
States Government. This recommendation disturbed both Curzon 
and Crowe. It went against traditional practice. The two men 
were upset further that this breach was suggested, not by 
Canada, but by the Admiralty. While neither ruled out the 
possibility of changes in practice, both Curzon and Crowe 
believed Canada should instigate them.30 This view was 
supported by Churchill at the Colonial Office who concurred 
with 'Lord Curzon that the present practice should be followed 
and that the initiative, as regards any change of practice, 
should rest with the Dominion Government.'31
The Foreign Office's belief that the responsibility 
rested with Canada to protect her interests was not a new 
theory. Curzon, in failing to contact Canada, revealed an 
unwillingness to acknowledge a partnership or even an 
obligation to protect Canada's interests. This stance, as
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shown in the above instances, highlighted the fragility of the 
Dominions' status. Advances made in the Dominions' status, in 
the war and during the peace negotiations, would only be 
sustained through the Dominions' own vigilance. It fell to 
each Dominion to guard its respective interests, but without 
the powers to do so. Curzon was content to assume that the 
usual practice of foreign policy, where it rested exclusively 
in the hands of the Foreign Office for the entire Empire, 
would be continued until shown otherwise.
The Cabinet Office and the Colonial Office made attempts 
to convince the Foreign Office that changes had occurred in 
the realm of imperial foreign affairs. In 1921, Hankey, in 
the Cabinet Office, suggested restarting the practice of 
sending weekly confidential papers to the Dominions through 
the Cabinet Office. He wished to include interviews with 
Ambassadors, as had been agreed to by Curzon at the Imperial 
Conference of 1921. When this request reached the Foreign 
Office, a junior official went further to recommend that all 
Foreign Office printed papers be sent to the Dominions. Crowe 
immediately stepped in and, having consulted with Curzon, 
quickly vetoed the suggestion and agreed to forward only the 
interviews with Ambassadors.32
The Colonial Office was equally unsuccessful in effecting 
any significant changes in the formulation of foreign policy. 
Chief among its reasons for this failure was the poor, and 
sometimes hostile, rapport between the Colonial and Foreign 
Offices. As mentioned earlier, Milner believed that Britain's 
relationship with the Dominions was becoming one of equal 
partnership, so that now their affairs should be dealt with 
through the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office33.
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Unfortunately, Milner had not succeeded in conveying to the 
Foreign Office that the involvement of the Colonial Office 
would be curtailed and that the Foreign Office should occupy 
this void. This new approach was never fully understood by 
the Foreign Office and gave rise to much ill-feeling between 
the two offices. Since nothing had been stated to the 
contrary, the Foreign Office regarded it as the duty of the 
Colonial Office to keep the Dominions informed and to organise 
any Dominion action. By this arrangement, the Foreign Office 
was obliged merely to transmit to the Colonial Office relevant 
material. Under this cloud of misunderstanding, the Foreign 
Office frequently complained that the Colonial Office was 
failing in its duty, and used this apparent ineptness as an 
excuse to resolve matters without input from the Dominions.34 
Relations did not improve with the arrival of Winston 
Churchill as Milner's successor in the Colonial Office. 
Although Churchill intended that his department should
maintain a pivotal role in relations with the Dominions, the
Foreign Office continued to complain of 'no support' from and 
the 'inefficiency of' the Colonial Office.35 The excuses,
whether of sound basis or not, provided the Foreign Office
with a reason to formulate policy without consulting the 
Dominions. The need for quick decisions made it impossible to 
endure the delays that resulted from the consultative process.
The Colonial Office attempted to encourage discussion of 
imperial foreign policy by circulating in March 1921 a lengthy 
memorandum entitled 'A Common Imperial Policy In Foreign 
Affairs'. The chief value of the document is the insight it 
offers into the understanding among the Colonial Office staff 
of the Dominions' new status. Beginning with an historical
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examination of events since the war years, the document 
concluded that the peace negotiations and the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles were constitutional landmarks in the 
development of the Empire, as the Dominions staked their 
claims in the formulation of imperial foreign policy. The 
document conceded that while in theory it had been established 
that the Dominions must be consulted, the practice had 
reverted to the situation where general control had 'almost 
entirely relapsed into the hands of the United Kingdom.' 
Careful not to single out any one department or group for 
blame, these circumstances were attributed to the break-up of 
the British Empire Delegation and the preoccupation of every 
government involved with the task of reconstruction. This 
document found it regrettable, but again without laying blame, 
that 'In more than one instance critical situations have 
arisen with the greatest suddenness and have called for 
decisions of the most far-reaching character, in circumstances 
in which effective consultation with the Dominions was 
impossible./36
The memorandum's underlying theme was the importance of 
maintaining imperial unity. 'The conclusions to be drawn 
therefore from the recent constitutional developments are not 
that unity of policy has become less necessary, but only that 
the more complete the equality of status the less tolerable, 
constitutionally, is a state of affairs in which one member of 
the group should exercise control over a policy which may 
involve in the most vital interests and even the existence of 
the others.' The Colonial Office was optimistic that imperial 
unity could be sustained. Blocks of unity remained on which 
to build. After all, the Treaty of Versailles, which showed
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the individual Dominion signatures under the main heading of 
the British Empire, suggested this continuance of unity. 
Moreover, separate Dominion membership in the League of 
Nations did not render the concept of unity incompatible, even 
if the Dominions and Britain voted in conflicting positions in 
the Assembly; the real power rested in the Council and so long 
as the British representative advocated a common imperial 
policy, then all would be well. A degree of confidence was 
expressed that even if another Dominion was elected to the 
Council - which, given the jealousy of other nations towards 
allowing the British Empire more than one vote on the Council, 
was unlikely - unity could be maintained by having both 
represent a common policy.37
Apart from a discussion on maintaining a unified voice in 
the League of Nations, the memorandum failed to recommend any 
machinery of consultation for achieving an integrated policy. 
It dismissed the structure of the British Empire Delegation as 
unrealistic since it would at best mean an occasional 
gathering, perhaps once a year, and it would not provide quick 
consultations when crises in foreign affairs occurred. The 
memorandum spoke vaguely of a standing Imperial Committee on 
Foreign Affairs with authorised Dominion representatives, but 
conceded that the Dominions would probably not be co­
operative. It concluded by suggesting that the solution might 
entail having permanent ministerial representatives in London 
whose task it would be to keep their home governments informed 
and who would be empowered to convey their views and aims. 
None of the schemes was explored in any depth nor was it even 
indicated which office - the Colonial, Foreign or Cabinet 
Offices - should take the lead in resolving the matter.38 The
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lack of solid recommendations left Foreign Office officials 
with the opportunity, of which they availed themselves, to 
avoid tackling the issue. 'It discusses', wrote Crowe of the 
memorandum, 'in a vague manner the difficulties inherent in 
the problem of setting up machinery for participation by the 
Dominions in the conduct of our Foreign relations. It does 
not pretend to offer any solution, and is quite anodyne.'39
Curzon and Crowe may have been relieved that the Colonial 
Office's memorandum was sufficiently vague that no response 
had to be mustered, but they would have agreed with the 
overall theme that the vital task was to maintain imperial 
unity, or, from the Foreign Office's perspective, sustain the 
appearance of imperial unity.40 In the new international 
order established in the aftermath of the war, the Foreign 
Office needed the strong voice of speaking not only for 
Britain and her dependencies, but also for Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa and India.
The Great War had eroded the British Empire's power in 
international affairs. Admittedly, Germany no longer rivalled 
Britain, but new challenges emerged to Britain's world status. 
The United States had a formidable international presence 
financially, militarily and politically, which Britain could 
not ignore in these circumstances. Whitehall was conscious of 
the strength given to the British voice in foreign affairs 
when the Foreign Secretary spoke not only for Britain but for 
the Empire as well. The Dominions provided a significant 
buttress against the growing international influence of the 
United States. The Foreign Office, keen to protect the 
invaluable commodity of imperial unity, chose not to conceive 
innovative ways of broadening consultation, but continued to
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conduct the foreign policy for all the Empire and to wait 
until forced to give way on a particular point by a Dominion.
This approach was successful in the years immediately 
after the war, because normally assertive Dominions, such as 
Canada, were preoccupied with domestic issues and gave little 
attention to international affairs.41 This changed, however, 
when renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance became an issue 
and Canada, together with other Dominions, had not only an 
interest but wanted a voice in the matter. Dissensions over 
renewal of the alliance dominated the Imperial Conference of 
1921, chaired by the new Colonial Secretary, Churchill.
Churchill in the Colonial Office .
Milner groomed Amery as his successor, but Lloyd George 
chose to appoint Winston Churchill as his next Colonial 
Secretary. The passing over of Amery was not politically 
surprising, since in 1919, Milner had had to employ a strong 
hand to fight Lloyd George's opposition to Amery's appointment 
as his Under-Secretary.42 Amery's departure from the Colonial 
Office, when he shifted to the Admiralty as a Parliamentary 
and Financial Secretary in April 1921, silenced a voice which 
had taken an interest in the Dominions and their 
constitutional relationship with Britain. Although his 
protege was not appointed, Milner was generous enough to 
credit Churchill with being 'very keen, able & broad minded.' 
Milner's major concern was that the new Colonial Secretary was 
'too apt to make up his mind without sufficient knowledge.'43
Churchill's appointment to the Colonial Office marked a 
full political circle for him. It was in this office that he 
had begun his ministerial career in 1905, as Under-Secretary
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of State. Despite this previous experience, he was not 
interested in the Dominions. His term as Colonial Secretary 
contained many of the same features as the tenure of Milner. 
The most striking similarity was that Churchill's attention 
was diverted from the daily function of the office as he 
became preoccupied with problems first in the Middle East and 
later in Ireland. The difference between the two men was that 
Milner had not sought to avoid the daily running of the 
office, as the missions to Egypt were imposed upon him, 
whereas Churchill assumed the post intending to concentrate 
most of his attention on the Middle East question. His 
involvement in the Middle East 'entanglement' and bringing the 
mandated territories under the Colonial Office were the terms 
that he set for accepting the post.44
Aside from these external distractions, the differences 
between the two men outweigh similarities when their tenures 
are contrasted. In political terms, Churchill's appointment 
was a gain for the Colonial Office, since one of Milner's 
traits, which operated to the detriment of the department, was 
his disdain for the rough and tumble of politics.45 This 
stance had disadvantaged him and the Colonial Office in 
dealings with Lloyd George, a man who thrived on the political 
game. Indeed, it could be argued that Lloyd George
preferred the playing of politics to the advancement of policy 
through politicking. The appointment of Churchill not only 
gave the Colonial Office a chief who played the sport of 
politics well, but one who, unlike Milner, enjoyed a healthy 
rapport with Lloyd George and who appeared to be in the inner 
circle of Lloyd George's administration. Nevertheless, the 
political skill and edge that Churchill brought to the
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Colonial Office did not prove beneficial to the Dominions. 
Unlike Milner, he had no progressive vision as to the future 
direction he wished British-Dominion relations to take. 
Churchill's lack of interest in the Dominions frequently meant 
that he failed to give even minimal attention to the conduct 
of their business. Without even knowing the dates of his 
missions to Egypt, Milner's absence is evident to a reader of 
the correspondence of the Colonial Office with the Dominions. 
Invariably, Milner initialled each item and more frequently 
than not he added his own comment. During Churchill's term it 
is difficult to find his initial on most documents concerning 
the Dominions, let alone to gauge through these documents his 
comings and going.46 For all his indifference to Dominion 
relations, Churchill did possess a concept of imperial 
relations which was far more traditional than progressive in 
character, and in many respects he ignored the advances 
supposedly secured during and just after the war. The fact 
that he gave little attention to the imperial relation may 
have been an asset for the Dominions, because his involvement 
would have probably set back, not advanced, their status. 
Contrary to the approach of his predecessor, Churchill opposed 
any reduction of the Colonial Office's involvement in 
relations between the Dominions and the British Government, as 
was shown when the issue of communication arose.
Just prior to the Imperial Conference of 1921, Churchill 
heard that General Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa, 
might submit a proposal that Dominions affairs be removed from 
the Colonial Office and placed directly under the jurisdiction 
of the Prime Minister. While it is highly likely that Milner 
would have supported this scheme, which conformed with his
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attitude, Churchill was strongly opposed. He wrote to Lloyd
George, and argued his case:
I do not think that this would be a good 
plan...My advice is (a) that correspondence 
on important matters between the Prime 
Ministers of the Dominions and the British 
Prime Minister should continue to be direct, 
the Colonial Secretary advising the Prime 
Minister as required; (b) that routine work 
should be discharged as at present by the 
existing staff in their present premises;
(c) that the name of the Colonial Office 
should be changed to some other title which 
avoids the word Colonies. I should be quite 
agreeable to "Overseas Affairs", or as 
suggested by Chamberlain "Dominions beyond 
the Seas".
It is interesting that while Churchill desired to retain the 
actual decision-making process, he was willing to support 
outward trappings that suggested a higher recognition of the 
Dominions. Churchill disclaimed all personal interest in the 
matter. 'In putting this view before you', he wrote to Lloyd 
George explanation, 'I am having regard solely to what I 
believe to be the best and most practicable arrangement at the 
present time, and not at all to the personal feelings of the 
temporary occupant of a particular post in Government.'47
Churchill's opinions on imperial relations were never 
discussed outside Whitehall, and it was not until the Chanak 
Crisis of 1922 that his views were conveyed to the Dominions. 
Until then the Canadian Government held Churchill in fairly 
high regard. Even Peter Larkin, the new Canadian High
Commissioner in London, who later proved his sensitivity to 
any British politician or official who clung to the 
traditional imperial views of Canada, found his first meeting 
with Churchill a pleasant one. Writing to his Prime Minister, 
Mackenzie King, in April 1922, he noted that the Colonial 
Secretary 'expressed himself most kindly...[and his] whole
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demeanour was most pleasant and sympathetic. /48 This 
favourable initial impression did not survive the Chanak 
Crisis, but it did survive the clash over the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
During the Imperial Conference of 1921, the first to be 
held since 1918, although not the promised constitutional 
conference, the Dominions' role in imperial foreign policy 
became the focus of the conference. The Dominions' role was 
not an issue of theory, but rather an issue of actual practice 
as the controversy regarding the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance grew. This military alliance between Japan and 
Britain began in 1902 in response to Russian expansion in the 
Far East. The emergence of the German threat in 1904 
increased the alliance's importance. Freed of anxiety about 
Russia in the Far East, Britain concentrated on the German 
threat. The alliance was redrafted and renewed in 1905. The 
new terms provided aid to either party in the event of an 
unprovoked aggression by a third party. Japan's potential 
enemy increasingly became China and the United States. 
Britain negotiated new terms for the alliance when it was 
renewed in 1911 because of its concern that it could be 
embroiled in a conflict between Japan and the United States. 
The alliance of 1911 stated that neither party would be 
obliged to go to war with a power with whom a treaty of 
arbitration was in force. Britain signed such a treaty with 
the United States in 1914. The alliance of 1911 remained in 
force until 1921 when once again the need to renew arose.
77
The international scene of 1921 differed from the 
international scenes which shaped previous alliances. The 
original reasons for the alliance disappeared in the post-war 
era. The German and Russian threats were gone. Britain 
weighed the advantages and disadvantages of renewal. Strong 
British advantages existed in renewing the alliance. The 
possibility existed that the Russian and German threats could 
re-emerge. If no alliance continued, then Japan might fall 
prey to Russo-German advances. The British Empire also faced 
military vulnerability in the Far East if Japan was not curbed 
by an alliance. Britain's main consideration involved Japan's 
potential anger. Japan had been a loyal and powerful ally 
throughout the alliance and Japan wanted the alliance renewed. 
American hostility presented the greatest threat to the 
alliance's renewal. Since 1900, the American-Japanese rivalry 
in the Far East increased steadily especially over China. 
British renewal of the alliance would place the British- 
American friendship in jeopardy. Britain faced a choice 
between potential Japanese hostility and its friendship with 
the United States.49 It was the potential alienation of the 
United States, if the alliance was renewed, which caused 
dissenting voices within the British Empire. The strongest 
protests came from Canadian circles.
Initially, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance appeared, because 
of the dissensions among the Dominions and Britain, to 
challenge imperial unity and force the British Government to 
consult with the Dominions. Certainly, this is what appears to 
have happened at first, when the Canadian Prime Minister, 
Arthur Meighen, arrived to fight against any alliance which 
excluded the United States. He returned home assuming he had
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reversed the thinking of the Foreign Office and ensured the 
participation of the United States. When the appropriate 
government documents50 were released many years later, this 
assumption was shown to be incorrect since the Foreign Office 
reversed its decision, not so much because of Meighen's 
representations, but because of the realisation that the 
United States Government was annoyed by the alliance and 
objected strongly to its exclusion from discussions on renewal 
of the alliance. Many British officials, including the 
Foreign Office, changed their views primarily because they 
could not afford to alienate their American allies.51
A new light is cast upon the Imperial Conference of 1921 
through understanding why the Foreign Office changed its mind 
regarding the United States Government and efforts to renew 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The truth behind the Foreign 
Office's transformation of opinion undermines any suggestion 
that Canada, or any other Dominion, had a noteworthy impact 
upon the formulation of imperial foreign policy. The issue of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance highlights the continuation of the 
practice of foreign policy being conducted solely by the 
Foreign Office. The lack of Dominion impact, especially in 
this instance the dissenting voice of Canada because of her 
crucial American relations, and most strikingly the failure of 
Canada to realise that the failure to renew the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance was not a testament to how much her relationship with 
Britain had developed, but an example of how little it had 
changed. The return of Meighen to Canada with the notion that 
he had effected a change in imperial foreign policy erected 
yet another barrier of misunderstanding between Canada and 
Britain in foreign policy.
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The determination of the Canadian Government that the 
United States should not be alienated in this matter caused 
the new Canadian Prime Minister, Arthur Meighen, to assume the 
unnatural role of agitator. Until the issue of the alliance 
arose, Meighen had maintained a low profile on the imperial 
scene. When he arrived in Britain for the Imperial Conference 
of 1921, he remained an unfamiliar quantity for the British 
and indeed remains a relatively obscure figure in Canadian and 
imperial political history. Part of his relative obscurity, 
certainly in the imperial arena, arose from his short term in 
office. He succeeded Borden as Conservative leader and Prime 
Minister in 1920, but his tenure lasted just over a year. His 
brief term was occupied primarily with domestic problems, not 
the least of which was trying to hold together a coalition 
government created by Borden during the war and sustained 
mainly by Borden's personality. Borden, writing to the 
British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
assessed his successor as 'a man of brilliant parts, still in 
the prime of his life, endowed with a strong constitution and 
great capacity for work. He is a powerful debater and 
possesses great courage and strong convictions.'52 Meighen's 
difficulty was that although he possessed all the right 
qualities, something went wrong when they came together, and 
he never excelled as a political leader.
There is no indication that British politicians realised 
Meighen's shortcomings. In British governmental circles, he 
remained an elusive figure with an unclear political agenda. 
The Duke of Devonshire, Governor General of Canada, reported 
to the Colonial Office on one of Meighen's first speeches as 
Prime Minister that instead of making a 'reasonably definite
80
declaration as to the policy of his new Government', he 
eulogised the late government.53 Meighen, for his part, 
made few pronouncements on imperial relations, but when he did 
he betrayed a 'limited personal commitment to the new system 
of external relations with which Borden's name was 
associated.'54 Initially, what little the Colonial Office did 
know about Meighen's imperial agenda seemed no reason for 
concern. Relief primarily prevailed as Meighen appeared 
content with the present imperial structure. In November 
1920, in Toronto, Meighen delivered a speech which touched on 
his imperial views. A copy of the speech was forwarded by 
Devonshire and although no comments were recorded in the 
Colonial Office, one official highlighted the following 
passage:
Our place [said Meighen] in the family of 
nations is what at the present moment we 
want it to be. It suits the measure of our 
development as a British Dominion. It meets 
the aspirations of all who love the Empire 
of which we are a part and see in it the 
world's best hope. That means it accords 
with the desire of an overwhelming majority 
of the Canadian people. We have the right 
of a full-stature nation within the British 
Empire, and that is the best lot I know of.
We have a distinct voice in the League of 
Nations comporting with our individuality as 
a nation and our importance as a 
country... Our share in the relations of the 
British Empire to the rest of the world and 
our responsibility as such will be as time 
goes on more and more clearly recognized and 
defined.55
It is against this outlook that Meighen's actions in the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance are so infused with meaning because, 
strong as his imperial links were, he was not willing to 
jeopardise Canadian-American relations.
Britain's decision to consult with the Dominions on 
renewing the alliance was hailed by the British press as an
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example of the new imperial relationship whereby the British 
Government would act only after discussions with the 
Dominions. One editorial praised arrangements when now, 'For 
the first time the Empire in conference will be called upon to 
decide the foreign policy of the Empire as a whole./56 To 
outward appearances, the consciousness that a decision over 
foreign policy had to be made in partnership with the 
Dominions seemed to have been realised in British governmental 
circles. An internal Foreign Office committee on the alliance 
affirmed in January 1921 the obligation to consult the 
Dominions before a final decision was reached.57 Other 
documents of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office also 
provide evidence of this new component of consultation, but 
equally apparent is how little impact Dominion opinion had for 
most of the time.
The uncertain degree of Dominion impact was highlighted 
by Canada's strong opposition to renewal of the alliance 
because of the potential ramifications for Canada's relations 
with the United States. This stance was enunciated by Canada 
early in the months leading up to the Imperial Conference of 
1921. In mid-February 1921, Meighen wrote to Lloyd George 
requesting an alternative to renewal in order to promote good 
relations with the United States. The Canadian Prime Minister 
also proposed that Borden be sent to Washington to solicit 
views of the American President and his Secretary of State.58 
The suggestion reflected the Canadian view that Canada could 
act effectively as a mediator. Initially, Churchill and the 
Colonial Office had no objection to such a mission by Borden 
and went so far as to prepare the draft response to Canada 
accepting the offer.59 Before it could be sent, Churchill met
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with Lloyd George and Curzon at 10 Downing Street. The 
outcome of the meeting was a firm rejection on the grounds 
that Britain could not permit any action which might limit the 
options of the British Cabinet and other Dominions. In an 
attempt to pacify Canada, Borden was invited to Britain to 
discuss the matter further.60 In Canada, the rejection was 
judged harshly by some in the Canadian Government as an 
indicator which showed how little Britain appreciated Canada's 
interest in good relations with the United States. Loring 
Christie noted in a memorandum to Meighen on the British 
response that, 'Canada's interest, as the next door neighbour 
of the United States, is overwhelming as compared with that of 
Great Britain or of any part of the Empire; and her knowledge 
and qualifications for dealing with the Americans are by the 
same token superior to those of other parts of the Empire and 
should be called into play.' Christie concluded that the 
rejection of a mission by Borden would mean the loss of 'great 
advantages' in resolving the matter.61 Indignant though the 
Canadian Government may have felt, five weeks elapsed before 
a response was sent. Again, Canada urged that an alternative 
to the alliance should be sought and that the special 
opportunity of understanding the perspective of the United 
States, afforded by Canada's close association, be fully 
utilised.62 The Foreign Office remained firm that Borden 
should not go to Washington, revealing concern that this might 
encourage a movement in the United States, led by Senator 
Lodge, to shift the leadership of English-speaking communities 
from London to Washington. One official in the Office did 
admit that Canada was the best suited to sound out the
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Americans, if the need ever arose.63 Such an admission was 
a rare occurrence.
Meighen was set for a showdown at the Imperial Conference 
of 1921. The British were prepared for this and suspected 
that since Meighen was 'a good deal under Christie's 
influence', he would be 'really voicing Christie's views.'64 
Meighen was not alone among Dominion leaders at the Conference 
in his opposition to renewal of the alliance. Billy Hughes, 
the Prime Minister of Australia, was also opposed but he came 
into direct confrontation with Meighen because he wanted 
guarantees since the collapse of the alliance would leave 
Australia exposed to potential aggression from Japan. The 
conference also revealed that British opinion had undergone 
changes. Within Whitehall there had never existed
wholehearted agreement that the accord should be renewed. A 
strong faction, gaining support, advocated a new agreement 
which would embrace the United States. Lloyd George had 
advocated working with the United States in the matter as 
early as 192065, and by April 1921 the internal committee of 
the Foreign Office on the alliance threw its weight behind a 
three-party agreement which would include the United States.66 
It was these forces within Britain which stressed the 
relationship with the United States that did more to thwart 
efforts to renew the alliance than the protests originating in 
the Dominions.
The Imperial Conference of 1921 did not match the build­
up that it was given. Indeed, it was an anti-climax, both in 
the matter of the alliance and in the overall advancement of 
the consultation of Dominions in foreign affairs. While 
Curzon made an impressive summary of foreign issues, the
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actual test of Dominion involvement through the example of 
discussing the alliance proved a dismal failure. The question 
lost most of its momentum when Lloyd George, displaying 
political skill, brought forward an opinion from the law 
officers that it had been wrongly assumed that the alliance 
would automatically terminate in three months. Rather, they 
concluded that the agreement would continue until either 
Britain or Japan formally terminated it.67 This clever 
performance, of which Lloyd George was especially proud68, 
immediately dissipated the intensity of the issue by removing 
the time-constraint, and this effectively ended debate of the 
matter. A series of British Cabinet discussions, which 
occurred concurrently with the Imperial Conference, resulted 
in the British shifting their priority to attempting to secure 
a conference, which would include the participation of the 
United States, China as well as Japan, and to placing second 
the option of resolving the alliance exclusively between 
Britain and Japan. Thus, although the matter was not settled 
at the Imperial Conference, at least the Dominion leaders left 
with the sense that they had accomplished something
constructive. Meighen and Christie were particularly pleased 
that the United States would now have the opportunity to
participate in the process. Unfortunately, both Meighen and 
Christie, and indeed the press corps, over-estimated the 
impact of Canada and other Dominions in redirecting imperial 
foreign policy. Worse still was the over-estimation, as
became evident later, of the Dominions' role in the 
formulation of foreign policy.
Canada's participation in the alliance question
essentially ended with the Imperial Conference. After the
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departure of the Dominions' leaders, the Foreign Office began 
to sound out the United States, Japan and China about 
participating in a conference to discuss the Pacific question. 
The countries' agreement surprised the Foreign Office. The 
countries also concurred that the conference meet in 
Washington through the autumn and winter of 1921-22. This 
decision contradicted the original British wish to meet in 
London. The Washington Conference reached an agreement on a 
ten-year building 'holiday' on battleships, which was signed 
by the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France and 
Italy. It also agreed that a four-party treaty, with United 
States, China, Japan and the British Empire, would be 
negotiated outside the Washington Conference. In April 1923, 
this four-power treaty replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.69
The Dominions were allowed to participate in the 
Washington Conference under the same system as that used for 
the Paris Peace negotiations, the British Empire Delegation. 
Canada found no fault with the B.E.D. and chose Borden to 
represent the country. The Dominion representatives had 
little if any impact on the negotiations, as their sessions 
were chiefly an opportunity for Balfour, who headed the 
delegation, to report on progress. The Dominions' acceptance 
of these arrangements, however, bolstered the British belief 
that the B.E.D. was the structure upon which future 
consultation with the Dominions could be adequately based.70
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The North Atlantic Triangle: British Understanding
One of the more revealing aspects of the circumstances 
surrounding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the insight it 
offers into the relations among Britain, the United States and 
Canada, frequently referred to as the North Atlantic triangle. 
Good relations with the United States had been an established 
priority for British foreign policy before World War One, but 
it became even more crucial in the post-war period. Equally 
for Canada, the maintenance of a good understanding with its 
neighbour south of the border was the first and most central 
consideration in its external relations. Given their mutual 
interests, one might expect that if circumstances were 
conducive to Britain and Canada working in partnership, then 
this would have been pursued. It was a partnership that 
Canada desired because it had long envisioned one of its most 
natural positions as the intermediary between Britain and the 
United States. It was a role that Canada actively attempted 
to press on Britain only to be rebuffed. The issue of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance occasioned another rebuff to Canada, 
and this is particularly poignant since it occurred in the 
supposedly new atmosphere in which foreign policy was seen as 
a collective effort and which took into account the interests 
of the Dominions and Britain. No other Dominion could claim 
the same degree of concern with the United States as Canada, 
and yet the disregard Britain showed for Canadian interests 
and participation highlighted the inequality in their 
relationship. Had Canada known of the indifference on 
Britain's part, the issue would have threatened or even 
damaged imperial unity in foreign policy by shattering the 
Canadian belief that it had a voice in policy-making. It was
Canadian ignorance of British attitudes which saved imperial 
unity from injury. British decision-makers were of course not 
uninformed about the high priority which Canada gave to her 
dealings with the United States. They had seen that in 1919 
when Borden requested an extension of the practice, whereby 
the British Embassy in Washington forwarded to Ottawa any 
despatches of interest to Canada.71 The Foreign Office agreed 
to this. Conscious that Canada would be pressing for a 
representative in Washington, the Foreign Office decided that 
this offer might go a long way to securing close links between 
the Canadian and British representatives and thus increase the 
likelihood of achieving 'real cooperation' at a later date. 
The concession was not so much an acknowledgement of the value 
of Canadian-American relations as an effort to preserve 
imperial diplomatic unity.72 Canadian actions, whether 
requesting more despatches or opposing the use of the name 
British Empire Delegation because the United States might 
interpret it as proof that Britain in reality had six votes in 
the League of Nations73, could not but reinforce the need for 
good relations with the United States. In Whitehall, however, 
and most noticeably in the Foreign Office, Canada's American 
interests were largely overlooked because they were not 
regarded as a threat to imperial unity.
Sir Auckland Geddes, the British Ambassador at 
Washington, entertained grave concern about the deepening 
cultural, economic and political ties between Canada and the 
United States, and the threat they posed for the Empire. He 
was convinced that the United States was actively pursuing a 
policy which would ally Canada with it and against the British 
Empire. Geddes wrote to Curzon in December 1920 of his belief
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that the United States intended to take advantage of the 
apparent chaos within the British Empire to re-align Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand and thus to assume the position of 
the leading nation in the world and leader among the English- 
speaking nations. He feared that Britain was committing a 
grave error if it overlooked this threat and failed to counter 
the United States' success with Canada by consciously building 
a stronger British base in Canada. He concluded his letter 
with a plea to Curzon, 'You may think this all very 
extravagant...but I think that it would be a mistake to ignore 
it.'74
Unfortunately, Geddes' warning fell on deaf ears, partly 
because he commanded no respect from Curzon, who considered 
him an 'unsuccessful representative' and was anxious to retire 
him not only from Washington but from the diplomatic corps 
altogether75, but mainly because most officials in the Foreign 
Office had not experienced at first hand the kinship between 
Canada and the United States and therefore under-estimated its 
strength. It certainly created an interesting division in 
British governing circles, between those who had either 
travelled to Canada or worked in the Embassy in Washington, or 
even the Governors General, who had experienced at first hand 
the close links, and those who had no such experience. 
Generally, the former group held the same views as the latter 
until they came into actual contact with the daily dealings 
between Canada and the United States and then they were 
shocked, almost to the point of panic, that the kinship 
between the two countries was stronger than that between 
Britain and Canada. It was this kinship, they feared, that 
would be the greatest threat to imperial unity and one about
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which Britain could not afford to be passive. Unfortunately, 
the majority of British decision-makers lacked this close 
contact and personal knowledge, so that they under-estimated 
the centrality of the United States in the decision-making 
process of the Canadian Government. Even the events of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not heighten British 
understanding, and the British continued to delude themselves 
further about the American threat to relations with Canada. 
Few imperial illusions, however, were to survive the Chanak 
Crisis which erupted in the autumn of 1922.
The Chanak Crisis: The Shattering of Illusions
In the late summer and early autumn of 1922, the British 
Empire was confronted with a military crisis in the Near East 
as Turkish nationalists posed a threat to Greek holdings in 
the region. Although the military consequences of the 
incident fizzled as quickly as the crisis, the political 
ramifications made it a watershed in imperial relations. The 
Lloyd George Coalition was one of the political victims of the 
debacle. The coalition collapsed mainly over its handling of 
the affair. The crisis also shattered any illusions held by 
the Dominions regarding the advancement of their role in 
foreign policy. The emergency revealed not only the failure 
of consultation, but even more basically, how little had 
changed when the British Empire could be brought to the brink 
of war by the action of the British Cabinet alone.
The Chanak Crisis erupted suddenly late in the summer of 
1922 when Turkish nationalists appeared prepared to use 
military force against the Greeks to reclaim possessions they 
believed rightly theirs. Conflicts in the region stemmed from
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the terms of the 192 0 Treaty of Sevres which partitioned 
Turkish Asia Minor; a section of the territory concentrating 
on Smyrna was given to Greece. Also under the terms of the 
treaty, a British garrison was posted at Chanak to ensure that 
the passageway, which was crucial to British interests in the 
region, remained open. The continuing saga of struggle 
between Turkey and Greece took on a new dimension in 1921-22, 
when the Sultan of Turkey was replaced by a revolutionary 
nationalist government headed by Mustafa Kemal. The 
nationalist government immediately repudiated the treaty and 
in the summer of 1922 launched a series of military attacks to 
reclaim territories from Greek possession. Kemal's army was 
highly successful and by early September it occupied Smyrna. 
British forces were under-manned and gravely exposed, 
especially in Chanak and the Dardanelles, as they faced 
Kemal's powerful army. Lloyd George and other ministers, 
spurred in part by their pro-Greek leanings, concluded that 
the only response was an impressive display of force.
On Friday, September 15, the British Cabinet resolved to 
reinforce the troops in the region. On Saturday at Chequers, 
a select group of British ministers, which included Churchill 
but not Curzon, decided to issue a forceful statement that 
Britain would stand its ground and defend the neutral zone. 
The imperial element entered when a press-release on the 
crisis became a plea that the Dominions send contingents to 
the area. Unfortunately, due primarily to carelessness on the 
part of Churchill, before the Dominion Governments could be 
informed of the request, the news was released by the press. 
The Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, whose Liberal 
party had defeated Meighen's Conservative Government in 1921,
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found out about unfolding events only when questioned by 
reporters.76
The main reason that King did not receive a copy of the 
telegram, sent from Britain before the press release, was that 
it was sent on the weekend and thus incurred a series of 
ciphering delays.77 King was highly indignant by the casual 
treatment from Britain, not only in the failure to relay this 
information before the press received it, but also by not 
keeping Canada informed in the Near East. King decided to 
employ the tactic, which he was to use frequently in foreign 
matters, of inaction., He refused to send a contingent of 
troops, despite outcries for military support for Britain 
within Canada, on the grounds that such a step had to be 
sanctioned by the Canadian Parliament.78 He was not willing, 
moreover, to re-call the Parliament during the recess until he 
was convinced that this was necessary. Of the other 
Dominions, only New Zealand pledged troops outright, while 
Australia did so later only after having made its displeasure 
clear about the manner in which it had been consulted. South 
Africa took no stand on the affair.
King's refusal to send troops at Britain's request marked 
a substantial departure from previous imperial policy, and 
thereby breached imperial unity. Events over Chanak alerted 
to him the fact that despite all the outward signs of change, 
imperial foreign policy, to which Canada was being committed, 
continued to be formulated by Britain with little or no input 
from the Dominion. This realisation spurred him to challenge, 
and eventually free Canada from imperial foreign policy.79
The Chanak Crisis brought questioning of the imperial 
relationship back to centre stage for the Canadians. It did
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not have the same effect in Britain. British politicians and 
officials initially contemplated its impact on imperial unity. 
This attention lapsed, however, once the crisis shook British 
domestic politics. The crisis finally subsided when the Turks 
did not attack Chanak and an armistice was signed in early 
October. Lloyd George and his ministry, however, still 
attracted sharp criticism for their handling of the affair. 
The ministry collapsed when the Conservatives withdrew their 
support. Andrew Bonar Law, a Conservative, succeeded Lloyd 
George in 10 Downing Street on 19 October 1922.80
The crisis is in one sense an appropriate end to the 
first four post-war years of imperial relations. Anglo- 
Canadian relationships failed to meet the expectations of 
progress anticipated under the Lloyd George Coalition, and 
worse, had failed to sustain even the status quo on 
constitutional advances made during the First World War and 
the subsequent Peace Conference. Under the Lloyd George 
Coalition there was a reversion to the practice that the 
Foreign Office was the sole agency in handling issues in 
foreign affairs. The Foreign Office, although not ignorant 
that it was now expected to consult with the Dominions in 
foreign policy, chose to maintain its role as the sole 
practitioner of foreign policy until challenged to do 
otherwise. The Foreign Office was able to hide behind several 
excuses which permitted officials to conduct imperial foreign 
affairs as they always had. The most frequent plea was the 
lack of a mechanism to enable them to consult properly with 
the Dominions on foreign matters, which demanded more than 
just a periodic meeting, and so they had often to make daily
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decisions without consulting the Dominions. As for the 
establishment of a mechanism which would allow proper 
consultation, the Foreign Office believed that it was the task 
of the Colonial Office to rally the opinions of the Dominions. 
Unfortunately for the Dominions, the Colonial Office did not 
assume the burden of devising a proper mechanism for 
consultation. This passive approach was further encouraged by 
the lack of initiative from Canada, or any other Dominion, 
demanding a voice in the conduct of foreign affairs. Canadian 
politicians did not give much attention to the actual 
implementation of constitutional evolution in foreign affairs. 
Under both Borden and Meighen an illusion persisted that 
Canadian interests were receiving adequate attention in 
foreign policy, as demonstrated in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
and, as will be seen, in the question of Canadian 
representation at Washington. The illusion collapsed, as did 
the Lloyd George Coalition, with the Chanak Crisis. The 
crisis made the conduct of imperial foreign policy a matter of 
priority for the Canadian Government, under the leadership of 
Mackenzie King, after a hiatus of several years. King became 
determined to challenge and break up imperial foreign policy. 
While it was Chanak that unleashed King on his crusade against 
imperial unity, the impact of the crisis on imperial relations 
was not grasped by most British politicians and this 
contributed to their failure to keep pace with and check the 
Canadian timetable for abandoning a unified imperial foreign 
policy.
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CHAPTER 3
CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT WASHINGTON: 1919-1926
Although the years 1919-1922 lacked the same vigorous 
initiative for change from Canada as occurred between 1916-18, 
Borden obtained in 1920 the right for Canada to place its own 
representative at Washington. The issue of Dominion 
representation in a foreign capital was the beginning of the 
final phase which dismantled imperial unity. Canada did not 
make an appointment until 1926 and with' numerous alterations 
in the terms of the appointment. The struggle between Canada 
and Britain regarding Canadian representation spanned the 
entire era when British-Canadian relations were being 
redefined. The process of resolving the issue was influenced 
by the developments in Anglo-Canadian relations.
In the autumn of 1919, the Canadian Government asked 
Britain for separate representation at Washington. This 
request directly challenged imperial diplomatic unity and 
therefore held great significance to both the British and 
Canadian Governments. The Canadians regarded the appointment 
as the logical step toward equality with Britain. The 
British, conversely, saw it as a challenge to imperial 
diplomatic unity, the last crucial link which bound the 
British Empire together. It was a complex issue which 
remained unresolved for seven years until the appointment of 
Vincent Massey in 1926 as Canada's first separate 
representative at Washington.1
Discussions regarding representation went through several 
stages as the British perspective changed concerning its 
relations with Canada. At each of these critical stages, the
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issue grew more complex as the result of confrontations over 
policy within Whitehall. The Colonial Office and Foreign 
Office, to whom the matter was entrusted, rarely agreed. The 
search for a consensus over this issue was not easy. Such 
difficulties, together with the evolution of British imperial 
opinion, form an essential component in the study of Canadian 
representation at Washington.
Origins; 1909-1919
As early as 1909, when the Canadian Department of 
External Affairs was established, one member of the Canadian 
Parliament suggested that a Canadian representative be posted 
to Washington. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, then Prime Minister, 
rejected the proposal as 'uncongenial'2. Perhaps Laurier 
found the request ahead of its time, but his remark reflects 
his intermittent interest in foreign policy. He was content 
with the current conduct of Canadian-American relations.3 The 
matter remained dormant until Laurier's successor, Robert 
Borden, and the Conservative Party, came to power in 1911.
One early decision of the new Conservative Government was 
to return the Department of External Affairs to the direct 
control of the Prime Minister. This action quickly 
established Borden's desire to be a more active player than
his predecessor in Canadian foreign relations.4 Among the
various foreign affairs which attracted Borden during his 
prime ministership, the issue of representation at Washington 
was one which he returned to time and again5. Practical
reasons drove him on this issue. The British Embassy at
Washington dealt with a broad spectrum of matters directly 
related to Canada such as trade, customs, and tariffs. In
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1912, James Bryce, British Ambassador to Washington, estimated 
that three-quarters of the business of the British Embassy was 
in fact Canadian.6 The entry of the United States into the 
Great War in 1917 enabled the Canadian Government to lay the 
ground for its future request for Canadian representation. 
The British allowed a Canadian War Mission at Washington. 
This mission became a vital precedent in achieving more 
permanent representation.
After the war, ratification of the Treaty of Versailles 
consumed Borden's energies until the autumn of 1919. Once 
that matter was settled, he returned with renewed 
determination to the question of Canadian representation in 
Washington. Inspired by the enhanced stature that the 
Dominions had gained in the course of the First World War, 
Borden now regarded such representation as 'the logical 
capstone of the quest for Dominion autonomy which.. .began with 
Resolution IX of the 1917 Imperial War Conference.'7
The Agreement of 1920:
On 3 October 1919, the 9th Duke of Devonshire, Governor 
General of Canada, writing on behalf of his Prime Minister, 
sent a formal request to the Colonial Office for the 
appointment of a Canadian representative at the British 
Embassy in Washington. Drawing heavily upon the content of 
Resolution IX of 19178, Devonshire argued that the large 
number of questions involving purely Canadian concerns 
required that 'effective steps should be taken to safeguard 
more thoroughly Canadian interests at Washington.'9 The 
British Government now faced its first challenge in the new 
environment brought about by the Great War. The significance
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of the matter was clear to L.S. Amery, Under-Secretary for the 
Colonies who concluded that it was 'a crucial decision in 
Imperial policy.' Privately, no doubt, some shared the 
sentiment of G.V. Fiddes, a Colonial Office official, who 
questioned whether all Canadians, as distinct from the Borden 
Government, desired representation.10 Any reservations, 
however, were overruled by British recognition that Britain 
had to honour the Canadian Government's request. Although 
displeased with the proposal, Whitehall knew that it was 
powerless to block it if Canada insisted because of the 
Dominion's new status. Even the Colonial Office official who 
described the Canadian action as separatist conceded that, 'Of 
course if Canada sufficiently desires anything she will get it 
up to separation inclusively.'11 Determined not to stand 
passively by, the Colonial Office entered willingly into a 
game of bluff with Canada. The Colonial Office decided if 
concessions were granted slowly and reluctantly, then Canada 
might be stopped just short of destroying imperial unity. The 
question for the Colonial Office became one of drafting a 
counter-proposal which would maintain the integrity of the 
Empire, and yet still satisfy the Canadians.
With this aim in view, Amery presented a plan on 7 
October 1919 which led to the Colonial Office's counter-offer. 
His plan recommended the division of the Embassy in Washington 
into two sections: one section dealing with purely Canadian
matters manned by an all Canadian staff’; the other section 
handling all other matters.12 Another aspect of Amery's 
scheme was a recommendation that the next Ambassador should be 
a Canadian.13
Amery believed he could market the proposal to the
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Canadian Government by exploiting the wording of the Canadian 
request. In its original telegram, the Canadian Government 
petitioned that its mission 'constitute a part of the 
establishment of His Majesty's Government'. Amery's plan, he 
argued, fulfilled the Canadian wish and it prevented the 
weakening of a joint imperial foreign policy. As an 
enticement, he intended to add that the measures were purely 
temporary until the Constitutional Conference, promised in 
1917, was convened.14 Conscious that imperial diplomatic 
unity was at the mercy of the Canadians, Amery was not 
optimistic that his counter-proposal would be accepted. He 
was determined, however, to pursue attempts to limit the 
Dominion's gains at the expense of imperial unity. 'If Canada 
still disagrees we shall have to give way, and see what can be 
done to retrieve the position hereafter./15 Amery's proposal 
for representation required the approval of the Foreign Office 
before it could be sent to Canada. The Foreign Office, 
however, held strong views on the matter.
The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office responded 
similarly to the Canadian request for representation at 
Washington. They feared the threat it posed to imperial 
diplomatic unity. They realised that they had to accede, but 
hoped that a counter-offer would lessen the ramifications of 
the Canadian request. The Foreign Office and the Colonial 
Office agreed on the need of a counter-offer. They did not, 
however, agree on its contents. The difference on substance 
brought the two departments into conflict. When the struggle 
was resolved and a counter-offer sent, the Foreign Office's 
opinions prevailed. It was the first time, but hardly the 
last, when the Foreign Office directed developments in
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Britain's relations with Canada. The Foreign Office's main 
advantage was that it was far more prepared on the question 
than the Colonial Office.
The Foreign Office had heard of a possible Canadian 
request as early as six months prior and this allowed time for 
preparation. It also permitted time for misunderstanding and 
resentment to grow within the department against the Colonial 
Office. Relations between the two departments on Canadian 
representation began badly when the Foreign Office first heard 
of the matter in late April, 1919, through Parliamentary 
Questions in the British House of Commons.16 The Foreign 
Office's immediate response was to enquire why it had not been 
informed by the Colonial Office. One Foreign Office official 
noted: 'It seems strange we have not been consulted,' but
concluded that, 'perhaps Colonial Office are waiting first for 
a definite proposal to be put forward.'17 The Foreign Office 
was correct here as they had not heard directly from the 
Canadian Government. The Foreign Office decided to press the 
Colonial Office for information, and in late May Lord Milner, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Devonshire to 
complain that he was still waiting for a report from the 
Governor General on the matter.18 The Colonial Office was
content to leave the matter until the Canadian Government
approached them. This stance dissatisfied the Foreign Office 
and in the summer of 1919 several letters were sent to the 
Colonial Office stressing they expected Lord Curzon, Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, would 'be consulted as to any
decision to be taken on this matter.'19 The silence of the
Colonial Office only increased ill-feeling in the Foreign 
Office20, until the latter was forced into independent action.
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Throughout the summer of 1919, high-ranking Foreign 
Office officials prepared an internal memorandum on the 
implications of Canadian representation at Washington. They 
concluded, as the Colonial Office would in late October, that 
such a step would undermine and destroy the last vestige of 
British imperial foreign policy. Foreign Office officials 
found it a contradiction to suggest that independent 
representation could be granted without undermining the 
principle of a unified foreign policy. Canadian diplomatic 
representation at Washington would force the Foreign Office to 
extend the privilege to other Dominions. The inevitable 
multiplication of Dominion representatives in a single foreign 
capital was feared. The danger of this proliferation, 
concluded one official, was that the British Government 'might 
find themselves committed to the support of some policy which 
they did not approve.'21 In order to avoid this, J.A.C. 
Tilley, a Foreign Office official, was willing to concede a 
Canadian Ambassador representing the whole of the British 
Empire. He preferred, however, the appointment of a Canadian 
counsellor to be part of the British Embassy staff in 
Washington. And yet he was surprised that his favourite 
recommendation, of encouraging Canadians, and all Dominions, 
to protect their interests by joining the diplomatic service, 
had found so little favour.22 Curzon was more incisive in his 
summation. 'Of course', he minuted, 'the real point is that 
a state that needs an ambassador is actually independent and 
that one of the few necessary vestiges of imperial control 
will have disappeared.'23 On this tenet, under the critical 
eye of Curzon, the Foreign Office prepared a memorandum
outlining the objections of the Foreign Office.
In this memorandum, the Foreign Office based its case on 
the problem of responsibility for Britain and the dangerous 
precedent this would set for the British Empire. Granting a 
Dominion its own representative would be detrimental to the 
British Government both in its internal and external 
relations. Externally, the Foreign Office feared the 
advantages foreign governments, particularly the United 
States, would enjoy. The Foreign Office feared that the 
United States would benefit from conducting direct 
negotiations with the representative of a Dominion without the 
knowledge of the British Government. This could lead to later 
problems. Internally, these arrangements might create 
difficulties between British and the Dominion Governments, if 
a Dominion, in its independent negotiations, produced a policy 
contrary to the one advanced by the British Government. 
Imperial diplomatic unity would clearly cease if two 
conflicting policies were stated. The Foreign Office 
memorandum therefore deprecated the Canadian proposal for a 
Canadian representative at Washington. Instead, it suggested 
that Canada be treated as a special case and granted its own 
counsellor at the Embassy in Washington. Then, the memorandum 
concluded, 'The aspirations of the Canadian Government might 
be satisfied by such an arrangement while the conduct of 
negotiations with the U.S. Government would remain centralized 
in His Majesty's Ambassador. On the other hand, the 
Ambassador would benefit by the advice of the Counsellor on 
the many Canadian questions which come up at Washington. '24 
Curzon circulated the memorandum to the Colonial Office and 
the Prime Minister, Lloyd George. Unfortunately, this
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memorandum cannot now be located in the Colonial Office files 
and the Colonial Office's reaction to this provocative 
statement is lost. In October, 1919, the Foreign Office 
referenced this memorandum25 in preparing a response to the 
Canadians.
In the autumn of 1919, Tilley drafted a Foreign Office 
counter-proposal differing significantly from that of Amery. 
His approach was cautious, unimaginative and, to a degree, 
coy. He proposed that Canadian representation at Washington 
be granted but only with restricted credentials. 
Concentrating on credentials, Tilley stressed the importance 
of not issuing separate ones, so that the Canadian 
representative could not carry out his instructions without 
the approval of the Ambassador. Moreover, if a disagreement 
between the Ambassador and the Canadian minister arose, then 
the matter should be referred to the Imperial and Canadian 
Governments. A representative working within these
limitations could not, he believed, jeopardize diplomatic 
imperial unity. In his concluding remarks, Tilley frankly 
admitted that his scheme could only minimise the damage. Its 
implementation was entirely dependent upon Canada. 'If the 
Canadian Government will agree to these terms', wrote Tilley, 
'I think that we shall come off well.'26
Before the Foreign Office reached a firm decision on its 
counter-proposal, the opinion of Lord Reading, a former 
British Ambassador at Washington, was solicited. Reading 
concurred there should be one voice in Washington. He 
recommended, in order to obtain the Canadians' approval, that 
the British Government should exploit the Canadians' 
willingness to allow its representative to become an integral
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part of the Embassy establishment.27 He supported the 
proposal by Lord Hardinge, the Permanent-Under Secretary in 
the Foreign Office, that the Canadian Minister should rank 
next to the Ambassador, which meant that in the Ambassador's 
absence he would assume charge of the Embassy. Both 
suggestions were incorporated in the Foreign Office's proposed 
response and, in due course, in the reply sent to Canada. 
These proposals later became the source of many difficulties.
The issue of representation was brought to the British 
Cabinet by Milner on 16 October 1919. While members of the 
Cabinet favoured the principle of Canadian representation at 
Washington, they did not probe the constitutional 
implications. They chose to regard the proposal as a 
'temporary and experimental arrangement pending the conference 
to be held in the not too distant future to discuss the 
readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component 
parts of the British Empire./28 The Cabinet then returned the 
issue to the Foreign and Colonial Offices to sort out the 
particulars.
The process began with the Colonial Office forwarding to 
the Foreign Office a draft reply to the Canadian Government.
As recommended by Amery, in order to avoid 'an appearance of 
dualism', the Colonial Office suggested that two branches be 
established in the Embassy. The remainder of the draft 
described how the specifics would be dealt with under such an 
arrangement. The Colonial Office concluded with hope that the 
'Ambassador himself should in future be selected by the 
Canadian and British Governments in consultation.'29
In the Foreign Office, Curzon rejected the Colonial 
Office's proposal which he thought 'went unnecessarily
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far...,30 In an attempt to compose a reply acceptable both 
to the Colonial and the Foreign Offices, Curzon held a meeting 
with Milner, Reading and Hardinge. The meeting produced a 
second draft counter-offer which supposedly reflected the 
consensus achieved in the meeting. Prepared by the Foreign 
Office, it was a draft which resembled the Foreign Office's, 
not the Colonial Office's, proposed reply.
This second draft differed from the original plan of the 
Colonial Office in several crucial ways. The Colonial Office 
proposed the establishment of two separate branches in the 
Embassy. The office did not recommend one way or the other as 
to whether the Canadian would take charge in the absence of 
the British Ambassador. The office also recommended that the 
Canadian representative have the title 'Minister 
Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary'. The Foreign Office 
opposed two separate branches and the scheme was abandoned. 
Instead, emphasis was placed on the integration of the 
Canadian representative into the establishment of the Embassy. 
This scheme would 'preserve the closest connection between him 
and Ambassador, so that there may be a constant interchange of 
views on matters of common concern.' The Foreign Office, 
also, eliminated 'Envoy Extraordinary' from the Canadian's 
title. The title of the Canadian Minister would only be 
Minister Plenipotentiary. This reduction in title reflected 
the desire of the Foreign Office to restrict the credentials, 
since in its view a distinction existed between the title of 
Minister Plenipotentiary and Minister Plenipotentiary prefixed 
with Envoy Extraordinary, because the latter implied 
independent accreditation to a foreign government while the 
former did not. Finally, unlike the Colonial Office draft,
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the joint reply made it clear that the Canadian Minister would 
assume charge of the Embassy in the absence of the Ambassador. 
The Foreign Office's desire to lock the Canadian minister into 
the establishment of the Embassy had prevailed, and at least 
for appearance's sake imperial unity in foreign policy was 
maintained. A final difference between the two drafts was the 
latter's omission of the provision for the Canadian Government 
to participate in the selection of the next British Ambassador 
at Washington.31 Eventually it was this draft which became 
the official response of the British Government. The views of 
the Foreign Office, for the most part, had overridden those of 
the Colonial Office. The concessions made to the Canadian 
Government were qualified. The 'imaginative plan' of the 
Colonial Office had been shelved.
The British Government sent its reply to the Canadian 
Government at the end of October and in mid-December received 
notification from Devonshire, the then Governor General, that 
his ministers found 'so far as practical result...' the 
British counter-proposal did 'not differ in substance from 
that put forward in my telegram of 3rd October./32 There must 
have been relief in Whitehall. The acceptance of the counter­
proposal meant that Canada's separatist move against a unified 
imperial foreign policy had been checked. The agreement of 
the Canadians to have their minister form part of the 
Embassy's establishment and be second-in-charge had ensured 
that the solidarity of the Empire would be maintained and 
emphasised. The Foreign Office regarded the agreement to 
exclude 'Envoy Extraordinary' from the minister's title as 
Canadian forfeiture of its minister's independence.33
Subsequently, the Canadian concession to permit its
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minister to become part of the establishment of the Embassy 
caused difficulties. Initially, however, the only objections 
that the Canadian Government voiced were those of the letter 
of credence and the matter of precedence. The Canadians 
requested that their government participate in the letter of 
credence to the United States, whereas Britain recommended 
that Curzon write the communication of credence. On the 
matter of precedence, the Canadian Government desired its 
minister to have the same precedence as the Ministers from 
other countries resident in the United States.34
Problems over the letter of credence were quickly 
resolved by having the King sign the letter. Acting on a 
request from the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office composed 
the reply to the Canadians to explain this arrangement. The 
Colonial Office felt it necessary to stress 'that it should be 
worded as not to give the Canadian Government any ground for 
supposing that we are suggesting a letter of credence from the 
King merely because they have expressed the wish to 
participate in the issue of the accrediting letter.'35 There 
is nothing to indicate that the Foreign Office shared this 
concern to avoid any Canadian misunderstanding of British 
action.
The issue of precedence was not resolved so readily and 
consumed four months of correspondence between Canada and 
Britain before it was settled. Evident in the correspondence 
was the Canadian Government's lack of appreciation of the 
distinctions that the British Government drew in its counter­
proposal. Canadian ministers believed their desire to have 
their representative enjoy 'precedence on the same basis as 
the Ministers of other countries'36 maintained the spirit of
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the arrangement described in the British telegram. Some 
Colonial Office officials believed the Canadian Government was 
not honouring what had been agreed, or failed to understand 
the terms. One official believed that the Canadian 
interpretation of the agreement broke with 'the spirit of the 
conditions.'37 Confusion between the two governments was 
compounded when Milner decided that his officials 
misunderstood the Canadian request. Clearly, as he perceived 
it, the Canadians sought only that their Minister should have 
precedence over 'our Charge d'Affaires or first Secretary and 
ensure his [Canadian's minister] acting in the absence of the 
Ambassador.'38 The months which followed proved, however, 
that it was Milner, not his official, who misunderstood the 
Canadian interpretation of the arrangements.
Whitehall did not confront the question of precedence 
again until prompted to by a telegram from Devonshire. In a 
telegram dated the 1 April 1920, Devonshire stated his 
government's interpretation of the agreement that the Canadian 
Minister, as Minister Plenipotentiary, would have precedence 
in the diplomatic corps. The Canadian Government cited the 
cases of Saxony and Bavaria before the War, who maintained 
Ministers at European Courts concurrently with Ambassadors of 
the German Empire, to justify their Minister's rank.39
The Canadian assumption, that its Minister would have 
precedence in the diplomatic corps, stimulated a flurry of 
minutes among British officials. The Colonial Office, while 
attempting to gauge the reaction of the Foreign Office to 
Devonshire's most recent telegram, received from them the copy 
of a telegram sent by Ronald Lindsay, Charge d'Affaires in 
Washington. The telegram told of a meeting between N.W.
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Rowell, representative of the Canadian Government and F.L. 
Polk, representing the American Secretary of State. Lindsay 
observed of the meeting:
Only point upon which there appears to 
be real difficulty is that of precedence.
Canadian Government very strongly of view 
that Canadian representative should have
such rank as would entitle him to precedence 
according to date of appointment with
ministers of other countries. Mr. Polk's
view is that Canadian representative.. .would 
be entitled to precedence only after
ministers of other countries as these
ministers are Envoys Extraordinary as well
as Ministers Plenipotentiary. ...
C.T. Davis, in the Colonial Office found that the Canadians
were changing their interpretation of precedence from that
originally stated in their suggested press announcement.
Davis found he could not support the examples of Bavaria and
Saxony as justification for ranking the Canadian minister;
they seemed irrelevant to the Canadian case. He did not
propose a response, but chose instead to pass the issue along
to the Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office's draft response was decisive in its
rejection of the Canadian claim to precedence with those of
other countries. Curzon could not locate any precedent to
support the Canadian's belief that its Minister should rank
with the representatives from other countries. The German
analogies were disregarded because the German states in
question, unlike Canada, had once been independent and it was
this prior independence which justified their having
independent envoys. Rowell, anticipating that appropriate
precedents might not exist to support Canada's request, had
recommended that the Council for the League of Nations be
persuaded to revise the diplomatic precedents adopted in the
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act of Congress at Vienna. This suggestion the Foreign 
Office draft firmly rejected in a tone which was condescending 
and mocking. 'This suggestion', noted the Foreign Office 
draft, 'amounts in fact to a proposal that an endeavour should 
be made to secure revision of the whole existing diplomatic 
practice of the world in order to meet the exceptional case of 
the Canadian representative at Washington, and the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs cannot feel that such a course is 
practical. . . '41
Amery, seeking a solution to the rank of the Canadian 
Minister, sought to appease the Dominion. He recommended that 
Envoy Extraordinary be affixed to the title of the Canadian 
minister and left as an option for the United States to honour 
as they saw fit. His suggestion never left the Colonial 
Office as Amery's offer to explore the proposal in a draft 
letter to Ottawa was vetoed by Milner. Milner's refusal was 
in keeping with his general philosophy concerning the evolving 
relationship between Great Britain and her Dominions. He 
believed that evolution could neither be halted nor should it 
be. He did, however, think that the initiative resided with 
the Dominions, not with Great Britain. Using one of his 
preferred phrases, Milner denied Amery the right to pursue his 
scheme as 'it would be wiser to wait until we hear further 
from Ottawa.'42
Milner's rejection of Amery's initiative meant the 
Colonial Office had no alternative response to the Foreign 
Office's proposal. Accordingly, in early May, the Colonial 
Office sent a telegram to the Canadian Government rejecting 
Canada's use of the analogies of Bavaria and Saxony. The 
Canadian representative would rank, the telegram explained,
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above Charges d 7Affaires but after Envoys Extraordinary and
Ministers Plenipotentiary who are heads of missions of other 
countries.43 The views of the Foreign Office again prevailed. 
The Canadian Government, for its part, did not pursue the 
matter. Thus, on 10 May 1920, timed so to be announced 
simultaneously in the Canadian and British Houses of Commons, 
the appointment of a Canadian representative at Washington was 
made public. A. Bonar Law, Government Leader in the House, 
made the announcement in the British House of Commons:
As a result of recent discussions, an 
arrangement has been concluded between the 
British and Canadian Governments to provide 
more complete representation at Washington 
of Canadian interests than has hitherto 
existed. Accordingly it has been agreed 
that His Majesty, on the advice of his 
Canadian Ministers, shall appoint a Minister 
Plenipotentiary, who will have charge of 
Canadian affairs, and will at all times be 
the ordinary channel of communication with 
the United States Government in matters of 
purely Canadian concern, acting upon 
instruction from, and reporting direct to, 
the Canadian Government. In the absence of 
the Ambassador, the Canadian Minister will 
take charge of the whole Embassy and of 
representation of Imperial, as well as 
Canadian, interests. He will be accredited 
by His Majesty to the President with 
necessary powers for the purpose.
This new arrangement will not denote 
any departure, either on the part of the 
British Government or of the Canadian 
Government, from the principle of diplomatic 
unity of the British Empire.
Need for this important step has been 
fully realised by both Governments for some 
time. For a good many years there has been 
direct communication between Washington and 
Ottawa, but the constantly increasing 
importance of Canadian interests in the 
United States had made it apparent that 
Canada should be represented there in some 
distinctive manner, for this would doubtless 
tend to expedite negotiations, and naturally 
first-hand acquaintance with Canadian 
conditions would promote good understanding.
In view of the peculiarly close relations 
that have existed between the people of 
Canada and those of the United States, it is
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confidently expected as well that this new 
step will have the very desirable result of 
maintaining and strengthening friendly 
relations and co-operation between the 
British Empire and the United States.44
Discussions of the appointment and its implications and 
ramifications failed to command great interest either in the
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British Cabinet or in the British Parliament. Apart from the 
Cabinet's consideration of the original request, the minutes 
show that it was not raised again. Having referred the matter 
to the Colonial and Foreign Offices, the Cabinet, in the 
ensuing eight months, limited its participation to reports of 
progress in the form of relevant memoranda and telegrams. The 
British Parliament displayed little more interest than the 
Cabinet, even though a few members raised questions 
occasionally. One member interested in the issue was 
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Murray, former Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to then Foreign Secretary Sir E. Grey, 1910-1914 and 
a former Assistant Military Attache at Washington, 1917. It 
was Murray's question on 7 April 1919 which alerted the House 
of Commons to a potential Canadian request for representation 
at Washington. At regular intervals from April until June 
1919, Murray and Grattan Doyle, a Conservative member, sought 
information from the government. Doyle attempted to determine 
whether the British Government acknowledged that 'the time is 
now opportune for the Dominion to have a special 
representative at Washington, with a status and prestige 
commensurate with the new Canada which has developed during 
the years of the War?'45 The British Government offered only 
evasive replies.
The issue of Canadian representation came up in February, 
March and April, and on each occasion the government refused
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comment as negotiations were pending. It was only in May that 
the questions from MPs sought more than information and 
queried the implications of the appointment. Murray asked of 
the government: 'Would it not be better to leave it to be
settled by the Imperial Conference, to be summoned as soon as 
possible to deal with the constitutional readjustment of 
various portions of the Empire?'46 Again the government 
avoided a precise comment. Even after the announcement of the 
appointment, the government avoided any discussion. Bonar 
Law's observation that, 'Every new development affects the 
constitution, /47 was to be the only statement of the 
government upon the constitutional implications of the 
agreement. Requests for the tabling of relevant
correspondence, further debates and a White Paper on the 
appointment were all refused by the government.
The Members of Parliament who spoke out on the Canadian 
appointment were few in number.48 Of these it was Murray who 
accented the constitutional development of the appointment. In 
a long address to the House on 20 April 1920, Murray traced 
the appointment back to Resolution IX of the Imperial 
Conference of 1917 which, he argued, reflected the importance 
of foreign policy to the Dominions. The Dominions had in 1917 
stressed 'that foreign policy and foreign relations ... must 
certainly in future be made compatible with the aspirations of 
the people of the Dominions.' Murray questioned the wisdom of 
the government in permitting Canada separate representation. 
The reservations he expressed publicly were commonly held in 
private amongst officials. He believed that separate Canadian 
representation in Washington marked 'the beginning of a great 
constitutional change' within the Empire.49
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Devonshire, the Canadian Governor General, and Sir George 
Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, played a 
secondary role in negotiations over the appointment. 
Devonshire appears in the Colonial Office correspondence only 
as the messenger. Perley, too played a minor part. There 
exists only scant correspondence from him to the Colonial 
Office. Indeed, it fell to the Colonial Office to keep Perley 
informed about the progress of events.
Both the Foreign and Colonial Offices watched with 
interest the heated debate which followed the 1920 
announcement in the Canadian House of Commons. The Liberals, 
who were the official opposition party, supported the 
appointment of a Canadian Minister at Washington. They took 
exception, however, to having the Canadian representative take 
charge of the British Embassy in the absence of the 
Ambassador. Mackenzie King, leader of the Liberal Party, 
described the decision as one that would 'create unnecessary 
friction between the governments.' R.M. Dawson, a biographer 
of King, regards the views expressed by King in this debate as 
the first clear insight into the stance that he would adopt on 
constitutional development. Certainly the conclusion that 
King reached in the debates was indicative also of his future 
positions on foreign policy. Mackenzie King, upon reflection, 
presented his interpretation of what the Canadian public 
desired.50
.. .What seems to be the more rational course 
is the middle one, that in matters between 
Canada and other countries Canada should 
manage her own affairs, and that in matters 
between Great Britain and other countries,
Great Britain should manage her own affairs, 
always when necessary with co-operation and 
conference between the two...
I do not believe the Canadian people
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wish to launch too deep into experiments in 
foreign policy at the present time. All 
matters of government, and particularly 
matters affecting diplomatic relations, are 
matters of constitutional evolution. If we 
are going to advance, by all means let us 
proceed along the line of evolution; but let 
us take one step at a time.51
The Colonial Office did not attach value to King's 
remarks. One official summed up the debate as 'very
interesting'.52 In fact, the only passage highlighted in the 
Colonial Office copy of the Canadian debate was that
concerning remarks by W.S. Fielding, the former finance 
minister in the Laurier Government. Enunciating his 
opposition to Canadian representation at Washington, Fielding 
claimed 'that if the seasoned officers of the Colonial Office 
and of the Foreign Office could give their private thought 
they would tell us they find in this arrangement a very 
dangerous experiment indeed.' The only observation made on 
Mackenzie King's views was to declare Fielding's 'attack far 
more effective than Mr. King's criticism'.53
The matter had ended, or so the British officials
believed. But the failure of the Canadian Government to 
appoint a representative meant that the issue was only
dormant. It did not become topical again until the Irish Free 
State sought its own representation at Washington in 1924.
In the interlude of 1920 to 1924, interest in Canada and 
the Colonial Office waned. The records of the Colonial 
Office's correspondence with Canada, in these years, show that 
neither side gave Canadian representation in Washington much 
attention. It is against this lull in interest that the 
sustained concern of the Foreign Office in the matter is 
remarkable. From 1920 to 1924, the Foreign Office kept up to
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date its information on the issue of Canadian representation 
at Washington. The Foreign Office's records, moreover, show 
not only that it continued to monitor the potential 
appointment, but also lengthy internal memoranda reveal the 
self-examination that the Foreign Office conducted in view of 
the constitutional changes occurring in Canada. The Foreign 
Office wanted to be prepared when Canada approached them 
again. The lack of Colonial Office documentation in the 
interim years of 1920-24 marks the return to a passive role 
reacting only when pressured.
The Interim Years; 1920-24
In his annual report of 1921, Sir A. C. Geddes, the 
British Ambassador to Washington since March 1920, observed 
there had been no further correspondence with the Canadian 
Government during the year on the subject of Canadian 
representation at Washington. His report did highlight a 
debate during 1921 in the Canadian House of Commons on the 
subject. Observing that no partisan lines had been adopted, 
he wrote that the House rejected the proposal that the 
Canadian Representative should assume command of the Embassy 
in the absence of the Ambassador. In the debate, the Prime 
Minister, Arthur Meighen, who had succeeded Borden as 
Conservative leader and Prime Minister in July 1920, declared 
that 'in point of sentiment' he was with those who opposed the 
idea, although he admitted that from a practical standpoint, 
'from the angle of need,' the step was desirable. He evaded 
giving any definite answer as to when the post would be 
filled.54
Meighen never appointed a Canadian Minister to
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Washington. He repeatedly defended his inaction by explaining 
he was unable to find a suitable candidate. One wonders 
whether Meighen's inability to locate someone suitable was in 
part because he did not try very hard. He never shared 
Borden's enthusiasm for the post and was content to place the 
appointment low in his priorities. Meighen's general
disinterest was initially shared by his successor and 
political foe, Mackenzie King. King, having led the Liberal 
Party to victory in the general election of 1921, proved as 
reluctant as Meighen in making an actual appointment. 
Admittedly, King and the Liberals disliked the terms agreed 
with Britain, that the Canadian Minister would be second in 
command, but the new Prime Minister did not push for any 
change in the agreement. Instead, he chose to let the matter 
drift for most of his first year in office. Ironically, King 
did not bother to pursue the matter of the appointment with 
the British Government and it was only after being questioned 
by Geddes in the summer of 1922 that his views on the matter 
were revealed. In the first week of November, Geddes wrote to 
the Foreign Office and discussed the renewed interest in 
Canada for an appointment to Washington and explained how he 
had tackled the matter with King that previous summer. Prior 
to King's visit to Washington in July 1922, Geddes wrote that 
he had heard public opinion in Canada favoured a 'diplomatic 
representative at Washington who shall be entirely independent 
of Embassy not... a special member, who would take charge in 
the absence of the ambassador.' An independent
representative, Geddes believed, was also favoured by the 
Canadian Prime Minister and Cabinet. Moreover, he felt the 
Canadians believed they were 'moving in a direction wholly
agreeable' to the British Government. This supposed belief 
troubled Geddes, who was convinced that the Canadians 
misunderstood the attitude of the British Government. The 
question of misunderstanding on the part of the Canadians was 
one of the points he raised with King when they met in 
Washington55 in July 1922. Geddes secured a promise from King 
that the Canadian Government would not act on the appointment 
without informing him and allowing further discussion. Geddes 
was pleased with this understanding and with his apparent 
success with King on a personal level. Writing of his 
relations with King Geddes concluded, 'Relations between 
Mackenzie King and myself are most cordial.' He was convinced 
that King did not want to appoint a diplomatic representative 
at all but rather 'a High Commissioner under some other title 
such as Canadian Government representative at Washington./56
The telegram from Geddes evoked a flourish of minutes in 
the Foreign Office. The first conclusion was that the matter 
should be postponed until considered by an Imperial Conference 
because full diplomatic representation of Canada at Washington 
'really means independence of Canada.'57 The telegram 
provided Curzon with the opportunity to voice his opposition 
to the original agreement of 1920. In a letter to the 
Colonial Office, he lashed out against the agreement calling 
it 'an unfortunate one in many respects...' His condemnation 
signified a reversal in policy, as it had been the Foreign 
Office which had urged the incorporation of the Canadian 
Minister into the establishment of the Embassy. Curzon's 
distancing himself from the original agreement indicates a 
growing belief in the Foreign Office that care had to be taken 
to prevent Britain from being committed to policies negotiated
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between a Dominion and a foreign country. The Foreign 
Secretary was disturbed that the Canadians thought the 
arrangement from 1920 permitted the appointment of an 
independent representative. In Curzon's interpretation of the 
agreement, there was nothing to imply that it established 'a 
totally independent Canadian diplomatic representative at 
Washington.' He was, however, willing to accept a solution 
which 'Mackenzie King is reported to prefer', the appointment 
of a Canadian High Commissioner to Washington. Finally, the 
Foreign Secretary requested that the matter either be 
discussed among the Colonial Secretary, the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Office, or alternatively, that it be brought to 
Cabinet in order to draft a response to the Canadians.58 The 
records give no indication that either course was pursued.
Geddes kept the issue alive in the Foreign Office with 
his second telegram, sent one week after the first, which 
offered a brief history of the issue and concluded with a 
review of the current position. In late October, a 'vague 
rumour' reached Geddes that the Canadian Cabinet favoured 
appointing a Canadian diplomatic representative at Washington, 
'who should be wholly independent of the British Embassy and 
who in no circumstances whatever would take charge of British 
Imperial interests./59 On the basis of this rumour, Geddes 
decided to pay a courtesy visit to the Governor General of 
Canada and attempt to determine the views of the Canadian 
Government. At his request, Lord Byng, who had succeeded 
Devonshire as Governor General in 1921, arranged meetings 
between the Canadian Prime Minister, his ministers and Geddes. 
The meetings confirmed the rumours Geddes had heard. 'Mr. 
McKenzie King [sic]60', wrote Geddes, 'told me again with
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great frankness that a majority of his Cabinet was wholly in 
favour of appointing a Canadian Minister, not an Ambassador, 
who would be entirely responsible to the Canadian Government 
for the handling of all Canadian questions, and that the 
Canadian representative's office should be distinct from the 
British Embassy.' Geddes was disturbed by Mackenzie King's 
understanding, and that of his Cabinet, 'that this plan was 
agreeable to His Majesty's British Government.'61
Geddes attempted to inform the Canadian Prime Minister 
that such a plan was flawed. He argued that if it was 
adopted, then Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and 
the Irish Free State would soon claim the same privilege and 
imperial diplomatic unity would be compromised. He tried to 
convince King that multiple representatives would mean the end 
of imperial diplomatic unity. He found, however, that King 
did not appreciate 'that this multiplication of 
representatives would cause much difficulty.' Geddes then 
realized that he and King held two different conceptions of 
the Canadian representative's function. He decided that the 
Prime Minister 'was not thinking really of diplomatic 
relations at all, but having in Washington headquarters for 
Canadians travelling on business or pleasure; that his main 
idea of the work of Canadian representative was to deal with 
commercial and financial matters in the interest of Canadian 
trade. /62
Concluding on a condescending note, Geddes wrote of his 
difficulties making Mackenzie King fully aware of the 
limitation of his representative, a factor which Mackenzie 
King apparently had not previously considered. 'In the course 
of our long conversations', Geddes wrote,
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I had laid some stress on the fact that a 
diplomatic representative accredited to the 
President of the United States was strictly 
limited in his official approaches to the 
United States Government to conducting 
business with the President or the Secretary 
of State or the latter's official 
representative for the time being. This, I 
think, impressed Mr. McKenzie King [sic] as 
most important. Obviously this necessary 
limitation, which was not present to his 
mind, would largely prevent the Canadian 
representative from performing those duties 
which the Canadian Government anticipates 
that he will perform.63
This broader explanation, which the second telegram gave, 
of the wishes of the Canadian Government, as Geddes understood 
them, pleased officials in the Foreign Office. They were 
relieved that the 1920 arrangement had been abandoned by the 
Canadians who did 'not want their man to take charge in the 
Ambassador's absence.'64 One official ventured the hope that 
the Canadians would abandon the 'high sounding title' of 
'Canadian Government Representative' in favour of 'Trade 
Agent' or 'Agent General'.65 These fond hopes were dashed by 
Curzon's terse comment, 'I doubt it.'66
The next move came from the Colonial Office which
organised a meeting between Devonshire, now back in England, 
with the Canadian Ministers, W.S. Fielding and Ernest 
Lapointe, now in London. The Colonial Office offended the 
Foreign Office by requesting that they draft a memorandum 
examining the issue. The Foreign Office refused when it 
learned that the Canadian Government would be shown the 
document. A curt minute affirmed that 'departmentally' the 
responsibility was not the Foreign Office's. Again the 
Foreign Office expressed its desire that the matter be
addressed by the Cabinet owing to its seriousness. The
problem was 'one concerning the constitution of the Empire.
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Separate diplomatic representation unequivocally means one 
thing: separation of Canada from the Empire.'67 The Colonial 
Office again approached the Foreign Office to draft a 
memorandum outlining the difficulties involved in setting up 
a separate Canadian Embassy or Legation.68 Being assured that 
only Devonshire would see the document, the Foreign Office 
gave way and duly forwarded to the Colonial Office a summation 
of the matter from its point of view.69
In this memorandum, the Foreign Office, not surprisingly, 
opposed the granting of separate representation to Canada as 
it would weaken 'imperial foreign policy, both in fact and in 
appearance'. First, the appointment of the Canadian 
representative would mean multiple representatives in 
Washington as Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and the 
Irish Free State would move quickly to claim their right to 
representation. Second, it would encourage stronger Canadian- 
American relations. There was a tone of apprehension as the 
Foreign Office reflected upon the close proximity of 
Washington and Ottawa. This, the department predicted, would 
present an 'opportunity to those elements in the United States 
(which at the present time include highly-placed and 
influential personalities) which aim at driving a wedge 
between Great Britain and the Dominions.' The Foreign Office 
was convinced the new arrangement would result in the 
Dominion's drift away from the Empire and towards the United 
States, since there was now nothing to check the growth of a 
closer association between Canada and the United States. 'It 
would also make it increasingly difficult for Canada to remain 
outside the various existing or projected Pan-American Leagues 
and Unions (should it be her wish to do so)', the Foreign
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Office decided. The department was particularly troubled that 
all appearances of imperial diplomatic unity would be lost, 
and it predicted that the next step, which could not be 
refused, if independent Canadian representation were granted, 
would be the United States' appointment of a diplomatic 
representative to Ottawa. This 'double appointment would 
infallibly be understood by other Powers as equivalent to a 
virtual declaration of Canadian independence.'
The Foreign Office therefore resorted to the suggestion 
that the Canadians be dissuaded from seeking full independent 
representation in favour of having trade representatives, 
since trade would constitute the majority of the business. If 
the Canadian Government accepted this, the Canadian minister 
would rank with his counterparts in London and Paris, and 
imperial unity would be maintained. This course would prevent 
Britain from being held responsible for agreements negotiated 
between a Dominion and a foreign country and would revive the 
suggestion of Canadians participating in the British 
diplomatic service.70
No firm conclusions were reached at the meeting between 
Devonshire, Fielding and Lapointe. The representative of the 
Foreign Office in attendance recorded that the only point 
agreed was that the Canadians would inform the British 
Government before taking any action. Although the meeting 
resulted in nothing new, the draft which the Foreign Office 
prepared for the meeting is of interest. It reflects the 
thought which officials at the Foreign Office gave the matter. 
The serious implications of the step were not lost to them, 
though their attempts to check Canadian desires were 
unrealistic. They were at best prolonging Canada's relentless
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march towards complete control of all its affairs.
Press clippings on the issue of Canadian representation 
in Washington accumulated in the Foreign Office files 
throughout the summer of 1923. Rumours reached the department 
that the matter would be raised at the Imperial Conference 
that year and with it the question of the Canadian 
representation taking charge in the absence of the Ambassador. 
Curzon was unconcerned with these reports as he knew King had 
repudiated the idea of the Canadian Minister being second in 
command only a few days earlier.71 The issue again was tabled 
unresolved and was not revived until the request from the 
Irish Free State for representation at Washington.
Hindsight now shows that Geddes and the Foreign Office 
need not have worried about King and his Cabinet taking 
drastic action. In the four years which elapsed between 
King's assumption of power and the appointment of a Canadian 
Minister to Washington the Prime Minister showed only 
intermittent interest in the matter, a lethargy out of step 
with his image as a strident Canadian nationalist. Apart from 
occasional statements, King was not as interested with the 
issue as much as Borden had been. In the first two years in 
office, King needed to be prodded by the British Government to 
give an indication of his views on the question. Geddes' 
visit to Ottawa in the autumn of 1922 is one example when 
Britain pressured King to give his views. British persistence 
continued until the Irish Free State appointed the first 
Dominion minister to Washington. The Irish Free State used 
the foundation established by Canada to make the appointment. 
Whitehall predicted the appointment would prompt Canada into 
to action, but British officials and politicians were wrong.
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Once again, Britain induced King to state his policy in light 
of these developments, and not vice versa.
Appointing an Irish Free State representative at Washington
In 1924 the Irish Free State was granted its own 
representation at Washington. The process of appointing an 
Irish Free State representative took only months from the 
initial request. At first, Whitehall believed that Canada 
would now appoint its representative to Washington, if only to 
avoid being upstaged by the Irish Free State. When the 
Dominions were informed of the Irish Free State's request, 
officials regarded Sir Arthur Currie, the Canadian general who 
commanded the Canadian Corps in Flanders 1917-19, as the most 
probable appointment by Canada.72 The Canadian Government, 
however, remained inactive and soon the Foreign Office doubted 
whether an appointment was imminent. The Foreign Office was 
surprised and dismayed by this silence. The failure of the 
Canadians to appoint their minister before the Irish Free 
State's minister created problems of precedence. The Foreign 
Office decided Canada's seniority had to be upheld. It 
therefore established precedence for the Irish Free State 
representative, not by the date of appointment, but by 'the 
historic priority of the Dominions./73 Canada's premier 
position had been protected, but only at the initiative of the 
Foreign Office without instructions from the Canadian 
Government.
Although King and his government were not motivated to 
appoint a representative or even to defend the seniority of 
the Canada, the Irish request was important to Canada, as the 
Irish based their claim on enjoying the same status as Canada.
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This meant that Whitehall was forced to establish what the 
final agreement had been with Canada on the matter. At no 
time did the question arise of the Irish Free State 
representative's taking charge of the Embassy. A minute by 
William Tyrrell, an Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office, 
reflected the new direction of the department's thinking 
concerning representation of the Dominions in foreign 
countries. Whereas previously the preference had been to 
avoid independent Dominion representatives, Tyrrell now 
advocated such representatives and that Irish, as well as 
Canadian, representation should be 'entirely separate from, 
and independent of, the British Embassy at Washington.' The 
conclusion was reached on the ground of responsibility.
Tyrrell believed this was the only solution if confusion and 
friction were to be avoided: the British Government must not 
'divorce power from responsibility./74
Sir Eyre A. Crowe, the Permanent Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, agreed with Tyrrell as he lashed out at the 
agreement of 1920. 'The compromise agreement which was 
originally proposed to Canada was a thoroughly bad one, and it 
is lucky that Canada since found it to be quite
impracticable.' He, too, favoured the representatives being 
independent from the British Embassy, so that the Ambassador
would not be held responsible for the actions of the
Dominions.75 Ramsay MacDonald, Foreign Secretary from January 
to November 1924, agreed with his officials. In more general 
terms he described the new course upon which Britain was 
embarking with her Dominions. 'We are entering in this and in 
other respects a dangerous and difficult path as regards the 
Dominions and their powers.' He feared the potential for
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establishing 'a terrible inheritance of misunderstanding and 
friction.' MacDonald also was concerned that the Foreign 
Office 'should at once try to make the dangers of that 
position plain to the Colonial Office.,76 The Foreign Office 
complained to the Colonial Office that it was impossible to 
define Irish Free State representation on basis of Canadian 
status. It admitted that it was unable to define Canada's 
status as the rejected proposal of 1920 left the matter 
unresolved.77
Despite complaints from the Foreign Office that the 
Colonial Office was 'going too fast',78 the Irish Free State 
appointed a representative in June 1924. In his letter of 
introduction to the United States, the representative was 
commissioned to handle 'matters at Washington exclusively 
relating to the Irish Free State' and was duly accorded the 
title 'Minister Plenipotentiary'. He was not to assume charge 
of the Embassy in the absence of the Ambassador. The letter 
also stressed that in 'matters which are of Imperial concern 
or which affect other Dominions in the Commonwealth in common 
with the Irish Free State will continue to be handled as 
heretofore by this Embassy.' Specifically, the arrangements 
did not 'denote any departure from the principle of the 
diplomatic unity of the Empire.' This assertion was 
contradicted by the ensuing statement which stressed that the 
Irish Free State had control over all its external affairs. 
'In matters falling within his sphere the Irish Free State 
Minister would not be subject to the control of His Majesty's 
Ambassador nor would His Majesty's Ambassador be responsible 
for the Irish Minister's actions.'79
The distancing of the British Ambassador from the Irish
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Free State representative was the work of the Foreign Office, 
As soon as the Foreign Office realised that the Irish Free 
State representative was independent, it demanded the British 
Government be relieved of any responsibility for his actions. 
'As we told the Colonial Office on April 14th, it is clearly
impossible for His Majesty's Government to accept
responsibility for action over which they would in fact have 
no control.'80 Successful though the Foreign Office was in 
separating its Ambassador from the Irish Free State
Representative, it did not concede much hope for the success
of the arrangements. The 'experiment' was described as 
'foredoomed to failure.' The Foreign Office reasoned that 
'The United States government will turn to the central 
authority of the Empire in every case in which they think that 
the Irish Free State Government is unable or unwilling to 
satisfy their requests.'81
The process leading to the appointment of the Irish Free 
State representative formed an important element in the 
evolution in status of a Canadian representative in 
Washington. The Foreign Office's concession that the Irish 
Free State's representative be independent was a critical 
development. It was largely due to Canada that the Foreign 
Office allowed the Irish Free State and Canada and other 
Dominions to have independent representatives. Although the 
Irish Free State had the first representative from amongst the 
Dominions, it based its claim on Canada's status and it was 
this example that governed the Foreign Office's response. 
Canada was very much in the forefront of the British 
officials' minds as they negotiated and worked out the 
particulars of the Irish Free State representation.
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The matter is resolved: 1925-26
Internal minutes in the Foreign Office and its 
correspondence with the Colonial Office throughout 1925-26 
show that it anticipated the Canadian Government's request for 
a representative at any time. While his officials were 
anxious to start drafting the terms which would govern the 
agreement, Sir Austen Chamberlain, MacDonald's successor as 
Foreign Secretary, curtailed Foreign Office officials' 
efforts. In a strongly worded minute, he declared the debate 
closed until the Canadian Government made a formal approach. 
'Any proposals on this subject should come from the Canadian 
Government. It is not for His Majesty's Government to take the 
initiative./82 Another two years were to elapse after the
appointment of the Irish Free State representative before the 
Canadian Government officially requested the appointment of 
its own representative in Washington. Using the Irish letter 
of accreditation in 1924, which took its origin from the 
announcement made in 1920, the only significant change 
concerned the expansion of the Canadian minister's title to 
include 'Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary'. 
While his officials in the Foreign Office vehemently opposed 
the granting of 'Envoy Extraordinary', Chamberlain felt that 
it was a small concession for the maintenance of goodwill.83
The issue of Canadian representation at Washington 
possessed little interest for the British Cabinet. Apart from 
occasional briefings, the Cabinet was content to leave the 
shaping of policy to the Foreign and Colonial Offices. The 
British Parliament was also unconcerned. Thus, the 
departments were left to devise a policy and reach an 
agreement with the Canadian Government. The struggle which
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persisted through the years from 1919 to 1926 provides an 
insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the Foreign 
Office and the Colonial Office in the imperial setting.
Throughout the twenties, as the issue of Canadian 
representation was dealt with and resolved, the approach of 
these two departments sharply contrasted. The Colonial Office 
was passive, reacting only when confronted with formal 
requests from the Canadian Government. The Foreign Office, 
however, was more aggressive in anticipating the Canadians' 
next move. Driven by the desire to anticipate the Canadians, 
the Foreign Office constantly sought and scrutinized any new 
information. This aggressive approach, bolstered by its 
senior status in the cabinet, resulted in the dominance of 
Foreign Office opinion in policy formation.
The view of Whitehall towards Canadian representation at 
Washington passed through several stages. In the early 
twenties, the emphasis was placed on dissuading Canada from 
having an independent representative. This is reflected in 
the British counter-proposal of 1920 which had the Canadian 
minister incorporated into the establishment at the British 
Embassy. By 1924, the focus shifted away from integration to 
separation. Whitehall became concerned to protect itself from 
responsibility for any agreements negotiated independently by 
a dominion with a foreign government. Whitehall's concessions 
to the Irish Free State, regarding an independent minister, 
appeared to mark British acceptance that unified imperial 
foreign policy was over. Britain's private prediction that 
the Irish Free State experiment would fail showed the 
lingering hope that imperial foreign policy might hold 
together. As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, the
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British hope of continued imperial diplomatic unity continued 
for another two years. In 1926, when Canada finally appointed 
a minister to Washington, Chamberlain's willingness to expand 
the minister's title to include 'Envoy Extraordinary' 
signified complete acceptance that imperial diplomatic unity 
ceased to exist.
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CHAPTER 4
THE AWAKENING CONSCIOUSNESS: 1922-1923
The collapse of the Lloyd George Coalition in October 
1922 ushered in two years of instability in British politics. 
The first phase of instability came with the two short-lived 
Conservative ministries from 1922 to 1923. The second phase 
of instability occurred with Labour's ten months rule in 1924. 
Although the Conservative administrations of 1922-23, the 
first headed by Andrew Bonar Law and the second by Stanley 
Baldwin, were brief, they presided over developments which 
redirected and changed forever the character of Anglo-Canadian 
relations. The two crucial developments at this time were the 
signing of the Halibut Treaty and the Imperial Conference of 
1923. The Halibut Treaty marked the first occasion when 
Canada signed an international agreement without the co­
signature of Britain. At the Imperial Conference of 1923 the 
Dominions were granted the right to negotiate and sign their 
own treaties. From the Canadian perspective these
developments meant that Britain had abandoned attempts to 
maintain a unified foreign policy. From the British 
perspective, however, the consequences were by no means as 
decisive. Indeed, 192 3 was a watershed in imperial relations 
as far as Canada was concerned. British politicians and 
Whitehall, however, were less enthusiastic about this 
independent signing power. Britain showed its lack of 
enthusiasm by distinguishing between the types of treaties 
that would come under this concession. Independent signing 
power applied to technical treaties but not political. It was 
through this interpretation of the agreement regarding
treaties that Whitehall hoped to preserve imperial unity.
Bonar Law's Ministry:
Andrew Bonar Law and the Conservatives were swept into
power in the General Election of November 1922. Bonar Law's
term as Prime Minister ended prematurely in May, 1923 when he
resigned after being diagnosed as having throat cancer, from
which he subsequently died in 1923. Bonar Law's ministry was
unremarkable. Hankey, although biased because of his
loyalties to Lloyd George, noted that, 'Except in Lord
Curzon... I have not seen a spark of ability anywhere else.
Stanley Baldwin hardly speaks. The Duke of Devonshire looks
like an apoplectic idol and adds little counsel. The rest -
except possibly but doubtfully Amery and Lloyd Greame - are
second rate.'1 Austen Chamberlain, the future Foreign
Secretary who was not in the Cabinet, was equally concerned
about the lack of strong men in the Cabinet but chose to
reserve his praise for Devonshire not Curzon.2
The appointment of the Duke of Devonshire, a former
Governor General of Canada, 1916-1921, as Colonial Secretary
initially appeared beneficial for Canada. Certainly, it
inspired the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, to
record: 'I think it a good appointment so far as Canada is
concerned.'3 But while Devonshire may have possessed more of
an interest, or, a greater knowledge than most of Canada, he
was not a formidable force in the Colonial Office. Peter
Larkin, the Canadian High Commissioner for Canada in London,
wrote to King of a meeting with Devonshire:
There is such a difference in dealing with 
the Duke of Devonshire and Mr. Churchill - 
both remarkably nice - but one bovine and
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the other like a race-horse.
...After leaving the Duke this morning 
I could not help thinking, coming down 'from 
the sublime', that he feels towards me as 
Queen Victoria used to feel towards Mr.
Gladstone - that I preached at him, and I 
don't think he likes being preached at, but 
we are the best of friends.
Although affable, Devonshire was a weak force, and once again,
with the Prime Minister's disinterest in imperial relations,
developments in Anglo-Canadian relations were directed from
the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, with the Foreign
Office dominating events. Devonshire carried on in the
Colonial Office when Stanley Baldwin startled many political
observers by succeeding Bonar Law at 10 Downing Street.
Baldwin's Ministry:
Despite the sudden change in Prime Ministers, Anglo- 
Canadian relations were not harmed because the most 
influential offices, those of the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office, did not undergo a change in leadership.
Baldwin, a man perceived as possessing moderate 
intelligence and no political sparkle, rose quietly but 
steadily in political circles. He began his career as the 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Bonar Law, 1916-17. He 
then moved to the Treasury where he was joint and later sole 
Financial Secretary until 1921 when he entered the Cabinet as 
President of the Board of Trade. It was in Bonar Law's 
Cabinet that Baldwin became Chancellor of the Exchequer, which 
set the stage for him to become Prime Minister. Baldwin, for 
all his lack of lustre, became a Conservative leader with 
staying power, heading two more ministries, one from 1924-29 
and another from 1935-37. Loring Christie, more perceptive
143
than most of Baldwin's colleagues, wrote of Baldwin, 'He is 
not the man for brilliant improvisations, which is no harm.
. . . [He has qualities] that he will grow with any job. His 
opponents in his own and other parties are, I am bold enough 
to believe, prone to underestimate him.'5
Although Baldwin's first ministry was short lived, it was 
full of developments in British-Canadian relations. The 
Halibut Treaty and the Imperial Conference of 1923 brought the 
British and Canadian Governments to confront the terms of 
their relationship. Apart from these confrontations, the 
consecutive Conservative ministries were the first to deal 
with Mackenzie King, who was decisive in forcing changes in 
British-Canadian relations. Early encounters with King proved 
difficult ones for those in Whitehall to whom Baldwin passed 
the burden of solving the problems. That Baldwin had no 
interest in imperial affairs was highlighted by the contrast 
with Mackenzie King's enthusiasm for dealing with affairs of 
imperial unity.
Mackenzie King; The Awakening of a Canadian Nationalist
The struggle between Turkish nationalists and the Greeks 
in the Chanak Crisis of 1922, from the Canadian perspective, 
marked a new departure in Anglo-Canadian relations. This 
episode exposed an inescapable reality to Canadian 
nationalists that, despite all the discussions of Canada's 
right and role in the formulation of imperial foreign policy, 
Britain retained the power to embroil the country in 
international affairs, whether Canada wished it or not. The 
reaction in Ottawa to the Chanak Crisis reflected new 
attitudes in governing circles and a new vision of imperial
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relations. Nowhere was this new approach in Canadian 
relations with Britain more evident than in Canada's new Prime 
Minister, Mackenzie King.
In the general election of December, 1921, Mackenzie 
King, who succeeded Wilfrid Laurier as leader of the Liberal 
Party in 1919, led his party to victory over Arthur Meighen 
and the Conservative Party. King, however, failed to achieve 
a majority and was left to lead the first minority government 
since Confederation. The electorate gave King two successive 
minority governments from 1921 until 1926, when he won his 
first majority. These minority governments, together with the 
general election of 1926, prompted by the King-Byng Crisis, 
marked these years with a reputation for high political 
turmoil.
At the beginning of King's first term in office, few 
would have predicted that he would become the country's 
longest serving Prime Minister and the one who would reshape 
Anglo-Canadian relations. King's political colleagues were 
interested primarily in King's actions in domestic affairs. 
King's colleagues, however, lacked interest in external 
affairs. King, therefore, freely set the agenda for the 
conduct of imperial affairs.6 It was not until the Chanak 
Crisis in 1922, however, that King's determined imperial 
policy began to take shape. In many respects, his action in 
the Chanak Crisis and afterwards caught his British 
counterparts off guard as they knew relatively little about 
the man. Throughout this period, King was to remain an 
unpredictable factor.
King was forty-seven years of age in 1921 when his party 
came to power. King had four degrees from Toronto and
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Harvard, and his association with the Canadian Government went 
back over two decades from his first entry into the dominion 
civil service in 1900. He became a deputy minister only a 
short time after joining the dominion government in the newly- 
founded Department of Labour. There, he earned the reputation 
of being an effective conciliator in industrial disputes. In 
1908, his first venture into political waters proved fruitful 
as he won a seat in the general election. In 1909, he joined 
Laurier's Government as Minister of Labour. This political 
sojourn ended abruptly in the general election of 1911 when 
the Liberal Government was defeated. King suffered personal 
defeat by losing his seat in Parliament. At this juncture, 
accepting an offer from the Rockefeller Foundation, the future 
Prime Minister crossed the border to head the Foundation's 
Department of Industrial Relations. Many powerful people, 
including John D. Rockefeller Jr., befriended King and he did 
much to keep the American mines and factories operating during 
the Great War. Upon the conclusion of the war, King was faced 
with the crucial decision of remaining in the United States or 
returning to politics in Canada. He chose the latter and upon 
the death of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1919 became leader of the 
Liberal Party.
Becoming Liberal leader and then the Prime Minister, King 
publicly appeared an intelligent, talented negotiator with 
political acumen. There was little awareness, either among 
his colleagues or within British circles, of his determination 
to free Canada from the constraints and responsibilities of a 
unified imperial policy. Indeed, King's actions gave no clue 
as to his imperial agenda until the Chanak Crisis in 1922.
Understanding King's motivation in imperial matters, like
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understanding the man himself, has eluded most historians. He 
possessed a multi-layered personality. The obvious temptation 
for commentators is to weigh heavily the legacy of his 
grandfather, William Lyon Mackenzie, leader of the abortive 
rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada, and to conclude that King 
was fulfilling the aspirations of his grandfather to free 
Canada of British interference. During the election campaign 
of 1926, King referred to a consciousness that he was 
concluding the action initiated by his grandfather in Anglo- 
Canadian relations.7 In conjunction with this theme, 
historians have advanced the theory which views King, through 
his work and friendships, as a pro-American politician who 
wanted to link Canada more closely with the United States and 
move away from the Anglo-Canadian relationship. Both 
considerations are vital factors, but do not necessarily mean 
that King was motivated by anti-British sentiment alone. 
True, he neither commanded the respect nor had the circles of 
friends which Borden enjoyed in Britain, and he remained 
defensive that British motivation in its relations with Canada 
was based on centralising aspirations. Sensitive though King 
was to any slight from Britain, whether tangible or not, King 
was pro-British, not pro-American, and actually 'admired 
British ways, coveted British approval, and was devoted to the 
British connection.'8
King's chief motivation in wishing to secure Canada's 
freedom from unified imperial policy came from a desire to 
have Canada able to chose for itself its involvement in 
international entanglements. He espoused a doctrine, which 
has been termed 'uncomplicated' and 'naive'9, that 
international affairs could be resolved through conciliation.
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He therefore regarded the League of Nations as the prime 
agency for negotiation. In practice, King gave little support 
to the League of Nations and was primarily motivated by the 
desire to avoid any international commitments at all costs.10 
'He made it [this international view] his own to the degree 
that his ideal of national unity based on reason, compromise 
and resolution of contradictions has become a synonym for 
Canadianism./11
In some ways, King was more Borden's successor than 
Meighen was in the imperial context. Both King and Borden 
shared the wish to increase Canada's status, whereas Meighen 
did not. Unfortunately, while both Borden and King worked for 
a stronger Canadian voice, they differed over the purpose and 
forum for this voice. Borden believed that Canada had a role 
in the international arena and therefore he accepted the risk 
of commitment there? King, on the other hand, wished to avoid 
such international responsibilities. It was not Borden's 
vision of Canada's international obligations, but his 
assessment of the realities of Canada's relationship with 
Britain which put him out of step with the evolving 
conditions. King held the better understanding of relations 
between the two countries.
In 1923, in the aftermath of the Chanak Crisis, Borden 
tried to convince King that Britain would never commit Canada, 
or any other Dominion, to a treaty without its consent.12 
King rejected Borden's view and formulated his imperial policy 
accordingly. As hindsight has shown, King was right. He 
understood that despite the appearance of partnership, Canada 
had not secured an adeguate voice in the conduct of foreign 
policy. Borden's view, that the solution rested in the
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imperial framework through improved consultation, had become 
outdated within four years. Thus from the Chanak Crisis 
onward, the priority in Ottawa became one of distancing Canada 
from decisions made in the Foreign Office. This shift in 
thinking strengthened the growing gulf of misunderstanding 
between Ottawa and London and left Whitehall further behind in 
comprehending changes in Britain's relationship with Canada. 
In response to the new Canadian efforts to avoid commitment in 
imperial foreign policy, there emerged a new urgency in 
British circles that a mechanism be sought to preserve unified 
imperial policy. These endeavours came from different parts 
of Whitehall, and in different forms over the next several 
years. One of the first was devised by the Cabinet 
Secretariat, an unlikely source, and its eventual failure was 
a bad omen.
Hankev. the Cabinet Office and Dominion Consultation
In the years immediately following the war, some in 
Whitehall believed that one way of improving consultation 
might be through a broadened role for the Cabinet Secretariat. 
This was something Milner approved and indeed was optimistic 
about, since he regarded the head of the Secretariat, Maurice 
Hankey, as one of the few men interested in the issue of 
consultation. Hankey, who favoured involvement of the Cabinet 
Secretariat in the consultation process, did not share 
Milner's goal of shifting the responsibility for the Dominions 
from the Colonial Office to other departments. It was for 
this reason that he opposed Dominion Prime Ministers being 
able to communicate directly with the British Prime Minister 
through cipher telegram? 'it would short circuit the Colonial
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Office and dislocate the whole administrative machinery of 
government.'13 Apart from this reservation, from 1919 until 
nearly the end of the Bonar Law ministry, Hankey championed 
the Cabinet Office's role in keeping the Dominions informed.
In the early 1920s, two criticisms were levelled at the 
Secretariat. First, this system, conceived in 1916 by Hankey 
and Lloyd George, might have been necessary to meet the 
demands of the war years, but in peacetime its large staff 
seemed a luxury. Second, among those who were particularly 
hostile to Lloyd George's 'Garden Suburb', the Secretariat 
appeared as yet another example of Britain being governed by 
an exclusive circle of advisers.14 This charge was somewhat 
unfair as Hankey had established a reputation as an efficient 
bureaucrat long before he created the Cabinet Office.
Maurice Hankey began his career with active service in 
the Royal Marine Artillery. His administrative life, for 
which he is most famous, began in 1908 when he became a Naval 
Assistant Secretary in the Admiralty's department of Naval 
Intelligence. In 1912, he left this post to become Secretary 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, a post he held until his 
retirement in 1938. It was the outbreak of the First World 
War which presented Hankey with the opportunity to broaden his 
administrative skills as he served as Secretary of the War 
Council, the Dardanelles Committee and the War Committee. 
When Lloyd George created his War Cabinet in 1916 and later, 
the Imperial War Cabinet, he appointed Hankey as secretary to 
both.15 These appointments marked the beginning of a Cabinet 
Secretariat which established a system for the recording of 
Cabinet conclusions, the distribution of Cabinet papers and 
various other administrative matters related to the smooth
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running of Cabinet business. As the war years progressed, 
Hankey and his expanding staff seemed indispensable, and after 
the war the temporary organisation in the Cabinet Office 
continued. Hankey increased his administrative domain by 
serving as the Secretary to the British Delegation at the 
Versailles Conference and the Washington Conference together 
with other international conferences, as well as serving as 
the Secretary General for the various Imperial Conferences. 
This wide spectrum of involvement increased Hankey's influence 
- an influence resented in many quarters.
During the summer and autumn of 1922, Hankey came under 
sharp attack both in the press and in the House of Commons for 
his 'unconstitutional' power.16 The fate of the Secretariat 
appeared sealed when Bonar Law, who publicly declared that he 
intended to end the Cabinet Secretariat in 'its present 
form',17 became Prime Minister. The new Conservative 
Government attempted to place the Secretariat under the 
jurisdiction of the Treasury; Hankey successfully fought 
against this action. Not only did he succeed in preserving 
the Secretariat in its original state, but he also earned the 
additional position of Clerk of the Privy Council. This 
onslaught on the Secretariat was to be the last serious one, 
and Hankey went on to serve not only Bonar Law, but also 
Stanley Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald and Neville Chamberlain.
The saga of Hankey and the Secretariat contained an 
imperial element in the years 1919-1922. Until the settlement 
of the Secretariat's crisis with Bonar Law, Hankey displayed 
a keenness to have that body assist in keeping the Dominions 
informed. In a memorandum written in November 1922 explaining 
and defending the tasks of the Cabinet Office, Hankey
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emphasised its vital capacity in consultation with the 
Dominions by its ability to distribute appropriate Cabinet 
material. It noted the satisfaction these arrangements evoked 
among Dominion Prime Ministers. The document went one step 
further and attempted to portray the Cabinet Office as one on 
which the Dominions had pinned their hopes for the promised 
development in imperial relations. 'The feature to which the 
Prime Ministers of the Dominions attach importance is the 
status of the Cabinet Secretariat immediately under the Prime 
Minister. Their hopes and their beliefs in this Office as an 
organ of possible Imperial development along the lines of the 
resolution of 1918, which were re-affirmed in 1921, would be 
shattered if the Cabinet Secretariat were placed under the 
Treasury.'18 While the evidence is scanty, it suggests that 
this particular argument was not a major factor in the 
continuance of the Cabinet Secretariat. Moreover, once the 
future of the Secretariat was assured, Hankey lost interest in 
using the Cabinet Secretariat as a solution to the problem of 
consultation with the Dominions.
Excluded from his memorandum was the other imperial 
vision Hankey had harboured since the Imperial War Cabinet and 
the Versailles Conference. He had been impressed, as were 
many British officials and politicians, by the display of 
imperial unity which the structure of the British Empire 
Delegation appeared to give. Hankey keenly advocated that 
this structure be duplicated in London but with an Imperial 
Cabinet and an Imperial Office which would be staffed with a 
permanent Minister from each Dominion. Under this scheme, the 
Imperial Office would be located within the structure of the 
Cabinet Office.19 The placing of permanent Dominion
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representatives in London to sustain constant consultation was 
not exclusive to Hankey. Hankey7s enthusiasm for the 
proposals may have lacked the sincerity of others as it waned 
once the Cabinet Secretariat's future was secure, so that the 
Secretariat ceased to be a major player in resolving the 
question of consultation with the Dominions.
Before another plan for improved consultation could be 
mooted, another event occurred which strained the fragile 
bonds of imperial unity. In the absence of some definitive 
understanding about the future of imperial relations, Canada's 
involvement in the Halibut Treaty of 1923 pushed diplomatic 
imperial unity one step closer towards disintegration.
The Halibut Treaty of 1923
Tempting though it is to regard the Halibut Treaty as a 
tidy, self-contained episode which marks the end of imperial 
unity, and therefore the end of the Empire and the beginning 
of the Commonwealth, such a view would leave the imperial 
story incomplete. Certainly in 1923, the Canadian Government 
took the view that the treaty established Canada's right to 
self-determination in foreign affairs. Ensuing events 
confirmed this conviction. The British, however, were 
reluctant to draw this obvious conclusion. In 1923, Whitehall 
considered the treaty a serious threat to imperial unity 
because the British Government, and particularly the Foreign 
Office, had not reached a clear appreciation of the new 
relationship with Canada. Yet again, this episode highlights 
the confusion, misunderstanding, and struggle between the 
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. This time, however, 
a new complication arose within the Foreign Office as two
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opposing schools of thought emerged over the direction of 
imperial relations. One group of officials regarded this as 
the end of unity. The other group viewed the treaty as an 
exception and thus imperial unity continued. The Halibut 
Treaty did not resolve the question of imperial unity for 
officials in Whitehall; but it demonstrated how far British 
thinking had fallen behind Canadian regarding the evolution of 
imperial relations.
Preliminaries
Discussions between Canada and the United States 
regarding the ocean fisheries off the Pacific coast of North 
America had been intermittent since 1917. Although two 
treaties regulating the fishing of salmon and halibut had been 
concluded, the inability of the United States to resolve the 
conflict between federal and state jurisdictions left the 
treaties unendorsed and the fishing question unresolved. It 
was for this reason that in late December 1922, the Foreign 
Office was pleased to hear from its Ambassador at Washington, 
Sir Auckland Geddes, that the Canadian and United States 
Governments had undertaken negotiations with a view to 
concluding a convention.20 The Foreign Office neither 
resented nor believed that Canada was stepping outside its 
jurisdiction in conducting the negotiations. The practice of 
Canada negotiating directly with the United States was 
accepted, as it was understood a British representative always 
signed the treaty.
The first intimations of potential conflict between 
Britain and Canada came in late January when Geddes informed 
the Foreign Office of the modifications to the agreement
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Canada desired. The Canadian Government wanted the
authorization required to bring the convention into effect to 
come from the Canadian Parliament, and requested various 
changes in the title of the treaty to indicate this.21 The 
Foreign Office, accepting the views of Maurice Peterson, 
foresaw difficulties if Great Britain were excluded from the 
title, and decided to avoid such a 'dilemma' by having no 
title for the agreement.22 These tactics failed when Lord 
Byng, the Canadian Governor-General, conveyed the wish of his 
government that the title of the convention read a 'Convention 
between Canada and United States'. Byng also requested that 
Ernest Lapointe, the Canadian Minister for Marine and 
Fisheries, be granted full powers to sign the agreement alone. 
These requests initiated a debate in Whitehall. Although 
eventually the question of signature became the dominant 
issue, initial attention was focused on the title.23
The issue of title
Reaction in the Foreign Office to the Canadian request 
for a change in title gave an indication of the arguments 
which would arise over the question of signature. The 
decisive opinion came from George Mounsey in the Treaty 
Department. He repudiated the examples, those from a 1921 
'Trade Agreement between Canada and France' and a 1922 
'Convention of Commerce between Canada and France', presented 
by the Colonial Office in support of the Canadian request 
concerning the title, as 'bad precedents'. Mounsey opposed 
any title which excluded Great Britain. 'The Treaty is not 
between Canada and the United States, it is between 'The 
United States of America and His Majesty George V' etc., which
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should, I think be altered to the usual form of 'His Majesty 
The King of the United Kingdom' etc...' He, like Peterson, 
favoured omitting the title.24 The Foreign Office decided to 
follow Mounsey's recommendation.
The Colonial Office, conveying this message to Canada, 
inquired if these arrangements were agreeable to the Canadian 
Government. Foreign Office officials were infuriated when 
they learned of this action. R. Sperling, an Assistant 
Secretary in the Foreign Office, noted: 'It was not our
intention to invite objections. We said that we should give 
the treaty a certain title in the treaty series and the King's 
titles for use in treaties are, I understand, laid down by 
statute./25 Mounsey agreed and believed that the Colonial 
Office 'should be taken to task./26 Sperling wrote a curt 
letter from the Foreign Office expressing the hope that the 
'Canadian Government will not avail themselves of the 
opportunity offered by the private and personal telegram. 
...Lord Curzon considers it essential that [regarding HM 
Ambassador signing too] the procedure laid down in my letter 
of February 10th should be strictly adhered to./27 The issue 
of the title did not proceed much further because attention in 
Whitehall was diverted to the more serious question of 
signature.
The issue of signature
The Canadian request to be sole signatory on the Halibut 
Treaty brought the Colonial and Foreign Office once again into 
conflict. From the beginning the Colonial Office supported 
the Canadian Government's wish to sign the treaty alone. The 
Foreign Office opposed the action on two grounds: first, on
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the theoretical level, a Monarch whose realm was one unit 
could not be broken up into the King of Canada and the King of 
the United Kingdom; second, and more strenuously maintained, 
was the fear of causing a breach of imperial diplomatic unity.
The Colonial Office saw no constitutional threat in the 
Canadian request and recalled discussions surrounding a 
similar instance, the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1921. It too 
had been an agreement negotiated between Canada and the United 
States. Also at that time the issue of having the Canadian 
representative sign alone arose. The Colonial Office reminded 
the Foreign Office of a letter which it received in 1921 from 
H.W. Malkin, a Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office, who 
conceded that such action would not pose a constitutional 
threat. Malkin also wrote of his meeting with Loring 
Christie, Legal Adviser in the Canadian Department of External 
Affairs, on the possibility of a Canadian Minister alone 
signing the treaty. In the end, the two men reached a vague 
agreement that if it was made plain in the preamble that only 
Canadian legislation could enact the convention, Malkin would 
encourage the Foreign Office to accept a Canadian minister 
signing alone and he felt the department would concede the 
point.28
The example of 1921 did not persuade the Foreign Office 
to change its mind. In support of its position was the fact 
that the Water Boundary Treaty had never reached ratification 
and so no precedent had been set. In early February 1923, 
Sperling argued that to allow Canada to sign alone would 
undermine the British Ambassador's status and the concept of 
the Empire as a single entity. Continuing the argument
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originally formulated by Mounsey, he observed that
Canada professes not to regard HM Ambassador 
as representing the Canadian Government and 
formally claims a right to conduct 
negotiations with a foreign Power 
independent of His Majesty's Government.
The fact is, of course, that the Ambassador 
represents the King and not any particular 
part of the Empire; without however going 
into the constitutional position we can say 
that the omission of the Ambassador's 
signature to a formal Convention between a 
Dominion and a foreign Power is 
unprecedented.
Sperling observed that in the instances of Canadian-French and 
Canadian-Italian agreements, Sir Auckland Geddes, as the 
representative of the British Government, had conducted the 
final negotiations. Sperling was unequivocal in stating that 
Geddes should sign the treaty.29 This sentiment was relayed 
in a telegram to Geddes from the Foreign Office, informing him 
'in accordance with usage, you, in your capacity of 
Representative of HM, should append your signature first, as 
this was a treaty between 'the United States of America and 
HM, and not the United States of America and the Government of 
Canada' .30
The Colonial Office continued its fight. In a letter 
which accompanied a copy of Devonshire's telegram to Byng of 
16 February 1923, E.J. Harding, Assistant Secretary, referred 
to the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries Convention of 1919 and Lord 
Milner's opinion at that time saying that, 'if the Canadian 
plenipotentiary had signed the Treaty alone there was no 
constitutional reason why he should not be the sole signatory 
of the Treaty on behalf of His Majesty. '31 The Foreign Office 
remained firm. Peterson referred to the example of the 
Sockeye Salmon Fisheries Convention as an episode from which 
the Foreign Office had learnt a lesson.
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We have perhaps hitherto taken a 
stronger line in this instance than that 
which was determined on in connection with 
the expressed desire of the Canadian 
Government to sign the proposed substitute 
for the Rush-Bagot Agreement without the 
intervention of HM's Ambassador. In that 
case, it was decided to leave the United 
States Government to raise the necessity for 
the association of a representative of HM's 
Government in the signature. Nevertheless,
I venture to think that we should maintain 
our attitude in present circumstances [that 
a British representative also sign to show 
the consent of the British monarch]....32
H. Ritchie in the Treaty Department supported Peterson's
views. Reviewing the terms of all treaties between the King
and foreign countries, he reiterated that established practice
dictated that the King was represented by the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs and abroad by his diplomatic
representative. He accused the Canadians of setting aside
'established practice' because of erroneous 'misapprehensions'
on their part, that 'the convention is not between The King
and the United States, but in some special sense between
Canada and that country: that our Ambassador at Washington is
not The King's Ambassador but in some special sense the
Ambassador of the United Kingdom: and that The King's Full
Powers to Sir A. Geddes to sign treaties on HM's behalf are
insufficient or can be ignored./33 Both the Foreign Office
and Canada appreciated the challenge that Canada's request
represented. Strangely, however, the Foreign Office failed to
recognise that Canada was tenaciously pursuing this action.
Perhaps this blindness explains in part why the Foreign
Office, having issued strong statements, unexpectedly reversed
its position and allowed Canada to sign alone.
On 1 March 1923 the Colonial Office forwarded to the
Foreign Office a copy of Byng's telegram34, dated the 28
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February, stating that on 1 March Lapointe would travel to 
Washington to sign the treaty alone.35 The Canadians 
justified this rapid action on the ground that they wanted the 
Treaty ratified before the United States Senate recessed on 4 
March. This sudden acceleration of events forced the Foreign 
Office to move quickly. Within hours of receiving the copy of 
Byng's telegram the Foreign Office, in a complete reversal of 
its previous stance, sent instructions to Geddes that he was 
to permit Lapointe to sign alone. In this fashion, at the 
last moment, the Foreign Office permitted Canada to establish 
a precedent and breach imperial diplomatic unity. Explaining 
why the Foreign Office should have acted this way is not easy. 
One clue can be found in the instructions the Foreign Office 
gave Geddes to allow Lapointe alone to sign. Officials may 
have hoped that in yielding on this point, they could prevent 
Canada from pursuing separate representation at Washington. 
In the telegram to Geddes, the Foreign Office revealed, 
'[Mackenzie King] hints...if this concession was made to 
Canadian sentiment, his hands would be strengthened in 
resisting or at least combating the proposal to appoint a 
permanent separate Canadian plenipotentiary./36 Anxious as 
the Foreign Office was to avoid separate Canadian 
representation at Washington, this explanation is not 
convincing. After all the forthright minutes and memoranda on 
the assault on sovereignty and the principle of a unified 
imperial foreign policy, how could these be set aside because 
of a vague intimation from Mackenzie King that he would not 
pursue separate representation for Canada at Washington? 
Geddes's telegram to the Foreign Office, 2 March 1923, 
reflected his apprehension about the Foreign Office's reversal
of action. Writing to confirm that Lapointe had signed the 
treaty alone on 2 March 1923, he concluded: 'I fear that an
unfortunate precedent has been created and I am doubtful 
whether concession made will have any permanent influence on 
Canadian Government as regards separate representation at 
Washington./37
Another insight into the Foreign Office's thinking can be 
found in the concluding segment of its instructions to Geddes. 
Here an attempt was made to rationalise the fact that its 
decision to allow Canada to sign had not in any way 
compromised principles of treaty-making or the sovereignty of 
the King. It had been effected 'Without abandoning the 
general principle that British Treaties with the United States 
must be signed by the plenipotentiary representing The King as 
sovereign of the whole British Empire, and without derogating 
from your supreme authority./38
Comprehending the change of heart by the Foreign Office 
becomes even more difficult when, only four days after the 
signing of the treaty, a minute by Sperling resumed the debate 
regarding sovereignty and the maintenance of imperial 
diplomatic unity. His minute is remarkable. In its 
pessimistic tones, it foreshadows the harsh reality that 
Whitehall would eventually have to contemplate. He argued 
that in granting Lapointe the powers to sign alone, the 
principle of a unified imperial foreign policy had been 
compromised. 'The precedent created may have some very 
troublesome consequences. If Dominion Governments are free to 
sign and negotiate treaties with foreign Powers, the occasion 
must arise sooner or later when HMG will approve some treaty 
proposed by a Dominion and the Secretary of State for Foreign
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Affairs will feel unable to advise the Crown to issue full 
powers for its signature.' The only option left to Britain, 
concluded Sperling, was to grant full control of foreign 
policy to the Dominions. However, with a touch of 
condescension, he predicted that this outwardly bleak outcome 
might be the only means of salvaging imperial unity. 'When 
the Dominion realizes that it is being offered the choice of 
becoming an independent second or third class Power with the 
privilege of paying for its own independence, or of remaining 
part of a first class Power, it will probably become more 
tractable. /39
Both Mounsey and William Tyrrell, Assistant Under­
secretary in the Foreign Office, disagreed with Sperling's 
commitments. Their strong disdain for Sperling's assessment 
makes his minute the more remarkable and their assumptions 
more feeble and implausible. Mounsey tried to shrug off the 
concession of signing power to Canada as merely an 
'embarrassing' action whose potential as a troublesome 
precedent could be disregarded because it was 'the thin edge 
of the wedge'. It was, after all, a treaty concerned only 
with local matters. He also dismissed Sperling's prediction 
of the difficulty the British Government would face when a 
Dominion concluded an agreement Britain could not support. 
Mounsey was satisfied that so long as the Foreign Secretary 
referred matters to the King then imperial diplomatic unity 
could be protected.
Assuming, however, that a Dominion 
government acquires the degree of 
independence in its relations with foreign 
states foreshadowed by Mr. Sperling, the 
Colonial Office could not according to 
present practice, submit direct to the King 
an Order in Council of the Dominion
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Government requesting full powers for its 
Minister to sign a treaty, but would ask the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to 
take this action? thus presumably entitling 
the Secretary of State to satisfy himself 
that the contents of the proposed treaty 
were in no way injurious[?] to the rest of 
r the Empire before deciding to recommend HM 
to grant the full powers.40
Mounsey's thinking was flawed concerning the issue of 
Sovereignty and who advised the Sovereign. If Canada, or any 
Dominion, defined the monarch in the capacity as Sovereign of 
that nation, then the Sovereign had to accept the advice of 
His Ministers in Canada. How could the Foreign Secretary for 
Britain intervene on advice given to the Sovereign of Canada 
by his Canadian advisers? This was, after all, what happened 
with the acceptance of Canadian advice. Mounsey failed, also, 
to explore what the ramifications of this precedent would be. 
He was content to fool himself that nothing drastic had 
happened. Tyrrell, concurring with Mounsey, was more willing 
to acknowledge that relations had changed for the worse. 'I 
suppose we shall have to go on living from hand to mouth but 
Mr. Sperling is quite right in pointing out the awkwardness of 
our relations.'41 Crowe noted of the difficulties: 'I think 
it is fully realized.' Curzon did not forward an opinion, 
choosing only to initial the exchange of minutes.42
Initially, Sperling's pessimistic predictions of what the 
Halibut Treaty precedent represented were swept aside. Many 
in the Foreign Office tried to see Canada's action as an 
exception and not one that furthered the evolution of an 
independent Canadian foreign policy. They believed that 
nothing had changed, and that even the Canadians were backing 
away from the potential precedent-setting act. This hope 
appeared in a minute by Peterson on Canadian press clippings.
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'The Canadian press', wrote Peterson in late May, 'appears to 
have modified its view as to the advantages to be derived from 
the independent signature of the Canadian Minister. A note of 
apprehension is struck in the later extracts.'43 Quickly, 
however, Sperling's concerns that Great Britain could be 
placed in an awkward position internationally by a Dominion's 
action were realised in the aftermath of the Halibut Treaty.
Conflict over publication of correspondence
The first intimations of the difficulty Britain might 
face appeared when the Canadian Government tabled in the 
Canadian House of Commons, without the permission from 
Whitehall, the correspondence relating to the Halibut Treaty. 
Foreign Office officials were annoyed because the 
correspondence contained private and personal telegrams. They 
feared an international breach in diplomatic practice and 
potential damage to their relationship with the United States. 
This behaviour of the Canadian Government confirmed the 
British belief that the Canadians were ignorant and ill- 
equipped in conducting themselves in the international arena. 
The Canadian's behaviour also gave the British concern about 
how this would reflect on Britain.
Initially, Canada sought permission from the Colonial 
Office in mid-March to publish correspondence relating to the 
Halibut Treaty. At that time the department assumed that 
private and personal telegrams would not be published.44 
Geddes, the British Ambassador in Washington, was consulted. 
He recommended approval be given for the correspondence 
between the Embassy and Ottawa/ with the proviso that all 
references regarding the question of signature were omitted.
164
He also promised to consult the United States Government about 
their notes. Before Geddes had a chance to do this, he was 
informed by Byng that the Canadian Government had gone ahead, 
without receiving an answer from the Colonial Office, and 
published the correspondence.
Byng sent a lengthy explanation of the action, 
accompanied with a letter from Mackenzie King giving his 
version of the events.45 Geddes was disturbed to learn that 
letters from the United States Government were included. The 
British Ambassador immediately sought the permission of the 
Foreign Office to smooth over any difficulties that might be 
created with the United States.46 Sperling, an Assistant 
Secretary in the Foreign Office, was not anxious to give 
Geddes approval to speak to the United States immediately, 
believing it wise to delay any action.47 Tyrrell, an 
Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, overruled 
Sperling. Tyrrell, lashing out at Mackenzie King's reply as 
'a poor excuse for a such a breach of international 
etiquette,,48 approved granting Geddes permission to contact 
American officials.
By early April, Geddes still had not received 
instructions to apologise to the United States as an agreement 
could not be reached in Whitehall. Although during the second 
week of April, the Colonial Office forwarded to the Foreign 
Office Byng's telegram of 17 March, the matter dragged on. In 
the middle of May, the Colonial Office sent to the Foreign 
Office the series of letters exchanged between Byng, his 
private secretary, A.F. Sladen, and Mackenzie King. The 
Colonial Office endorsed, moreover, Byng's advice to allow the 
controversy over the publication of correspondence to be
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quietly dropped. The Foreign Office took offence both at 
Byng's suggestion and King's incomprehension that he had 
breached international etiquette. Peterson felt that King's 
lack of appreciation of the seriousness of his action 
highlighted the inadequacies of Canadian experience in the 
ways of international affairs. He endorsed the view that 
Geddes should be instructed to apologise, if only informally, 
to the United States/9 Sperling now, too, supported an 
apology. 'I think that is the least we can do. An incident 
of this sort can scarcely be treated as if it had not happened 
—  as suggested by Lord Byng.'50 Tyrrell concurred that 
Geddes should apologise if the Colonial Office approved. R.G. 
Vansittart, an official in the Foreign Office, seeking this 
approval, took the opportunity to criticise the actions both 
of King and Byng. 'You will notice Mackenzie King's 
letters...show no realisation that the susceptibilities of the 
United States Government have in any way to be taken into 
account, while Lord Byng's suggestion that the whole matter 
should be treated as though it had never taken place, seems to 
us quite impracticable.'51
The Colonial Office tried to prevent Geddes apologising 
to the United States by citing an example from 1883 which 
suggested the United States might publish correspondence 
without permission. As a concession, however, the Colonial 
Office requested that the King Government always be consulted 
before Geddes acted.52 The Foreign Office agreed, but could 
not resist refuting the Colonial Office's example and 
condemning yet again the Canadian action. 'The fact remains 
however', wrote Vansittart to Marsh in the Colonial Office, 
'that such publication is contrary to the universally
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recognised rule of intercourse between nations....'53
The matter was finally resolved in June when Geddes, with 
permission from the Canadian Government, informally apologised 
to the United States. The Foreign Office harboured a degree 
of resentment that it had been left to clean up the mess 
caused by the Canadian Government.54 The incident, moreover, 
provided ammunition for the growing school of thought in the 
Foreign Office that the vital question was not preserving 
diplomatic unity, but protecting the British Government from 
commitments which came from a Dominion's independent action. 
This school of thought, not yet universal in the 'Foreign 
Office, was gaining in influence, and its exponents directed 
much of the Foreign Office's thinking during the Imperial 
Conference of 1923. The impact of this influential group on 
the Imperial Conference of 1923 won support from Curzon, the 
Foreign Secretary, who feared that Britain might be obligated, 
without consent or consultation, by Dominion international 
actions.
Post-Halibut Treaty.; New Reflections on Dominions and Treaties
After his success with the Halibut Treaty, Mackenzie King 
recorded his assessment of imperial relations in his diary. 
He wrote of his sense of destiny with respect to the direction 
Canada must take in imperial relations. The Halibut Treaty 
was more than a commercial agreement because it possessed 
distinct political overtones for the Canadian Prime Minister. 
King viewed this treaty as part of his wider objective that 
Canada must only be drawn into international issues, peace and 
war, and international commitments, through her own choice and 
her own participation in the negotiations.55 King predicted
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this would bring him into conflict with the British 
authorities because he was challenging the very basis of 
imperial diplomatic unity. He prepared for the Imperial 
Conference of 1923 and a probable British counter-attack aimed 
at reversing any precedent set by the Halibut Treaty. King 
noted his belief that Whitehall would seek to ensure that 
imperial foreign policy remained intact and capable of 
enveloping Canada in international conflict without 
consultation or approval.56 He was determined to fight and 
was buttressed in this resolve by his staunch supporter, O.D. 
Skelton, the Dean of Arts at Queen's University, Kingston, who 
accepted King's invitation to attend the conference.57
King's determination to use the Halibut treaty as the 
means of reshaping Anglo-Canadian relations in the realm of 
foreign affairs was recognised in British circles. His calm 
satisfaction, mixed with the determination to protect his 
gain, was not however matched in the Colonial and Foreign 
Offices. Reaction both within and between the two departments 
was diverse and fluctuating, with the greater uncertainty 
occurring in the Foreign Office. Initially, Foreign Office
officials attempted to dismiss the Halibut Treaty as an
unfortunate exception. Next came their recognition that 
imperial unity was under siege. Finally, opinion in the 
Foreign Office sharply divided over whether their efforts 
should concentrate on devising a scheme to maintain imperial 
unity on critical matters in foreign policy, such as political 
treaties, or, alternatively, whether officials should resign
themselves to the end of unity. The Foreign Office and the
Colonial Office shared a new consciousness of and urgency 
about Anglo-Canadian relations. The Foreign Office
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initially rejected any precedent that might have been created 
by the Halibut Treaty and dismissed the circumstances of its 
signature as an unfortunate 'experiment'58. Through an 
exploration of technicalities, Foreign Office officials 
attempted to convince themselves that imperial unity was 
intact. Several accepted Canada's sole signature because it 
only pertained to matters of 'purely local concern'59 . They 
believed no precedent had been established which permitted 
Dominions to sign treaties alone when the issues involved 
imperial concerns. It was by these technical discriminations 
that the Foreign Office, and indeed the Colonial Office, tried 
to salvage unified imperial policy in the most significant 
aspect of diplomacy, that of political treaties: the making of 
peace and war.
Sir Cecil Hurst, an Assistant Under-Secretary and Legal 
Adviser in the Foreign Office, wrote a lengthy memorandum 
immediately after the signing of the Halibut Treaty. He, too, 
took consolation from the fact that the treaty was purely of 
local concern and moreover a commercial treaty, which did not 
reflect adversely upon imperial unity. The lesson he thought 
was to amend the weakness revealed in the imperial system, 
arising from an issue not lucidly defined. Hurst recommended 
that Whitehall should prepare in advance the response that 
might be used when a treaty's jurisdiction was unclear, since 
one Dominion might regard it as a local concern which it could 
handle alone, whereas Britain, or even other Dominions, might 
see the treaty as having imperial implications and thus 
needing imperial endorsement.60
Hurst also identified the Crown as providing a 
technicality behind which the British Government could hide in
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an effort to sustain imperial unity, if only for appearance's 
sake. He observed that so long as it remained vague on which 
ministers' advice, imperial or dominion, the Crown issued the 
power to make a treaty, and equally, so long as the Dominions 
continued to pass their requests through the official channel 
in Britain, then certainly in appearance, at least, imperial 
unity would be maintained.61
The theoretical examination of the Halibut Treaty and the 
consolation it brought was soon shattered by practical aspects 
of the treaty, as when the United States Senate attempted to 
extend its interpretation of the treaty to include all of the 
Empire. This action re-awakened fears within the Foreign 
Office that Britain might be bound by a treaty which it had no 
part in formulating. This new concern balanced against the 
desire to maintain imperial unity with respect to political 
treaties, provoked more examination in the Foreign Office in 
the months leading to the Imperial Conference of 1923.
In the summer of 1923, Foreign Office officials began to 
analyse closely the issue of the treaty-making powers of the 
Dominions. Evident in the series of minutes which followed 
was a growing awareness of the extent of the Dominions' powers 
and the reality that Britain possessed no authority to check 
their actions. Mixed with this increasing sense of dominion 
autonomy was the issue of responsibility. As mentioned above, 
Britain feared that it might be held responsible for a treaty 
which it did not negotiate. It is difficult to discern which 
consideration spurred the other. But even with these 
prevailing factors, Britain remained unwilling to accept an 
end to imperial foreign policy with respect to political 
treaties. This reluctance was displayed in the thinking
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devoted to devising resolutions on the question for the 
Imperial Conference of 1923.
The British Government attempted to maintain the unity of 
imperial foreign policy on matters of declaring war and making 
peace by using subtle, and at times ambiguous, language and 
interpretation of jurisdiction. They made distinctions 
between a political versus commercial treaties, or local 
concern versus imperial concern. These distinctions were 
vital considerations. They also adopted into their 
discussions the word 'consultation' which really stood for 
unified imperial policy. In time, officials in the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices clung to the idea of consultation as the 
means to salvage imperial unity. They believed improved 
consultation would ensure ratification of the treaties by the 
Dominions. 'Consultation', however, applied only to political 
treaties. Britain's focus on consultation in political 
treaties failed to address the new circumstances created by 
the Halibut Treaty. Although to a large degree the British 
disregarded the events of the Halibut treaty, King persisted 
with his underlying desire to have Canada take control of its 
own declaration of war and its own making of peace. Once 
again, unknowingly, the British were falling behind the pace 
of constitutional evolution set by Canada.
Sir C. Hurst, together with a fellow Legal Adviser, H. 
Malkin, and a Counsellor, G. Mounsey, began in late July 1923 
to study the question of the Dominions and treaty-making. 
They accepted that Dominions would go ahead and make treaties. 
It was, therefore, 'too late in the day'62 to reverse this 
process. Instead, they turned their attention to the matter 
of responsibility and keeping the Empire unified in the
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international setting. They made light of the question of 
responsibility in these early stages. Foreign Office 
officials, particularly Malkin, could see no reason why the 
present procedure should not continue whereby the Foreign 
Office would be the medium of communication when a foreign 
government complained that a Dominion was not fulfilling its 
treaty obligations. Furthermore, if the Foreign Office 
believed that the Dominion was at fault, then it could raise 
the matter with that Dominion. The Foreign Office recognised 
that it had no actual power over the Dominions, and if the 
Dominions continued to press the point, the Foreign Office had 
'no practical means of correcting them'63. This lack of 
actual power did not concern officials; they consoled 
themselves that whenever conflicting views had arisen between 
the British Government and a Dominion regarding obligations 
within a treaty, they had found 'in the last resort that 
Dominions are usually reluctant to insist on a point of view 
in international relations which is not supported by the Home 
Government./64 The unwritten belief was that disunity in 
imperial foreign policy would be acknowledged only internally. 
Internationally, the Empire would appear unified. British 
priorities dictated that in matters of war the Empire remained 
united. It was essential, therefore, that Dominion treaty- 
making powers be defined to ensure when any part of the Empire 
was at war, then all of the Empire was at war.65
The Colonial Office entered this debate by compiling a 
lengthy response to the Foreign Office proposal that the 
Dominions be granted limited powers to sign treaties 
applicable to themselves alone in commercial matters. The 
Colonial Office memorandum was shaped, like that of the
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Foreign Office, by the Halibut treaty. It is interesting to 
observe that in the historical section, the bulk of the 
examples and actions which had propelled change in the 
negotiation of commercial treaties was brought about by 
Canadian action. Moreover, without the recent dispute over 
the Halibut treaty, the whole issue of treaties, both 
commercial and now political, would not have been undergoing 
examination.
Even though the Colonial Office shared the Foreign 
Office's objective of maintaining imperial unity in foreign 
policy, the two offices clashed over how to achieve this goal. 
The Foreign Office favoured the granting of limited signing 
powers so that only the Dominion concerned would have 
obligations to the agreement. Therefore the Foreign Office 
thought that in political treaties which affected more than 
one Dominion there would be a British Ambassador or 
representative signing along with the Dominions and thus 
imperial unity would be maintained. The Colonial Office 
opposed limiting Dominion signing powers in political treaties 
where it was the only imperial party concerned. Instead, in 
a complicated scheme, the Colonial Office divided potential 
treaties into two categories - technical and political. In 
technical treaties, the practice of issuing limited powers to 
the Dominion concerned should be continued. With political 
treaties, full signing powers should be issued to the Dominion 
in all instances, not just those of local concern. In other 
words, the Colonial Office supported the continuance of the 
Halibut's Treaty precedent, where the Canadian representative 
was issued full unlimited signing power. The Colonial Office 
thought that giving full unlimited signing powers to the
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Dominions was one way to maintain unity in imperial foreign 
policy.
The Colonial Office believed that when a Dominion signed 
a treaty with full powers then in reality the Dominion would 
be signing on behalf of the Crown. The Colonial Office 
maintained that imperial diplomatic unity prevailed so long as 
a Dominion represented the Crown. The Crown, if the analogy 
of a human body may be employed, was one entity whose arm or 
leg could not be separated and act differently from its head. 
Furthermore, a treaty was signed in the name of His Majesty of 
the British Empire, not the monarch of specific regions, and 
therefore it did not matter whose signature, a Dominion or 
British minister, was on the treaty as it was all done as a 
representative of the crown of the British Empire and thus 
bound the entire British Empire.66 It was on this issue of 
Dominion signing powers for political treaties that the 
Foreign Office and Colonial Office disagreed. The Foreign 
Office looked no further than the attempts of the United 
States Senate to interpret the Halibut treaty as being 
applicable to all the British Empire to recognise that 
difficulties had arisen because the British Government had not 
been careful in defining the terms of the signing power of the 
Canadian representative. While the Foreign Office was 
relieved that the United States Senate had not pursued its 
original interpretation, the potential dangers were not lost. 
This Foreign Office stance seemed progressive, since it 
recognised the independent status of the Dominions established 
after the war by their signatures on the Treaty of Versailles, 
among many of the peace treaties, and their membership in the 
League of Nations. It is impossible not to be slightly
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cynical that the Foreign Office referred to these precedents, 
several years after the fact, because only now was it 
considered convenient to acknowledge them. Also, progressive 
as the Foreign Office suddenly appeared on the question of 
Dominion status, it could still write that matters of imperial 
concern required British participation. In the instances of 
treaties with imperial ramifications, the Dominion 
representative would receive full signing powers, but the 
treaty would be co-signed by a British Ambassador or 
representative.67
Considering the sudden recognition of the independent 
status of the Dominions by the Foreign Office, the Colonial 
Office gave a more sobering evaluation of the separate signing 
powers accorded to the Dominions under the terms of the Treaty 
of Versailles. The Colonial Office questioned how much 
independence the Dominions really had achieved when Lord 
Milner was able to sign various peace treaties on behalf of 
South Africa without having his power, beyond that of a 
representative of the British Government, extended. This 
questioning raised another issue that while much discussion 
was being focused around the Dominions' extensive powers, not 
as much was being devoted to Britain's diminishing power.
Sir Cecil Hurst, a Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office, 
took a rather damning view of the Colonial Office 
recommendations by observing that: 'After studying the
memorandum, I am satisfied that it is historically incomplete, 
politically unsound and practically unworkable.'68 He was 
particularly offended by the recommendation that a Dominion, 
signing an agreement on its own, should be granted full power. 
In fact, he was so disgusted that he ordered the cancellation
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of a meeting organised between the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office to resolve the question. He decided that 
nothing of value could be contributed by the Colonial Office 
and that the matter was better left with the Foreign Office. 
Yet again, the Colonial Office found itself excluded while the 
Foreign Office sorted out the formal character of Dominion 
relations.69
Apart from his damnation of the Colonial Office's ideas 
on treaty-making and the role of the Dominions, Hurst's minute 
is quite extraordinary. It reflects not only an amazing 
instinct over the direction which imperial relations with the 
Dominions would have to take in the future, but an interesting 
testament to the development of Hurst's own thinking. Only 
seven months earlier, he had suggested that imperial unity 
might potentially be salvaged by relying upon an ambiguous 
interpretation of the Crown.70 By October, Hurst was no 
longer ambiguous on the role of the Crown and on whose advice 
the Crown acted in the matter of the Halibut treaty. Directly 
attacking the Colonial Office's definition of the Crown, as 
the all-enveloping Crown of the British Empire, Hurst now 
argued the constitutional case that the Crown took advice from 
different ministers according to the country involved. The 
Crown who headed the government in Canada took actions only on 
the advice of its Canadian ministers. As Hurst now claimed, 
this had always been the constitutional position of the Crown 
in theory; the difference was that since the First World War 
the theory had become practice as the Canadian ministers who 
advised the Crown were now the ministers responsible to the 
Parliament of Canada. Hurst's capacity to recognise that the 
Crown, although embodied in one physical person, was in theory
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several crowns each of whom acted on the advice of a 
particular set of ministers, and that this was neither 
illogical nor unworkable, placed him ahead of most of his 
British colleagues. Unfortunately, for the majority in 
Whitehall, the riddle of one Crown responsible to several 
constituencies which could potentially come into conflict with 
each other remained a hindrance to resolving Anglo-Canadian 
relations.71
Hurst's memorandum also reflected a growing trend in the
Foreign Office to recognise, several years after the fact, the
advancement of the Dominions' status both in the final stages
of the Great War and their membership in the League of
Nations. Defining the practice established by these events as
one where the British Empire now consisted as 'a community of
free peoples under a common Sovereign', Hurst used this to
argue that the Colonial Office's desire to grant the Dominions
unrestricted signing powers ran counter to the independent
status of the Dominions, since another Dominion could be bound
without having been consulted. What Hurst chose not to state
was that his argument prevented the British Government from
being obligated.72
As progressive as Hurst was in recognising the
independent status of the Dominions, he remained optimistic
that continued unity could be achieved, but only if proper
steps of consultation were established. In a damning
assessment of the current system, Hurst noted for the future,
Cordial consultation can only be ensured by 
frank recognition of the rights and 
obligations of the various portions of the 
Empire. It will certainly not be
facilitated by the maintenance of paper 
restrictions or adherence to principles 
which served well in the past but which at
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present are not likely to be acceptable to 
the Parliaments of the Dominions or to the 
ministers responsible to those 
Parliaments.73
Hurst's belief that adequate consultation at this belated 
stage would save the day was incorrect. Recognition in 1923 
that sufficient consultation was the only possible way to 
preserve imperial diplomatic unity seemed to be a repetition 
of the earlier scenario regarding attempts to maintain unity 
in imperial defence policy, particularly naval policy. 
Unfortunately, just as these tactics failed to save imperial 
defence, so too did they fail in imperial foreign policy. It 
would be some time before Whitehall recognised that its 
efforts had come too late as matters of Dominions' status had 
progressed beyond the point of no return.
Imperial Conference of 1923
The first Imperial Conference in two years was convened 
in the autumn of 1923. It was a critical turning-point in 
imperial relations as the British conceded treaty-making 
rights to the Dominions. While Whitehall had initially viewed 
such concessions as limited in scope and not harmful to 
imperial diplomatic unity, the implementation of the changes, 
especially by Canada, in the years after 1923, meant that 
imperial unity had been compromised.
As King predicted, the precedent of the Halibut Treaty 
became the focal point of discussion of foreign affairs at the 
Conference. Contrary to King's anticipation, however, the 
British Government allowed the precedent to stand and 
confirmed that the Dominion Governments had the right to 
negotiate and sign treaties of purely local concern without
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consulting the British Government or having the treaty co­
signed by a British Ambassador or representative. The 
confirmation came in the form of a resolution whose initiative 
Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, supported. Some historians 
have wrongly seen this action by the British Government as an 
acknowledgement that imperial unity in foreign policy was 
over.74
Mackenzie King certainly viewed the resolutions passed at 
the Imperial Conference as marking the end of imperial unity. 
His determination to protect the precedent of the Halibut 
Treaty was facilitated by the lack of determination on the 
British side. In terms of preparation, Hankey, Secretary to 
the Cabinet, found it to be ' a deplorable spectacle compared 
with Lloyd George. It is the first time I have ever felt that 
the ability on the Dominions7 side was superior to the British 
side of the table - except for Lord Curzon.,7S The lack of 
talent in the British delegation, as suggested by Hankey, may 
have reflected a lack of interest.
Against the background of the British Cabinet's 
indifference to the question of imperial unity, dissension 
also brewed in the Foreign Office. Writers who have argued76 
that Curzon and King saw eye to eye on imperial relations in 
the realm of foreign policy may be quite close to the truth. 
The problem is that if Curzon agreed with King, his views were 
distant from those in his own department. As discussed 
earlier, Curzon's officials believed that unity had to be 
maintained in vital political agreements, such as those 
concerned with war and peace. They believed this maintenance 
might be achieved by dividing the agreements into various 
categories. The resolution from the Imperial Conference of
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1923 granting independence to Dominions to make treaties of 
local concerns can be interpreted as signalling the end of 
imperial unity. It can also be interpreted as a Foreign 
Office attempt to preserve the unity in crucial matters by 
confining the Dominion Governments to local matters. 
Hindsight shows that the resolutions in 1923 did, in fact, 
mean the termination of unity, primarily because the phrase 
'local concern' was left largely undefined and thus open to a 
wide spectrum of interpretation. Unfortunately, the Foreign 
Office officials did not foresee the impact of the resolutions 
and continued to explore the fragile concept of unity.
The need for maintaining this fragile concept of unity in 
political matters remained a high priority with Foreign Office 
officials. This concern reflected itself in many ways. Some 
wished to sustain publicly the image that the British Empire 
still operated as one cohesive body. This Foreign Office 
desire showed during discussions about publishing the Imperial 
Conference's resolutions. Contrary to the wishes of Dominion 
leaders, particularly Mackenzie King, the Foreign Office 
strongly opposed publication of the conference's resolutions. 
As one official noted, 'it was not contemplated nor is it I 
think desirable that the general attention of the world should 
be drawn to this position by the publication of the 
resolutions. /77
In the months after the Imperial Conference, Foreign 
Office officials continued to work for the establishment of 
'cordial consultation' with the Dominions. The difficulty was 
to devise the means of achieving this cordial consultation. 
One of the few recommendations came from Sir Eyre Crowe, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, who, in a
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more optimistic tone than his colleague Hurst, believed that 
it was feasible to encourage the placement of a Dominion 
representative in London, who would be empowered by his 
government to contribute his Dominion's view on foreign 
matters and thus the consequent policy would remain united as 
the proper consultation had been carried out.78 Crowe proved 
too optimistic in supposing that all the Dominions, 
particularly Canada, would be willing to assist in the scheme. 
He was wrong, as many were, in assuming that Britain and 
Canada were working towards the same goal of preserving 
imperial unity in foreign affairs. It was this incorrect 
assumption which led the Foreign Office to try time and again 
to establish 'cordial consultation'. Recognition of the need 
for proper consultation came, like so many other components of 
the imperial relationship, too late in the process. British 
efforts continued, but again these were too little, too late. 
In the immediate years, the British made repeated endeavours 
to promote imperial consultation. Their next major initiative 
towards this goal came during the brief term of the first 
Labour Government in 1924.
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CHAPTER 5
BRITAIN'S FIRST LABOUR GOVERNMENT AND ANGLO-CANADIAN 
RELATIONS
Studies about Anglo-Canadian relations in the 1920s have 
devoted little analysis to the impact created by the first 
Labour Government, which took office in January 1924 under 
Ramsay MacDonald. This lack of analysis stems from the 
conclusion that MacDonald's first ministry was not outstanding 
in policy produced.1 Certainly in terms of domestic policy, 
the Labour Government did little to distinguish itself. The 
Labour Government showed that Labour in power was not a 
national disaster. In their brief nine months in power, 
however, Labour did made a favourable impression on foreign 
affairs. MacDonald took a strong interest in foreign affairs 
and his interest ushered in another era of Anglo-Canadian 
relations in the realm of foreign policy.
The lack of historical attention to MacDonald's ministry 
and Anglo-Canadian relations means even such straightforward 
questions as whether this Labour Government introduced a new 
approach or was content to carry on in the same vein, has gone 
largely unexplored. This has left an impression that in terms 
of imperial relations a status quo was adopted by all parties. 
This impression will be tested by examining the ratification 
of the Lausanne treaty and the British Government's attempts 
to convene the constitutional conference, promised in 1917 but 
never held. Both of these issues brought MacDonald into 
conflict with Mackenzie King and revealed MacDonald's imperial 
attitudes in foreign affairs. These encounters further helped 
King to shape and articulate his definition of Canada's
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relationship with Britain in external affairs. When his 
efforts to improve consultation with Canada and other 
Dominions were rebuffed by King, MacDonald introduced new 
elements in the development of Anglo-Canadian relations.
Ramsav MacDonald
In many ways the rise of Ramsay MacDonald paralleled that 
of his party as both seemed highly unlikely candidates to win 
office. The illegitimate son of a farm labourer and a servant 
girl, MacDonald grew up in poverty and received only basic 
schooling. His rise to the leadership of a national party and 
then to Prime Minister of Britain was therefore remarkable, 
although it was hardly effortless. After two unsuccessful 
bids to win a seat in the House of Commons, MacDonald finally 
won a seat in 1906 in Leicester and held it until his defeat 
in 1918. Subsequent bids to re-enter the House failed until 
1922, the year he assumed the leadership of the Labour party.
Apart from his own lack of experience, the burden 
MacDonald faced in forming the government was a shortage of 
ministerial material within his caucus. It was primarily for 
this reason that MacDonald took the unusual step of assuming 
the roles both of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. In 
the Foreign Office, MacDonald's nine months of service were 
consumed with the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, 
attempts to convene an imperial constitutional conference, and 
setting the basis for an eventual settlement of the 
reparations crisis which had led to French occupation of the 
Ruhr. The first two matters brought MacDonald into the vortex 
of British-Dominion relations. The ensuing conflicts 
generated more tension within the Anglo-Canadian relationship,
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as the apparent message from London to Ottawa, intentional or 
not, was that the centralising forces were still strong in 
Whitehall. This impression immediately caused Mackenzie King 
to resume his vigilance over Canadian autonomy.
MacDonald Ministry;
MacDonald's ministry and Ramsay MacDonald himself 
received favourable assessments from both sides of the 
Atlantic. Mackenzie King wrote enthusiastically of the new 
Labour Government: 'It is a strong sane and sober
administration and on the whole better I believe than any 
since the days of Asquith's'2 Even three months into its 
mandate, the ever-critical Maurice Hankey observed: 'I have
never worked with a more business-like Cabinet.' While the 
bulk of his praise was directed towards MacDonald, he could 
find no reason to regard the new cabinet as less competent 
than previous Cabinets. 'There are no very outstanding 
figures', noted Hankey, 'but they are quite a competent lot of 
men and their team work is excellent. . .they are no more 
ignorant than the members of an ordinary Party Government 
coming into office after a long term of absence. In fact, 
they were better informed.'3 Generous though Hankey was in 
his approval of MacDonald, believing that he had the potential 
to be either an admirable Prime Minister or an admirable 
Foreign Secretary, he feared that the Labour leader would be 
neither since he had taken on two demanding posts, both of 
which required his undivided attention to be done properly.4
Concerns that MacDonald had over-burdened himself reached 
the highest circles of government. Many, including the King, 
George V, and Lord Curzon, the last Foreign Secretary, voiced
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concern that MacDonald would not survive the strain if he 
assumed both posts.5 Indeed, MacDonald would have preferred 
to turn the task of Foreign Secretary over to someone else, 
but he was unable to find anyone suited to the task. It is 
questionable how far MacDonald searched among his colleagues 
for a Foreign Secretary. Apart from J.H. Thomas, he 
apparently had little regard for his colleagues' potential 
skills in foreign affairs. He did seriously contemplate 
appointing Thomas, but hostility within Labour ranks prevented 
this. Thomas was not excluded, however, from the Cabinet but 
was appointed Colonial Secretary.6 While the appointment may 
have appeased the Labour ranks, the Colonial Office acquired 
a Secretary of State whose tenure was ineffectual and 
uneventful.
J.H. Thomas: the forgotten Colonial Secretary
If Andrew Bonar Law can claim the title as the 'Unknown 
Prime Minister', then certainly the J.H. Thomas can boast the 
title as the forgotten Colonial Secretary. His appointment 
was unusual in that there was little in his background or his 
interests which particularly qualified him for that task. His 
rise from errand boy, with rudimentary formal education, to 
trade union official, member of Parliament and then Cabinet 
Minister was a testament to his capabilities. He certainly 
proved his administrative skills by his direction of the 
National Union of Railwaymen, which brought him both 
prominence and powerful enemies, including many in the Labour 
Party. His placement in the Colonial Office was not because 
of expertise, but because it was the safest location for one 
of the most controversial ministers in the new government.
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It would be unjust to dismiss Thomas as an ineffective 
Colonial Secretary because of his prior preoccupation with 
British labour matters. He certainly possessed skill and
potential. Thomas was 'the only colleague who enjoyed 
unimpeded access to [MacDonald] at any time and at any 
length,'7 and this relationship might have been advantageous 
in giving the Colonial Office a powerful ally. Thomas also 
enjoyed equally good, although limited, relations, with 
Mackenzie King.8 Thomas' relationship with MacDonald and King 
did not make him or help him develop as a Colonial Secretary. 
Instead Thomas was an ardent imperialist who introduced 
himself to his staff at the Colonial Office with the greeting, 
'I'm here to see that there is no mucking about with the 
British Empire'9. He was content to leave the running of the 
Colonial Office in the hands of his officials. The result of 
this was that in the ensuing entanglements in dominion 
relations the Colonial Secretary played no role, allowing the 
leadership and direction to come predominantly from the 
Foreign Office.
Lausanne Treaty; Conflict over the Ratification
At first it was thought that British-Dominion relations 
would take an enlightened turn under the leadership of Ramsay 
MacDonald. Unlike his predecessors in the Foreign Office, he 
appeared conscious of the partnership between Britain and the 
Dominions and anxious to solicit their views. In 1923 he 
actively canvassed the opinions of Canadian members of 
Parliament on foreign affairs.10 The illusions of improved 
relations, however, were shattered by complications which 
arose over the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in the
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early months of 1924.
MacDonald inherited the problematic Treaty of Lausanne 
which originated with the Chanak Crisis of 1922. From the 
beginning, the question of Canada's participation in and 
obligations to the treaty had been vague. The task fell to 
MacDonald to proceed with the final stages of ratification, 
and this brought him into conflict with the Canadian Prime 
Minister. Decades of hindsight suggest that the dissension 
between MacDonald and King is a footnote in the annals of 
imperial relations. Even among those writers11 who pay heed 
to the dispute, the matter is regarded, in the Canadian 
context, as another event which entrenched King's desire to 
remove Canada from any obligations to British foreign policy. 
C.P. Stacey carried the argument one step further and cited it 
as another example that showed 'London's attitude to Dominion 
problems was careless and casual.'12 It is true that King's 
determination not to have Canada as a partner in the treaty, 
and his success this way, did strengthen his resolve to have 
sole command in determining Canada's international 
commitments. It is unfair, however, to dismiss the actions of 
MacDonald as casual. Quite the contrary in fact. The debacle 
over ratification awakened an interest in MacDonald about the 
role of Dominions in foreign affairs, since beyond the actual 
issue of the Treaty of Lausanne was the more general question 
of imperial unity in matters of political treaties. It was 
events in the final stages of the Lausanne treaty that spurred 
MacDonald to search for a new consensus with the Dominions.
As the conflict in the Chanak came to a close, the main 
task became the drafting of a new peace with Turkey to replace 
the Treaty of Sevres. Contrary to the practice established in
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Paris Peace talks of 1919 and the Washington Conference of 
1921, the Dominions were not invited to send representatives. 
Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, had been unable to plead 
successfully to Poincare, the French representative. Poincare 
refused to allow the Dominions to be represented unless the 
French protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia were also given 
representation.13 Curzon tried to argue that the precedent 
of Dominion representation, inapplicable to the two French 
protectorates, had been established in Versailles14, but 
Poincare refused to give way.
King was not offended by Canada's exclusion from the 
peace conference, but rather regarded it as advancing his 
cause of securing Canadian autonomy in the matter of 
international commitments. To the Canadian Prime Minister, it 
was logical that since Canada had not been involved in the 
military conflict, it should not be involved in the 
settlement. King's unwillingness to fight for Canadian 
representation was compatible with his evolving argument that 
the Canadian Parliament had to ratify any treaty before Canada 
could be held responsible for its maintenance. Any 
recommendation concerning ratification had to come from the 
Canadian cabinet which could responsibly make the 
recommendation only if Canada was an actual participant in the 
treaty's drafting. Thus King was freed of obligation under 
the Treaty of Lausanne because Canada was excluded from the 
negotiations. It was in King's interest not to press for 
representation. Without representation he had the ideal 
excuse for avoiding ratification, or, more meaningfully, of 
escaping commitment, thus strengthening Canada's independence 
in foreign matters. This Canadian line of argument, emerging
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in the early stages of the Lausanne conference, never changed. 
Difficulties arose because the British interpretation of 
Canada's commitments was rooted in the belief that Canada 
would ratify the treaty and thus maintain imperial unity.
British misunderstandings on this point of ratification 
arose because of King's communications. In the autumn of 
1922, King personally wrote the Canadian response to the first 
British telegram informing Devonshire, then Colonial 
Secretary, that there would be no Dominion representation at 
the conference. As was typical of King, it was a rambling 
response full of ambiguous and vague statements about Canada's 
commitment to ratification.15 King believed that he had 
explained that absence from the negotiations meant that Canada 
accepted exclusion from the entire process, including any 
responsibilities involved under the treaty.16 Unfortunately, 
Whitehall's interpretation differed greatly. It assumed that 
the Canadian Government took no offence at the composition of 
the British delegation and was prepared to present the 
impending treaty to its Parliament for ratification. 
Devonshire cabled this interpretation of the arrangements to 
King in early December 1922.17
King, once again, took it upon himself to argue his case. 
This time he drew upon the examples of the conferences at 
Versailles and Washington. He identified the four stages 
which were established at these conferences as prerequisites 
before Canada committed itself to the ensuing treaties. 
First, Canada appointed a representative who participated in 
the negotiations and the drafting of the treaty. Second, this 
representative formally signed the treaty on behalf of the 
Canadian Government. Third, approval of the treaty was given
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by the Canadian Parliament, and finally, the Canadian 
Government recommended that the treaty be ratified by the 
King. The underlying factor throughout this process was that 
Canada had a direct interest in each of the treaties concerned 
and therefore chose to be committed to them. Correspondingly, 
by not having representatives at the negotiations of the 
treaty Canada was completely excluded from the process, 
including the ratification of the treaty.18
Again, King's telegram was imprecise in meaning. He did 
not state outright that Canada would not ratify the treaty. 
King's vagueness would have prolonged misunderstanding between 
Britain and Canada over ratification had not Byng sent a 
private accompanying note which concisely stated the Canadian 
position: 'I understand Prime Minister is afraid that
representative of Canada may be asked to sign Treaty and does 
not want to be put in position of refusing request. He holds 
that as Canada is not represented at Conference Canada cannot 
sign Treaty.' Byng added the further note, 'He is quite 
agreeable that Lord Curzon should sign for Empire and that
Treaty should be presented to Canadian Parliament for
ratification in usual way.'19 A great deal has been made of 
this final sentence and Byng has been blamed for causing 
misunderstanding regarding ratification.20 Byng's added
statement may have given substance to the British expectations 
that Canada would ratify the treaty, but it was not the sole 
source of these expectations. For the moment, King took the
matter as settled when Devonshire replied that the British
Government accepted the fact that Canada would not sign the 
treaty. The Colonial Secretary's telegram did not mention the 
issue of ratification, since this to the British, was separate
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from signing. it was not, therefore, an obvious corollary 
that Canada's failure to sign the treaty meant that it 
excluded itself from the ratification process.
Much of the British misconception that Canada would 
ratify the treaty was based upon the fact that until Canada 
did so it was still technically at war with Turkey. This 
practical legal consideration unravelled King's otherwise tidy 
argument. The Lausanne Treaty replaced the Treaty of Sevres 
which, despite King's interpretation of events surrounding the 
signing of the various Peace treaties of 1919, had been signed 
by a British representative on behalf of Canada and was 
ratified by the Canadian Parliament. Thus for two additional 
reasons, apart from the telegram from Byng, Whitehall 
concluded that Canada would ratify the treaty.
MacDonald and King:
Whitehall was not alone in contemplating the riddle that 
without ratification Canada was still technically at war with 
Turkey. In early April, O.D. Skelton, the future Canadian 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and already a 
close adviser of King, wrote to the Canadian Prime Minister on 
this very concern. In language far more precise than King's 
own, Skelton encapsulated the dilemma facing the Canadian 
Government and offered two solutions. He acted on the 
assumption that Canada was technically at war with Turkey, 
since the collapse of the Treaty of Sevres, and would remain 
so until the new treaty was ratified. Exploring Canada's 
options, Skelton feared the implications if Canada allowed the 
King to ratify on the recommendation of Britain and other 
Dominions, with only Canada refusing approval. To permit
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this, reasoned Skelton, was an admission by Canada that its 
assent was not required in order to bind it to a treaty. He 
concluded that for Canada to allow this would be a tacit 
admittance, or worse still, acceptance, that the British 
Government still spoke for all parts of the Empire. In the 
end, Skelton recommended endorsing the treaty proper but 
excluding some of the conventions and protocols.21
Skelton was correct in his assessment of the Treaty of 
Lausanne. But whether consciously or not, he ignored a vital 
element in his argument: by conceding that Canada was still at 
war with Turkey, he inadvertently admitted that Britain could 
still declare and commit Canada to war. This consideration 
was equal in importance to ratification? until it was 
acknowledged and resolved, the British-Canadian relationship 
would remain an unequal partnership. This question was not 
the one dominating the Lausanne Treaty discussion, however, as 
attention remained fixed on ratification and Canada's role in 
the process. It was this issue of ratification which brought 
MacDonald, relatively early in his tenure as Prime Minister, 
into conflict with King.
On 1 April 1924, in response to a question in the House 
of Commons, Ramsay MacDonald made an unfortunate conjecture 
that Canada would ratify and accept the obligations of the 
Treaty of Lausanne. King was incensed when he learned of 
MacDonald's statement. Initially, he directed his anger at 
the Colonial Secretary and then at MacDonald. On both 
accounts he created a stir. In both instances, the 
misunderstanding regarding Canada's position stemmed from a 
false interpretation of Canada's earlier statements on her 
position.
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King wrote his first rebuttal of MacDonald's comments to 
J.H. Thomas, the Colonial Secretary. Including copies of the 
dispatches sent from Canada on the matter since the autumn of 
1922, King argued, as the dispatches showed, from the 
beginning, that since Canada was not a party to the 
negotiations it would not accept any obligations resulting 
from the treaty. This forceful declaration by King22 resulted 
in a lengthy memorandum prepared by the Colonial Office staff 
to provide background information for Thomas. Historically, 
it is a valuable chronology tracing the Colonial Office's 
understanding of evolving relations with Canada. The 
memorandum traced the dispatches exchanged with Canada and 
showed that as lucid as King believed he had been in defining 
the Canada's stance, he had in fact so confused the Colonial 
Office that officials were shocked by what they regarded as a 
King's change in position over Canada's treaty obligation. 
While the memorandum deals with the specifics of this issue, 
it also reveals how startled the Colonial Office staff were by 
Canada's apparent desire to breach imperial unity.
The Colonial Office memorandum focused on Canada's 
obligations to the Treaty of Sevres, the predecessor of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, which dated from the Paris Peace 
Conference. The Dominions had accepted obligations even 
though they had not participated in negotiations and were 
committed by a British representative's signature. It was 
not, therefore, unreasonable to assume that these conditions 
would continue to be acceptable. Furthermore, the memorandum 
noted that Canada had not refuted these assumptions when they 
were communicated in December 1922.23
Tracing the contents of the telegrams exchanged, the
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memorandum stressed that Canada never clearly indicated an 
unwillingness to ratify the Lausanne Treaty. Citing the 
Canadian telegram of 25 November 192224, which queried 
obligations under new treaty, the Colonial Office argued it 
had made it 'perfectly plain that any Treaty negotiated would, 
as a Treaty of Peace, be binding on Canada...'25 in its reply 
of 8 December 1922.26 It believed Canada accepted this 
conclusion as the telegram of 31 December 192227 'did not in 
any way challenge this view.'28 Disturbed by King's comment 
that following the precedent of Versailles and Washington, 
since Canada had not participated in the negotiations, it 
would not be sending a representative, the Colonial Office 
nevertheless believed that Canada would ratify the treaty. 
This assumption had been confirmed by a private note from Lord 
Byng29 accompanying the telegram.
The last substantial correspondence on the matter came in 
June 1923, when the Colonial Office informed Canada that only 
a British representative would be signing.30 Canada responded 
that it approved of this arrangement.31 It was, therefore, 
a shock when the forceful telegram of 24 March 1924 arrived 
disassociating Canada completely from ratification of the 
treaty. The Colonial Office was at a loss to explain the 
change.32 On reflection, it realised that Canada's position 
had been ambiguous from the beginning and, worse still, it 
could not be said 'that there is anything on record to show 
that the Canadian Government have accepted the obligations 
imposed by the Treaty.'33 Even with the memorandum prepared 
by his officials to guide him, the Colonial Secretary took no 
lead in the matter. King was not to be silenced without 
satisfaction. He turned to MacDonald and accused him of
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deliberately misrepresenting the position of the Canadian 
Government. What followed was a fascinating unofficial 
correspondence between the two Prime Ministers.
Initially, MacDonald tried to pass the question off as 
the action of a few political agitators. He wrote to King of 
his belief that many were well informed of the difficulties 
between the British and Canadian Governments over the treaty, 
but a few had decided to try to make political gain from it. 
In particular, he accused a 'mischievous little group of 
Liberals [British]' who seemed to be 'doing their level best 
to do evil in order to satisfy their hatred' of the Labour 
Government. In his response MacDonald wrote that he thought 
that Canada would fulfil all necessary obligations, conceding 
it was 'a purely personal belief' not based on a written 
promise, but rather based on his feelings about what Canada 
might do. He acknowledged that 'in the heat of debate it may 
have been rather peremptorily expressed./34
As usual, King replied in a long, convoluted letter which 
extended to six typed pages. On the theoretical level, King 
initially made sense as he argued that the precedents of the 
Versailles and Washington conferences meant that, in order for 
the Dominions to be committed to obligations, they must have 
representation or at least full knowledge and have given their 
prior consent. To reject this precedent would mean a return 
to the state of what King referred to, in one of his favourite 
phrases, as 'secret diplomacy' whereby the Dominions were 
committed without consultation or approval from their 
respected parliaments.35
On the technicality that Canadians were still at war 
until the treaty was ratified either by or for them, King's
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thinking becomes hard to follow. His solution was that the 
state of war should end as it began 'by the separate and 
unassisted action of His Majesty's Government.' He continued 
with a confusing riddle concerning his views on ratification. 
Alternatively, he explained that 'in no way did I suggest that 
any part of the Empire should be excluded from ratification.' 
He followed with the explanation that 'I simply made it plain 
that not having participated at the Conference, not having 
been represented at the Conference, not having signed the 
treaty or authorized its signature, we did not feel that we 
could recommend the treaty to Parliament for approval and that 
without Parliament's approval, as government we could not 
concur in its ratification.' King concluded that by not 
ratifying the treaty in the Canadian Parliament, he was 
asserting the new imperial relationship whereby Britain could 
no longer impose obligations on self-governing Dominions, in 
this instance 'under the guise of ending a state of war./36
On a personal level, MacDonald's actions cast a shadow 
over his working relationship with King. In the closing 
section of his letter, King displayed annoyance over the 
comments in Parliament and observed that MacDonald had to 
correct them publicly. 'I deeply appreciate', wrote King, 
'what you have said confidentially, . . . but you can see that 
this does not help me in the least with respect to the false 
position in which I have been placed, when no word is 
forthcoming publicly from you.' He stressed the need for a 
public retraction from MacDonald, or else he would have to 
resort to laying a complete explanation before the Canadian 
Parliament.37
MacDonald neither responded on the point of a public
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clarification, nor explored the inconsistency in King's 
argument that he would allow the King to ratify without 
excluding any part of the Empire. He adopted the 
interpretation that Canada accepted the British ratification, 
but regarded itself as excluded. It was this understanding 
which caused MacDonald to focus on resolving the issue that 
Canada was still technically at war. He wrote to King that 
with all the Dominions, except Canada, agreeing to 
ratification, there remained unanswered questions, such as 
Canada's position under international law, or indeed the 
position of the British Empire? MacDonald pleaded with King 
to work with him in resolving the matter and offered the 
suggestion that Canada might not be compromised if King 
accepted it as an obligation under the League of Nations or if 
he treated 'the experience as a special one and safeguard 
yourself against a repetition of it by a declaration to that 
effect?'38 In the end, King chose not to seek out a mutual 
solution with MacDonald and embraced, in what was becoming a 
familiar pattern, action through inaction.
No further crises surrounding the Treaty of Lausanne 
materialised. In many ways this episode has been relegated to 
secondary status in the Anglo-Canadian relationship in this 
period.39 While the long-term effects of the crisis are 
generally minor, it offers a point for reflecting upon the 
development of British-Canadian relations, after the Imperial 
Conference 1923, both in theory and in practice. One 
surprising feature comes from King's lack of clarity in 
explaining the status of Canada in imperial matters. The 
question begged is whether this was merely due to King's 
inability to express his thoughts, or whether he was still
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confused over the precise nature of Canada's imperial 
relationship and his understanding of it. The answer is not 
straightforward. Certainly, King's imprecision with his 
written word caused confusion. But equally, King appeared 
unsure as to how to resolve the riddle that Canada did require 
association, either directly or indirectly, with ratification 
of the treaty of Lausanne. Skelton made it clear to King that 
to accept ratification indirectly, by permitting the King's 
ratification to be applicable to all of the Empire, would be 
supporting the continuing concept that the British 
Government's advice to the King in foreign affairs would be 
applicable to all parts of the Empire. Consequently, King 
choose to permit Canada's indirect association with the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne. King's decision 
sustained the message to the outside world that the British 
Empire still spoke with one voice in foreign affairs. His 
action also bolstered the image that the British Government 
was still the spokesman for the Empire.
Within the spectrum of imperial relations, the conflict 
with King awakened in the British Prime Minister a new 
awareness concerning imperial relations, and in particular 
those with Canada and the breakdown in communication which 
arose from a lack of consultation. In order to prevent 
another such conflict, improving consultation with the 
Dominions became a priority for MacDonald in the aftermath of 
the Lausanne question. Undeterred by King's refusal to work 
towards resolving the problem of the Treaty of Lausanne, the 
British Prime Minister sought better consultation and 
communication by resurrecting the proposal for a 
constitutional conference. Unfortunately, King proved as
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unwilling in this spirit of cooperation as he had in the 
spirit of cooperation to resolve the conflict over Treaty of 
Lausanne.
Constitutional Conference: Failed efforts 1919-24
MacDonald's desire to convene a constitutional conference 
was not a novel idea but rather the last attempt to call the 
conference referred to in Resolution IX of the Imperial 
Conference of 1917. The significance of Resolution IX is now 
symbolic, but when it was drafted, however, the draftees 
anticipated action, particularly with its commitment to a 
constitutional conference to discuss imperial relations as 
soon as possible after the war. The circumstances which 
prevented its being summoned form an important aspect in 
understanding the evolution of British-Canadian relations. 
When MacDonald attempted to implement the proposal in 1924, 
his action was doomed because the atmosphere of imperial 
relations had changed too much. But even in the more 
favourable post-war environment, the will did not exist either 
in Whitehall or in the Dominions to bring it about.
Within Whitehall, efforts to mount a constitutional 
conference went through two great periods of activity. The 
first phase, during the years 1919-1921, was more energetic 
than the second, during the summer and autumn of 1924. When 
contrasted, the two periods present an interesting insight 
into the progression of thinking on both sides of the 
Atlantic.
One difference in Whitehall's attitude, between these two 
periods, was the belief in 1919-1921 that this conference 
would actually take place. In these years, debate within the
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Colonial Office revolved around specifics such as the agenda 
and its contents. This in turn raised the question of timing 
in order allow for adequate preparation. In the end the 
debate became circular: the preparation time required pushed 
the date further and further off, until it had been postponed 
so long that what remained of any enthusiasm for a conference 
had dissipated by early 1922.
This inability to set a date was due also to an 
unwillingness both in the Dominions and Britain to 
participate. The reluctance of the Dominions, such as Canada, 
has received a great deal attention, and has been interpreted 
in two ways: either as an example of increasing Dominion
nationalism, or as an indication of changing attitudes within 
the Dominions to the new international order. After the Great 
War, the Dominions no longer regarded the British Empire as 
the sole means to achieving peace, but rather, decided that a 
partnership was required between the United States and the 
British Empire, and this shifted their attention away from 
imperial integration.40
Perhaps growing nationalism and a new definition of the 
British Empire in the international arena influenced Dominion 
leaders, but Canadian politicians had more practical reasons. 
As Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister until 1920, 
wrote: 7We were over-confident in proposing a Constitutional 
Convention immediately after the war, as no such Convention 
could be summoned to advantage until after the subject had 
been considered and debated much more exhaustively than has 
hitherto been practicable.741 His successor, Arthur Meighen, 
opposed an early convening of a constitutional conference, not 
because of nationalistic impulses, but because he failed to
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grasp what had to be changed. Long before the First World 
War, Canada was conscious that its best interests were served 
not within the imperial context alone, but within the triangle 
formed by itself, the United States and Britain.
Whatever the reason, Canadian leaders were not anxious to 
become involved in a constitutional conference immediately 
after the war. They would have been surprised to learn that 
even before Meighen said in the autumn of 1920 that he would 
not participate in such a conference in 1921, Whitehall had 
already postponed the conference for an undetermined future 
date. In these years, virtually all the decisions on the 
British side regarding a constitutional conference were made 
within the Colonial Office, and almost exclusively between the 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, and his Parliamentary Under­
secretary, L.S. Amery.
In the first summer of peace, the problems which blocked 
a constitutional gathering were beginning to appear. In July 
1919, Maurice Hankey, the Secretary of the Cabinet, held out 
little hope that the constitutional conference would be 
imminent, as the Dominion leaders had to return to pressing 
domestic matters, and therefore any imperial developments must 
await their next visit to Britain.42 The question became a 
matter of trying to coordinate schedules to find the first 
appropriate time. The initiative came not from the Canadians 
but from the British and chiefly from L.S. Amery.
Amery approached the organisation of the conference with 
his usual enthusiasm, only to encounter opposition from an 
unexpected source, his superior, Lord Milner. The opposition 
of Milner was surprising since as early as 1916 he stated on 
public record his belief that a 'great and deliberate effort
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of constitutional reconstruction'43 was required. Immediately 
after the war, he reiterated the hope that within the year a 
constitutional conference would be held since, 'with the one 
great exception of the Crown, a bond of priceless value, it 
[the Commonwealth] has no common organ of any kind. The old 
bonds of Empire are obsolete and no new constitutional bonds 
have been created.'44 In 1919 Milner appeared publicly still 
committed to a constitutional restructuring. In practice, 
however, he gave no support to Amery's efforts.
In December, 1919, Milner informed Amery he too 
understood the urgency because of the 'present chaos' in 
imperial relations, but he decided that since the Dominion 
leaders were exhausted, the conference should be postponed 
unless they pressed for it.45 Through January, 1920, Amery 
renewed his efforts and expressed to Milner his concern about 
the dangers of delay. 'What I cannot help feeling', wrote 
Amery, 'is that while the Constitutional Conference may be 
postponed till next year all sorts of things are bound to 
happen this year which may make the situation increasingly 
difficult for the Conference unless something in the nature of 
an Imperial Conference keeps things together./46 Milner again 
expressed his support in principle for Amery's efforts but 
fearing a backlash refused to permit any planning for a 
conference. He believed such initiatives would be 'in for a 
bad re-action [sic] in constructive Imperial politics, but if 
we can weather the next year or two without letting everything 
that was achieved during the war go absolutely to pieces it 
should be possible to rebuild on the foundations then laid./47 
It is questionable how candid Milner was to Amery in revealing 
all his motives for blocking the conference. Anxious about
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the direction such a gathering might take, the Colonial 
Secretary wished to avoid the risk. In the autumn of 1920 it 
was this apprehension, not those relating to the attitudes of 
Dominion leaders, that guided Milner.
In the autumn of 1920, W.M. Hughes, Prime Minister of 
Australia, wrote to the British Government pressing for a 
constitutional conference. He wanted to check the forces 
which were causing the Empire to drift, as the 'Dominions now 
are exerting themselves in a way.. .that may lead us anywhere.' 
Hughes cited the example of the pending Canadian appointment 
at Washington.48 This telegram provided Milner with the 
indication he had previously required that the Dominions 
wished to have such a conference. Now Milner chose to 
overlook this fact and, forwarding the telegram to Lloyd 
George, enclosed a 'very confidential note' to Lloyd George 
which argued against conceding the request on the ground that 
it was not worth the risk of evolving 'a new constitution'. 
He reasoned that avoiding a conference would force the 
Dominions and Britain to work within the parameters of the 
existing system and seek out practical solutions to ensure 
'harmony'. 'It is true', noted Milner, 'that we have been 
drifting rather, and we and the Dominions are all at sixes and 
sevens about "Imperial Cabinet", "Imperial Conference", 
"Constitutional Conference", etc., etc. Everybody feels that 
something is wanted, yet nobody knows what...We do not, in my 
humble opinion, want a "Constitutional" or other 
"Conference"...'.49 Milner did not have to press his case 
hard with Lloyd George, whose only commitment to redefining 
British-Dominion relations was to mouth empty words of 
support.
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Milner had no difficulty, therefore, in accepting Arthur 
Meighen's wish that no constitutional conference be held in
1921. As Meighen informed Amery, '1 am strongly impressed 
with the importance of letting constitutional developments 
proceed as a matter of growth without pre-arrangement and as 
far as possible without concrete emphatic alteration. In a 
word, while things must grow and change for the better it 
would be just so much for the better if they do not appear to 
change at all.'50 Meighen objected to an Imperial Conference 
and refused to attend one in 1921, if it was to be the 
promised constitutional conference. In a fashion which made 
him so effective in settling impasses, Milner personally 
penned an unofficial letter to Meighen asking him to 
reconsider attending an Imperial gathering in 1921 as many 
immediate matters needed to be settled. Milner held out the 
olive branch that no immediate constitutional conference would 
be held in the near future.51 Meighen accepted.
At the Imperial gathering of 1921, many observers in 
attendance also concluded that the constitutional conference 
was not imminent. As Loring Christie reported to Borden, 
'there does not seem to be much prospect of much else being 
done for many people seem inclined to go slow on the 
constitutional question.'52 As events unfolded, things went 
much slower than even Christie predicted. Amery's last major 
bid to convene a constitutional conference came in June of 
1921, when he suggested to Lloyd George that the now retired 
Milner chair a committee to set the agenda for a conference 
and make recommendations for the interim.53 The suggestion 
never came to fruition and the issue lay dormant through 1922 
and 1923.
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The failure to call the constitutional conference in the 
years 1919-21 meant the loss of an imperial opportunity. At 
this time the attitudes of Canada and Britain, and indeed the 
other Dominions were sufficiently close that it would have 
been possible to reach a consensus, and thus extend the life 
of imperial unity. The conference did not occur for several 
reasons including preoccupation of the Dominions with domestic 
affairs; but the factor of Dominion nationalism is not in 
itself an adequate explanation. It fails to take into account 
prevailing attitudes in Whitehall, and notably overlooks the 
firm opposition of Lord Milner. In Canada, Borden, the first 
Prime Minister to deal with the issue, was not opposed to a 
constitutional conference, but wished to have time to prepare 
properly and to get domestic matters in hand first. His 
successor, Meighen, was opposed to a conference not because he 
regarded it as an infringement on Canada's national 
sovereignty, but because he was content with the current 
status of Canada within the Empire. The theory that Dominion 
nationalism blocked a conference was to develop within Canada 
later and it became a positive factor only in 1924 under 
Mackenzie King.
The question which begs an answer is whether anyone 
benefited from avoiding a conference in these early years. 
Canada's growing control of all its affairs was a strong 
beneficiary. Had a conference been convened and decisions 
made, Canada might have been brought more into the imperial 
network and into machinery from which it would have been more 
difficult in the ensuing years to disengage itself, 
particularly in respect of commitments regarding imperial 
foreign policy. If this supposition has any validity, clearly
208
the loser was Britain. While Milner feared how a conference 
might have redefined imperial relations, Amery was more shrewd 
in assessing the value of a conference. He intended it to 
avoid 'anything in the nature of a fixed or written 
constitution'54 and to concentrate primarily on constructing 
the machinery of consultation for a new Empire.55 In view of 
the future problems caused by diverging attitudes and the lack 
of effective consultation regarding foreign policy, it is 
clear that, by avoiding a constitutional conference, Whitehall 
missed its best chance to prolong the life of imperial unity 
in foreign affairs. This was not realised until several years 
later, at which point the next concerted action was too late.
Attempts of 1924: Constitutional Conference
Although efforts to convene a constitutional conference 
failed in 1919-21, in the years which followed there lingered 
a despair in Britain over the confusion of the role of the 
Dominions in the imperial foreign policy. In November 1922, 
on the eve of the difficulties which would arise over the 
Lausanne Conference and treaty, Eyre A. Crowe, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, allowed his 
disenchantment to show. Casting his thoughts back to the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Crowe 
recalled the panel system and the participation of Dominion 
representatives in these panels on behalf of the British 
Empire. Crowe's recollections revealed his displeasure at 
Britain being represented by men who knew little or nothing of 
the countries being discussed.
It would be deplorable to repeat at 
Lausanne the arrangement made at the Paris
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Peace Conference...[Sir Robert Borden 
becoming Britain's] "expert" [on Albania] 
was ludicrous and embarrassing...
That the position of the Dominions is 
thoroughly anomalous must be admitted. This 
is the inevitable consequence of the 
illogical precedent of the Paris Peace 
Conference. No amount of sophistication can 
get us over the fundamentally contradicting 
principles indulging the arrangements then 
insisted upon. We at one moment maintain 
the position that the British Empire, as 
also its foreign policy, is one; at another 
moment we claim a separate and entirely 
independent position for each Dominion in 
the important sphere of foreign policy 
represented by the League of Nations. The 
arrangement is difficult to defend in theory 
as it is difficult to work in practice.56
This sense of frustration grew more widespread and contributed
to the efforts to deal with the problem during the MacDonald
ministry.
A notable difference in 1924 was that the motivation came 
from the Foreign Office and, more significantly, from the 
Prime Minister. This motivation reflected a more direct 
involvement by the Foreign Office and a recognition that the 
issue of imperial unity affected the Foreign Office the most, 
and that the Foreign Office could no longer run the risk of 
allowing the Dominions' role in foreign policy to remain 
exclusively under the direction of the Colonial Office. Even 
so, it would be unfair to suggest that the Foreign Office 
began to contemplate the advisability of a constitutional 
conference only in 1924. During 1919-1921, the Foreign Office 
contemplated imperial affairs more discerningly than did the 
Colonial Office. After repeated difficulties, the Foreign 
Office concluded only a formal constitutional conference would 
clarify the division of power between Britain and the 
Dominions in directing imperial foreign affairs.
One clear example of the problems the Foreign Office
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faced in dealing with the changed, but undefined, state of 
imperial relations occurred over a draft convention regarding 
water pollution on the boundary between the United States and 
Canada in 1921. Concern arose in the Foreign Office when it 
learned, from reading Canadian Parliamentary comments, that 
the Canadians believed it fully within their rights to sign 
the convention alone. British officials were perturbed by 
this break with precedent in excluding the signature of a 
British delegate. Not only were senior officials upset, but 
they were frustrated by the obstacles facing them. Getting no 
support from the Colonial Office, they knew they could not 
prevent Canada from using the phrase 'on the advice of the 
Canadian Government' in the preamble. Conversely, they then 
could not stop other Dominions following Canada's example. 
The implementation of such a preamble, together with the 
precedent of a Dominion signing agreements alone, meant a 
fatal blow to imperial diplomatic unity. This confusion 
caused one official to cite this as a clear example of why a 
constitutional conference was required.57 Another observed 
that the conference was needed in order to 'prevent 
innovations being made [in this case by Canada] before the 
position has been discussed and determined./58
The most interesting memorandum came from C.J.B. Hurst, 
a Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office. His reaction to 
Canada's attitudes and understanding of imperial relations 
illustrates prevailing assumptions on imperial relations. The 
precedent which worried him the most was the possibility that 
Canada could claim that the Crown acted on Canada's advice 
alone. These implications were far-reaching and undermined 
imperial unity. While Hurst acknowledged that constitutional
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relations with the Dominions were developing he denied that 
power had been given to the Dominions to instruct the Crown 
alone. Hurst did not rule out that 'within the near future we 
shall reach a practice under which a Dominion Government would 
be entitled to advise HM to act in a matter affecting that 
Dominion, we have not reached that stage at present.' He 
observed that already in one sense the Dominions had 
arrangements where the Crown acted on their advice, as seen in 
the person of the Governor General. He was quick to qualify 
this position, however, by pointing out that the sphere of the 
Governor General was limited and did not include treaties. 
Hurst was adamant that the power of making treaties still 
remained exclusively with the British Government. This tenet 
was essential to the maintenance of imperial unity, argued 
Hurst, 'if some measure of central control is still to be 
maintained over the international engagements of the Empire 
and of its constituents elements - a control which seems to me 
essential if the unity of the Empire is to be preserved - the 
whole question of the conduct of the foreign relations of the 
Empire is bound to be brought into consideration because it is 
necessarily involved in any decision arrived at.'59 Both 
Hurst and Amery agreed in placing weight on the indivisibility 
of the Crown. Again, however, this riddle hindered the 
clarification of imperial relations. The Monarch was one unit 
not multiple. If the Monarch had more than one set of 
advisers, did not this, concluded Hurst, invite the potential 
conflict of action, when the Monarch received conflicting 
advice?
The issue of Canada signing the Convention in 1921 did 
not develop further, as it did not get beyond the draft stage.
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The Foreign Office saw the incident as a clear illustration of 
how vitally a constitutional conference was required in order 
to set guidelines to prevent the erosion of imperial 
diplomatic unity. Without guidelines there existed no way to 
check the Dominions' behaviour. In 1921, however, the Foreign 
Office, while content to recognise the need for a 
constitutional conference, was prepared to leave the issue to 
the Colonial Office.
An awareness of the need to preserve imperial unity 
carried over to 1924 when the Foreign Office assumed the 
initiative in attempting to convene a gathering of Dominion 
representatives to examine and define the constitutional 
arrangements between Britain and the Dominions. Gone in 1924, 
however, was the conviction that Hurst had expressed in 1921 
that treaty-making powers for the Empire were held exclusively 
by Whitehall. As MacDonald took the lead in trying to bring 
the Dominions together to sort out constitutional relations, 
his theme was one of cooperation and consultation. Motivated 
by the difficulties he had encountered in ratifying the Treaty 
of Lausanne, MacDonald thought present problems arose not 
from the Dominions exerting themselves in their new relations 
with Britain but from the weakness in the existing structure. 
In this assessment, MacDonald espoused a view opposite to that 
of Mackenzie King and his government.
MacDonald first intimated in April 1924 that he wished to 
bring the Dominions together to define constitutional 
relations and establish a mechanism for effective 
consultation. After this initial statement, he did not raise 
the issue again until June.60 At that time, MacDonald 
carefully stressed that the proposed gathering was not a
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Constitutional Conference, but rather a 'special meeting' 
which would explore constitutional matters in a preliminary 
manner. This preliminary examination would be the foundation 
for a future Constitutional Conference. 61 The request was 
not favourably viewed by O.D. Skelton, in Canada, who regarded 
it as a step towards unification and counter to what had been 
achieved in imperial relations. As Skelton observed of 
MacDonald, 'the sphere is much more limited than Mr. MacDonald 
recognises. Many of his present difficulties would vanish if 
he realised that it was his task to frame the policy, not of 
the British Empire, but of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland./62 Eventually, Skelton concluded that Canada could 
not refuse to participate since it appeared likely that 
Australia, New Zealand and the Irish Free State would 
participate. He concluded that since Canada had no choice but 
to participate, it was best to begin preparations. He was 
completely opposed, however, to invitations for 
representatives from the opposition as well as from the 
government.63 So it was that Canada agreed to participate in 
a preliminary constitutional meeting whose date was set for 
October 1924.64 Before it could be held, the Labour 
Government collapsed and the ensuing general election 
prevented a convening of this meeting.
The short life of this first Labour Government means that 
much must be left to conjecture in assessing its imperial 
vision. The attempt by MacDonald to convene a meeting in 
preparation for a constitutional conference shows that he had 
a keen interest in imperial affairs. He was motivated by a 
firm belief that if he could bring the Dominion leaders 
together, he could secure cooperation and salvage imperial
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unity. There is no sign that his conviction ever wavered, and 
had his government not collapsed he likely would have 
persisted with the constitutional conference. From the 
Canadian side, however, there is little evidence to suggest 
that such a meeting and future conference would have produced 
the results MacDonald desired. Skelton, in preparation for 
this preliminary meeting, prepared a memorandum on Canadian 
policy. Skelton defined MacDonald's assumptions on foreign 
policy as based on the belief that 'there must be one foreign 
policy for the Empire, that the British Empire must be 
considered a unit in foreign affairs and conferences.' 
Skelton noted that it was 'essential to decline to accept this 
view of the Empire as a whole being a single and in fact the 
only international unit.' Canada had to reject this view of 
the Empire. If Canada did not, then Skelton concluded, it 
would be 'impossible for us [Canadians] to claim with any 
logic either our present distinct representation in the League 
of Nations or distinct representation in future international 
conferences./65
MacDonald's efforts were too late in the imperial story, 
yet they show the degree of optimism and misguidance which 
prevailed. His attempts, moreover, proved a forerunner of a 
shift in the thinking of Whitehall. MacDonald employed the 
phrase 'consultation' to describe the direction he wished 
imperial relations to take66, but his guiding principle 
remained the maintenance of unity in foreign affairs. Unity 
still seemed possible once the correct machinery of 
consultation could be found. He believed that effective 
cooperation and consultation with the Dominions in foreign 
affairs would produce acceptance by them of any
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responsibilities incurred by treaties and thus unity would be 
maintained. In 1924, the shift in policy centred on the 
recognition by Whitehall that the Dominions' consent was 
required before they were bound to any treaty obligations, but 
centralising tendencies persisted as the British officials 
continued to believe that it was merely a question of devising 
the appropriate machinery of consultation to preserve unity. 
The difficulty rested with Canada's determination not to be 
drawn into the web of consultation. Over the next several 
years, Canada systematically closed every avenue which might 
have permitted increased consultation and preserved unity.
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CHAPTER 6
1924-1926: THE LAST SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS TO RETAIN
FORMAL IMPERIAL DIPLOMATIC UNITY
The collapse of the Labour Government and the subsequent 
general election brought Stanley Baldwin and the Conservatives 
back to power. It was the task of this second Baldwin 
ministry, in power until 1929, to preside over the final 
decline of formal imperial diplomatic unity. The new 
Conservative Government contained many familiar faces such as 
Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office. Leo Amery's 
personal ambition of nearly two decades was realised when he 
assumed the lead at the Colonial Office. Curzon did not 
return to his former post at the Foreign Office but was 
demoted to Lord President of the Council where he remained 
until his death in 1925. One surprising appointment for a 
Conservative ministry was Winston Churchill who as a Liberal 
MP had served so prominently in the Lloyd George coalition. 
Churchill's place in the Cabinet was even more dramatic since 
Baldwin had placed him in the Treasury. The interactions of 
Baldwin, Chamberlain, Churchill and Amery, and particularly 
between Chamberlain and Amery, left a deep impression upon 
imperial relations in these critical years.
Between 1924 and 1926, the British became more aware of 
the changes occurring in imperial foreign policy. From 1924 
until the negotiation of the Locarno agreements, the collapse 
of imperial diplomatic unity was not regarded as imminent by 
many in British Government. The Locarno agreements of 1925, 
also, did not indicate to Whitehall that formal unity was 
over. The Locarno agreements convinced many in the British
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Government that Britain must act quickly and competently to 
preserve imperial diplomatic unity. Within the key offices in 
Whitehall, these years stand out for the high degree of 
consciousness of imperial relations, and an unrealistic degree 
of optimism about the future. From the Locarno treaties until 
the Imperial Conference of 1926, the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office (and later the Dominions Office which was 
created in 1925) made concerted efforts to conceive and 
execute schemes to ensure diplomatic unity. The refusal by 
some Dominions, particularly Canada, to accept these 
initiatives spelt the schemes' doom. These initiatives were 
not without merit, but they had come too late. From 1924 to 
1926, Whitehall deluded itself that its schemes were 
sufficient to preserve imperial diplomatic unity. Until 1926 
Britain believed imperial diplomatic unity might be salvaged. 
When the Imperial Conference of 1926 was over, however, 
Britain acknowledged that imperial diplomatic unity, in the 
formal sense, was almost over. Whitehall then scurried to 
find comfort in the advent of informal diplomatic unity.
The Need For Action: a growing consciousness
The Labour Party's defeat at the polls in October 1924 
left in limbo the matter of a constitutional meeting with 
Dominion leaders. The fate of the proposed constitutional 
meeting was one of the first decisions which Austen 
Chamberlain, MacDonald's successor in the Foreign Office, and 
the new Colonial Secretary, Leo Amery, had to make. 
Chamberlain and Amery agreed, after reflection, to cancel the 
meeting. The necessity of this decision, however, meant that 
imperial matters took an early priority for the new
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Conservative ministry. Now the need for action embraced even 
the Colonial Secretary and the Foreign Secretary. It was the 
beginning of something quite new? a Foreign Secretary taking 
a keen interest in the imperial component of foreign affairs. 
Even more remarkably, this Foreign Secretary was willing to 
cooperate and discuss the matter with the Colonial Secretary.
The speed with which attention was given to the imperial 
relations deserves some note. On 7 November 1924 the new 
Conservative Government announced the composition of its 
Cabinet. Within five days, the Cabinet had its first meeting 
and two days later, on the 14 November 1924, Chamberlain was 
corresponding with Amery on the formation of a joint committee 
to examine the question of consulting the Dominions on 
foreign affairs.1 While such speedy execution was
characteristic of Amery, who had kept the Dominions foremost 
in his mind for a decade and a half, the promptitude was more 
unexpected from Chamberlain who had had little involvement in 
the Dominion question in the past. His interest was aroused, 
it seems, when his officials came forward to explain the 
preparations that MacDonald, his Labour predecessor, had made.
In 1924, one of the first memoranda Chamberlain read as 
the new Foreign Secretary concerned consultation with the 
Dominions. This memorandum, prepared by a Foreign Office 
official for Chamberlain, explained the history and current 
status of the issue. It discussed how the Dominions were kept 
informed, through weekly narrative dispatches and copies of 
the summary prepared for Cabinet. Mentioning briefly the 
resolution concerning treaties passed at the Imperial 
Conference of 1923, it observed that the current phase in 
imperial relations stemmed from MacDonald's misunderstandings
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with the Dominions during the Lausanne Treaty. In particular, 
the memorandum explained how MacDonald's difficulties with 
Canada had 'led him to draw attention to the necessity of 
finding some better method for consulting with Dominions.' 
Noting that invitations had been issued to a constitutional 
meeting, the memorandum added, 'the Dominions were very half­
hearted on the subject but in the main have now agreed to the 
idea of such a conference, but the date at which it is to meet 
remains unsettled.' After a conversation with N.W. Rowell, a 
former minister in Borden's Government, and the appointment of 
an Irish Free State representative to Washington, MacDonald 
had established a joint committee of the Foreign Office and 
the Colonial Office to prepare proposals for when the 
constitutional gathering occurred. Chamberlain had to decide 
whether or not to continue with this initiative.2
He immediately contacted Amery to say that he was keen 
that the joint committee should proceed. This was in keeping 
with Chamberlain's emerging belief at the time that 'the 
essence of our policy is that the British Empire is one and 
indivisible.'3 Yet while Chamberlain favoured a joint 
committee to explore possible methods of consultation, he was 
not enthusiastic about a constitutional gathering. Amery, 
once a supporter of such a gathering, now also found it 
undesirable. In a telegram to the Dominions in early 
December, he tried to distance the new government from 
MacDonald's attempts to organise a constitutional conference. 
Amery accused MacDonald of forging ahead when the Dominions 
obviously did not wish the gathering, although whether or not 
he actually believed this is questionable. Amery, with more 
sincerity, acknowledged that more time for preparation was
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needed, because Whitehall was still unsure about how to 
achieve its goals. Consequently, the constitutional gathering 
envisioned by MacDonald was postponed forever.4 There was 
relief in Canada, where the gathering held little appeal.5
In postponing the constitutional conference, Amery 
stressed to the Dominions that the matter of consultation 
remained in the forefront of Whitehall's attentions, and that 
other avenues of improving consultation would be explored. 
This, of course, raised the question of what routes this might 
involve. In these early months Amery had a much clearer sense 
of how he wished to proceed than Chamberlain did. Amery was 
back on target with his desire to encourage the use of the 
Dominion High Commissioners in London. Chamberlain did not 
possess such a lucid vision; in these early months Chamberlain 
was clearer about what he did not want than what he did want 
in British-Dominion relations.
Chamberlain rejected the suggestion that the Foreign 
Office should relieve the Colonial Office of its duties by 
communicating directly with the Dominions on foreign policy. 
This suggestion came as the result of a telegram from the 
Canadian Government to Amery recommending that in order to 
improve consultation the Canadian Minister of External Affairs 
should communicate directly with the Foreign Office. While 
the proposal drew few comments from Foreign Office officials6, 
Chamberlain composed a lengthy memorandum, to be considered in 
British circles, in which he firmly opposed the proposition. 
He refused to consider direct communication with the Dominions 
because that would place them on a par with foreign countries. 
On a more practical level, Chamberlain believed that the 
degree of consultation before action that Canada appeared to
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envisage would cripple the execution of foreign policy. He 
believed it essential that 'in a crisis the British Empire 
must not be paralysed because nowhere in that Empire has 
anyone the right to speak or act on its behalf.'7
This Canadian telegram was passed on to the joint 
committee of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office for 
examination and reply. Although the matter of direct 
communication with Canada was discussed, attention focused on 
King's comments regarding the role of the Dominion High 
Commissioners. The joint committee sent no response to King's 
telegram. This decision was taken despite consideration of 
Chamberlain's memorandum, which outlined several responses, 
all of which stressed the need to assure the Dominions that 
they would be kept informed and consulted as best could be 
done.8
Although the Canadian telegram failed to resolve the 
difficulties surrounding consultation, it did foreshadow 
changes. The most fascinating point the telegram highlights 
is Chamberlain's imperial attitude on the eve of great 
alterations in the imperial relationship. Anxious to appease 
the Dominions, Chamberlain was unwilling to dissolve imperial 
ties by having the Foreign Office confer directly with the 
Dominions. This would be an admission, he felt, that the 
relations between the Dominions and Britain had become those 
of foreign countries. Chamberlain, moreover, rejected any 
method that might hinder the swift execution of foreign 
policy. Chamberlain's imperial vision was based on preserving 
the unity of the Empire. What he could not foresee was that 
within a few years he would reverse his present position by
225
pursuing direct communications on foreign policy with the 
Dominions.
Amerv and Chamberlain; a new higher level of involvement
One of the unfortunate ironies of the period 1924-1926 is 
that in many respects attention to the Dominions had never 
been sustained at such a high level of interaction between the 
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. Instances had
occurred in the past when the Foreign Secretary intervened on 
particular issues, but Austen Chamberlain showed a more 
enduring interest in imperial relations than his predecessors 
had. This offered potential for resolving the present impasse 
in reshaping imperial relations. Difficulty in redefining 
imperial relations arose because both Chamberlain and Amery 
failed to appreciate the new imperial climate. Thus, instead 
of leading to a productive partnership, the co-existence of an 
involved Foreign Secretary and an energetic Colonial Secretary 
increased dissension.
When Leo Amery took over as Colonial Secretary, it marked 
the realisation of his professional ambition. Although 
groomed for the post, he had been passed over as Milner's 
successor in 1921, in favour of Churchill, and lost out to 
Devonshire in Bonar Law's ministry. With Amery now in the 
Colonial Office there was an informed and a committed Colonial 
Secretary. He was conscious of the evolving relations with 
the Dominions. Amery was also truly a protege of Milner both 
in the department and in his imperial vision. Amery had
first come into contact with Milner in the latter's famous 
'kindergarten' in South Africa, while Milner was the High 
Commissioner there. Like so many of Milner's young followers,
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Amery had a sense of the grandness of the British Empire and 
the influence it wielded internationally. Like Milner, he 
also recognised that with the new conditions created by and in 
the aftermath of the First World War, a new type of 
relationship had to be forged with the Dominions to preserve 
the fabric of unity. By 1924, Amery had retained his 
determination to maintain the unity, but he was sufficiently 
progressive to recognise that it had to be achieved in a 
different way. It was in striking out in another direction 
that Amery was to differ from his mentor, Milner. One of the 
characteristics of Milner's philosophy as Colonial Secretary 
was that new ways of cooperating with the Dominions had to be 
found. But instead of increasing the role of the Colonial 
Office, Milner foresaw its diminishing involvement and 
anticipated that the relations between the Dominions and 
Britain would primarily be conducted through the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Office and not the Colonial Office. 
What marked Amery's terms at the Colonial Office and later at 
the Dominions Office, was his determination to uphold and 
enhance these departments' involvement in British-Dominion 
relations.
Other attributes distinguished Amery from Milner. Amery 
remained highly energetic, though not always positively so, 
and Milner's attempts to refine these energies had failed. 
Whereas Milner had adopted the principle that initiatives had 
to come from the Dominions, Amery was forever conceiving one 
scheme after another in which Britain took the initiative in 
reshaping imperial relations. Where Milner commanded the 
respect of his colleagues, which did much to elevate the 
stature of the Colonial Office, Amery was tolerated but never
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greatly respected by his staff. Finally, if Milner is to be 
remembered for his strong South African leanings, Canada was 
the one that had the strongest pull for Amery. His wife was 
a Canadian, his younger son, Julian, was a godson of Sir 
Robert Borden, and Amery made a point throughout his political 
career of cultivating his Canadian contacts and staying 
informed of Canadian sentiment.
Chamberlain, Amery's opposite number in the Foreign 
Office, was something of a contrast. Unlike Amery, 
Chamberlain did not possess a long record of interest in 
imperial affairs. Indeed, it was not until he took office in 
1924 that he became involved, but he did then have an impact 
which has not received sufficient attention. If ever there 
was the need to judge a person in his time and setting in 
order to obtain a more accurate view, it is with Austen 
Chamberlain. The eldest son of Joseph Chamberlain, the famous 
Colonial Secretary at the turn of the century, and half- 
brother to Neville Chamberlain, Austen has been lost in their 
historical shadows.9 Few historians have been kind to 
Austen10, portraying him as a poor copy of his father. Yet 
he enjoyed a long political career, held most of the leading 
posts in Cabinet, apart from Prime Minister, commanded the 
respect of his colleagues and wielded power within the 
Conservative party. Historians may prefer to emphasise what 
Chamberlain did not achieve and view him as a failure because 
he never occupied 10 Downing Street. It is important, 
however, to examine what Chamberlain did accomplish. Among 
other things, as Foreign Secretary he was actively involved in 
determining the role of the Dominions in foreign affairs. As 
one biographer noted, with disparaging approval: after
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Locarno, Chamberlain's 'own preoccupations as Foreign 
Secretary became increasingly imperial rather than 
continental.'11 Initially, Chamberlain hoped that unity could 
be maintained. When it became clear that such men as 
Mackenzie King did not want to remain in the imperial fold, 
Chamberlain then displayed foresight in choosing to build for 
the future by accommodating the Dominions and laying the 
ground for informal imperial unity in diplomatic affairs. It 
is difficult not to speculate that Chamberlain was in office 
at the wrong time. Of all the Foreign Secretaries in the 
1920s, he most of all appreciated the need for the Dominions' 
participation and most conscientiously solicited their views 
and followed them. The problem was that while Chamberlain's 
skills might have succeeded in the early 1920s in extending 
the life of imperial unity, they were misplaced in the climate 
after the Imperial Conference of 1923. Chamberlain learned 
the hard way that it was no longer realistic to hope for the 
continuation of formal unity. But in this, too, he displayed 
foresight. Recognising new circumstances and redirecting the 
energies of the Foreign Office, he helped to lay the 
foundations of informal unity. This achievement secured 
informal unity during the Second World War and up to the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. All this, of course, is getting ahead of the 
story. In the meantime a few more efforts were made to save 
formal diplomatic unity. But it was a struggle exacerbated in 
no small part by tensions and disagreements between the 
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. The conflicts were 
intensified by the ill-will which developed between Amery and 
Chamberlain. Signs of these difficulties began to emerge in 
the early months of the new administration.
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Dominion High Commissioners: the untapped solution?
By the autumn of 1924 there were not many options open to 
Whitehall for resolving the difficulty of adequate 
consultation and salvaging unity. Placing the onus on the 
Dominions remained the prevailing option. It was, therefore, 
on this premise that the potential of utilising the Dominion 
High Commissioners was regarded with new enthusiasm. Amery 
embraced the concept and his zeal for this scheme of 
consultation made it easy for him to abandon MacDonald's 
proposed constitutional gathering.
From 1924 until 1928, Amery pursued attempts to build 
this new consultative structure on the foundation of the High 
Commissioner. In 1924, this attempt to build on the High 
Commissioner seemed to offer a chance of preserving unity, 
particularly in the early months of the Conservative 
administration, before the Locarno negotiations arose. But in 
the aftermath of the Imperial Conference of 1926, his scheme 
was inappropriate and unrealistic. Its eventual collapse can 
be ascribed to the opposition of Austen Chamberlain and of 
certain Dominions. Mackenzie King in Canada was one of the 
most vocal opponents and the prime factor in the scheme's 
collapse.
The notion of having the High Commissioner fill the gap 
for consultation had been mooted since the outset of the First 
World War. In 1914, the idea was promoted by Canada's new 
acting-High Commissioner to London, George Perley. Sent to 
fill the vacancy created by the death of Lord Strathcona, 
Perley was asked to review this 'virtually nominal' office and 
make recommendations. He proposed that the High Commissioner 
should be a member of the Canadian Cabinet in order to give
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clout to the office in British circles.12 The Canadian Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Borden, was not receptive to the plan 
either in 1914 or in 1917 when Perley again tried to raise the 
matter.13
After the First World War, the idea of the Dominions 
appointing a resident minister in London gained in popularity. 
Encouraged by the efficiency and success of the Imperial War 
Cabinet, this War Cabinet seemed to many contemporaries the 
ideal mechanism. During the war, the Dominion Prime Ministers 
had been on hand to expedite decisions. In peacetime, 
however, each Dominion Prime Minister would have to be 
replaced by a resident minister who would be in constant 
consultation with his own Dominion. This minister, would not 
only relay information from the British Government, but be 
empowered to speak for his government. While the idea was 
discussed with relative frequency in Whitehall, it was never 
formally proposed to the Dominions. Had the constitutional 
conference gone ahead as planned immediately after the war, 
the scheme might have been debated. Failure to take steps to 
implement it can be attributed primarily to lack of support 
from the Dominions. Borden was never quite comfortable with 
the idea and King not at all. When in 1922, Milner suggested 
to him that Canada should place a minister in London, King 
chose to ignore the proposal.14 Then in 1923, Stanley Bruce, 
the Australian Prime Minister, voiced his support for resident 
ministers. While this was warmly greeted in the Foreign 
Office15, renewed efforts to proceed with the plan collapsed 
when South Africa spoke out against it.16 Clearly by 1923, 
matters had progressed too far to hope that all the Dominions, 
notably Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State would
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endorse a concept that had the lingering sense of an Imperial 
Cabinet, which they felt would undermine the sovereignty of 
their own cabinets. Although the plan for resident ministers 
was never adopted, the notion of empowering Dominion 
representatives to act as intermediaries between the British 
Government and the home governments persisted long enough to 
reappear in the guise of Amery's proposal for the High 
Commissioners in the years 1924-28.
Within days of assuming office in November 1924, Amery 
had a brief meeting with each High Commissioner. He decided 
to convince Baldwin to host an informal tea for the High 
Commissioners at 10 Downing Street and invite Chamberlain to 
say a few words on foreign affairs.17 The tea went ahead with 
Chamberlain's talk focusing on Egypt: he expressed the hope 
that the Dominions would sign the Protocol and invited the 
Dominions' representatives to discuss foreign affairs with 
him.18 Amery judged this tea a great success, believing that 
he, Baldwin and Chamberlain had gone as far as they could 
'without forcing the hands of the Dominion Governments by 
treating the High Commissioners as their diplomatic 
representatives.'19 Amery may have believed that he had 
initiated a new form of consultation, but he was to receive 
opposition to his scheme from Chamberlain and from King.
Chamberlain could not escape consideration of this plan 
to improve consultation with the Dominions. Not only was 
Amery pressing him, but so too was Phillip Kerr. Kerr, a 
secretary to Lloyd George from 1916 to 1921, had a strong 
interest in imperial matters as shown in his association with 
the Round Table group. He edited The Round Table journal from 
1910 to 1916. In the autumn of 1924, Kerr wrote a letter to
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The Times under the pseudonym 'Voyageur'.20 Based on his 
three years of travel in Canada, Kerr gave his impressions of 
Canadian attitudes, particularly on imperial matters. When 
Kerr heard that Chamberlain had enquired who was the author of 
the letter, Kerr wrote directly to Chamberlain with 
recommendations on saving imperial unity. What was lacking, 
Kerr argued, was 'the element of constant personal contact'. 
Kerr, like Amery, concluded that the best solution centred on 
the High Commissioners. Unlike Amery, Kerr recognised that 
the British had to proceed slowly to avoid aggravating 
suspicions among Dominion Prime Ministers that their High 
Commissioners were 'trying to become absentee foreign 
ministers'. Kerr also acknowledged the fear in some Dominions 
that casual discussion among these ministers in London might 
commit the Dominions to imperial initiatives without prior 
consultation.
With this in mind, Kerr recommended that Chamberlain 
should 'inaugurate the habit' of having regular, informal 
talks with each High Commissioner on pressing foreign matters. 
Kerr hoped that the High Commissioner could add that little 
extra detail to the telegrams sent from the Colonial Office 
and provide an impression of the 'atmosphere' in the 
Dominions. He believed it important to keep such meetings 
low-key, but thought that in time they might develop into a 
system of consultation 'which would prevent incidents like 
those of Chanak. '21
Chamberlain did not oppose the notion of utilising the 
High Commissioners but was unwilling to have regular, informal 
meetings with them. Forwarding Kerr's letter to Amery, he 
distanced himself from the scheme, fearing to proceed with it.
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Fortified by the opinion of Lord Balfour, who served as the 
British Prime Minister from 1902 to 1905, Chamberlain worried 
that the plan suggested assimilating 'the position of High 
Commissioners to that of Foreign Ambassadors'. This, he 
argued, would undermine the indivisibility of imperial policy. 
He was of course willing to meet High Commissioners from time 
to time when they requested it.22
Chamberlain's anxiety about striking the right balance 
with the High Commissioners soon ended when Mackenzie King put 
an end to the affair. Perhaps if Amery had followed Kerr's 
cautious approach more closely then matters might have been 
more successful. But a more realistic view would be that even 
under the most ideal conditions, the scheme was doomed once 
King decided to block it. Amery's clever informal tea with
Baldwin, Chamberlain and the High Commissioners triggered 
King's apprehensions about Whitehall's intentions. King 
learned of this event from newspaper clippings and a letter 
from Peter Larkin, Canada's High Commissioner, whom King had 
appointed as Perley's successor in 1922. According to 
Larkin's account, Baldwin was 'anxious' that the Dominion 
Governments stay 'well-informed on everything concerning the 
Empire's Foreign policy'. Baldwin expressed interest in 
considering any scheme which might offer a better 'way of 
keeping touch' other than through the High Commissioners, but 
until then he proposed to continue to call the High 
Commissioners together to keep them informed on foreign 
affairs.23
The informal gathering aroused King's fears of a 
centralist plot in London. Although Larkin mentioned only 
Baldwin, King was convinced that 'it was one of Amery's
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schemes to set up a round table council in London'. Such a
potential decision-making body would undermine the autonomy
of Canada in foreign affairs. King, moreover, feared that
this was a stratagem to 'puli' Canada into European affairs24
and Britain's future wars.25 Echoing this fear was O.D.
Skelton, the future Canadian Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, who believed that the meeting of a
'collective circle' must be avoided.26 King conveyed to
Larkin his displeasure at the recent meeting of the High
Commissioners and opposed regular gatherings, as this council,
as he now phrased it, might easily assume powers it did not
have. Writing of the difficulties, King noted,
We see...grave possibilities of differences 
arising with some of our sister-dominions or 
between our own Dominion and the Mother 
Country, if it should ever come to be 
assumed that meetings of the kind had a 
significance from the point of view of the 
relations of the dominions to the Mother 
Country. It is difficult to see how some 
such view will not come to be very quickly 
accepted were any practice followed which 
might afford grounds for it.27
Following King's instructions, Larkin extracted from 
Amery a promise that the Colonial Secretary would abide by 
King's wishes and not pursue collective gatherings of the High 
Commissioners.28 Larkin tried to soothe any misunderstandings 
with King by stressing that the High Commissioners' gatherings 
were inoffensive since they discussed matters such as the 
British Empire Exhibition. He promised, however, that if he 
ever became 'entrapped' in a meeting with Amery and 
Chamberlain, he would prefix every comment with 'no authority 
from my Government to express'.29
King was not content to leave the matter there and told 
Amery that he did not want to alter Britain's direct
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communication with Ottawa. Again, King returned to his theme 
of responsibility, and asserted that it was Britain's 
responsibility to communicate all queries directly to Ottawa. 
King informed Britain that Canada would not support any 
schemes, such as using the Canadian High Commissioner. King 
wanted all consultation to be conducted directly between 
London and Ottawa. King believed that consultative schemes 
such as the High Commissioners tended 'to obscure or lessen 
full responsibility of [the British and Canadian 
governments]... themselves deciding upon questions that may 
demand consultation most appropriate method of consultation 
and upon the extent of their obligations in all such matters 
[sic!.' He then recommended that the High Commissioner 
receive copies of all correspondence that passed between 
Britain and Canada.30 An inter-departmental committee of the 
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office rejected this 
suggestion. In a drafted response, never sent, this inter­
departmental committee observed that the High Commissioner 
already saw most of the official despatches between the two 
governments. The chief exceptions to this were those dealing 
with foreign affairs which were highly confidential. An 
earlier arrangement made with Australia placed R.G. Casey as 
a liaison officer in the Cabinet Office. In his capacity as 
a liaison officer between the British and Australian 
Governments, Casey saw despatches on foreign affairs. He did 
not possess copies of them, but was permitted to discuss the 
contents with the Australian Government.31
Matters rested there for the time being: the chance of 
establishing a mechanism with the High Commissioners for 
improved consultation had now almost vanished. But the scheme
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was not permanently abandoned because Amery tried to resurrect 
it in 1926, and again in 1927. Curiously, in his second 
strong bid in 192 6, Amery had the support of Chamberlain.
In 1924, Chamberlain's and King both opposed using the 
High Commissioners for improved consultation because both 
feared that autonomy would be endangered. King and 
Chamberlain differed, however, in their identification of what 
aspect of autonomy was under threat. Regular meetings, 
Chamberlain believed, implied foreign status and therefore 
undermined imperial unity. Conversely, King feared that 
regular meetings would undermine Canadian autonomy. Who was 
right? If the High Commissioner carried on without any 
addition to his status, such as the ability to represent 
Canada in imperial foreign policy discussions, then King was 
closer to the truth. Either way, the matter ended before it 
effectively got started. In time, Chamberlain dismissed 
King's reservations and supported the idea of utilising the 
High Commissioners to improve communication and salvage unity. 
But the proposal was stillborn. Canada never supported it.
As has been already explored, King refused Canadian 
participation in any gatherings of the High Commissioners 
because these implied a decision-making body. This much he 
had made clear to Amery. An important component in King's 
refusal, however, was his inability to make the mental leap 
necessary to envisage an expansion of the post of High 
Commissioner to encompass foreign affairs. What was not 
appreciated in Whitehall was that hesitancy on the part of 
Canadian Prime Ministers reflected their failure to enlarge 
the limited view they held regarding the High Commissioner's 
post. The collapse of Amery's scheme affords an opportunity
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to examine the role of the High Commissioner from the Canadian 
perspective.
A striking feature of the Canadian High Commission in 
London in the 1920s was how little it had evolved since its 
inception in 1880. The post remained restricted primarily 
because the Canadian Government refused to let it keep pace 
and grow with its own expanding autonomy. In 1880 the chief 
motivation in placing a Canadian representative in Britain was 
to give a voice to Canadian interests, primarily those of 
trade and emigration. While Sir John A. Macdonald, the 
Canadian Prime Minister, envisioned a diplomatic element to 
the post, Whitehall was insistent that no diplomatic status be 
attached to the title. Optimistically, Macdonald continued to 
imply a diplomatic dimension when he informed the Canadian 
House of Commons that Canada's new representative would give 
'a higher status to Canadian commerce and more direct means of 
communication with the various nations.'32 Ironically, it was 
Macdonald who instigated the tradition of excluding the High 
Commissioner from foreign affairs and who was, moreover, 
instrumental in limiting the scope of the High Commissioner's 
authority to represent the Canadian Government. Macdonald 
guarded jealously the Prime Minister's right to be the only 
person who spoke for and committed Canada in imperial and 
external matters. This precedent was firmly set when the 
first Imperial Conference was held in 1887, and Macdonald sent 
representatives with restricted authority.33
The jealousy with which Macdonald defended the Prime 
Minister's dominance in imperial and external matters 
initiated difficulties which continued to afflict the High 
Commissioner's post from its inception.34 The possessive
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manner of the Prime Minister was mirrored in the actions of 
government departments which, in order to defend their domain 
of power, communicated directly with their British 
counterparts. These limitations prevented the High
Commissioner's role from expanding significantly in its first 
three decades.
During those decades, only three men held the post. All 
were of high calibre, the first two, Alexander Galt35 and Sir 
Charles Tupper36, having served in Macdonald's cabinet. The 
third appointee was Sir Donald Smith, a former governor of the 
Hudson Bay Company and a prominent financier of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway, who later became Lord Strathcona and Mount 
Royal.37 Despite the scope of their skills, the participation 
of all three was limited to commercial and emigration matters. 
Advancement of the office was particularly hindered by 
Strathcona's term. Serving from 1896 until his death in 1914, 
at the age of ninety-three, Strathcona's lack of vigour in his 
later years reduced the office to a nominal existence.
The inactivity of the High Commissioner's office prompted 
Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, to review the 
office and its direction, but his decision to appoint Perley 
as only acting-High Commissioner reflected his degree of 
ambivalence about the office. Perley was elevated to permanent 
High Commissioner only in 1917 after he had resigned from the 
Borden's cabinet.38 While Perley was charged with the task 
of assessing the office's duties and making recommendations, 
Borden ignored all his suggestions that greater stature be 
given to the post. Borden's unwillingness to elevate the 
office showed the British that he too shared Macdonald's and 
Laurier's reservations about the degree of power that should
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be conceded to the office. Moreover, Borden's high profile in 
London during the war years consolidated the notion that the 
British Government had to deal directly with the Canadian 
Prime Minister, thus relegating the High Commissioner to the 
sidelines in matters beyond commercial interests.39
While Perley was unsuccessful in enhancing the stature of 
the High Commissioner, he did improve its operations as a 
functional unit and this contributed to and facilitated the 
expansion of its duties during the war, when Perley was the 
Canadian Cabinet Minister in charge of overseas military 
forces. It was during this time that the High Commissioner 
was given access to official correspondence exchanged between 
the British and Canadian Governments. This arrangement, 
however, the High Commissioner found frustrating. Although he 
was made privy to more information, he remained an observer, 
not a participant, in many instances, especially those 
regarding foreign matters.40
The electoral victory of the Liberals brought a new High 
Commissioner, Peter Larkin, to London early in 1922. In his 
instructions, Mackenzie King showed that he too was adhering 
to the tradition whereby duties were confined to the trade 
sphere. Larkin, like Perley, tried to add stature to the 
post, but was never as assertive in practice as in his 
aspirations.41 He was content, it seems, largely to defend 
his existing authority and, unlike Perley, he showed hyper­
sensitivity to any British slights on Canada and a readiness 
to convey these to King.42 Larkin sent frequent
correspondence, but this was not reciprocated by King. Where 
Larkin would write privately with great regularity and detail, 
King responded in kind at best two times a year and then
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confined the letters to commercial and trade affairs.43 
Perhaps in this too, King was maintaining the tradition that 
it was agreeable that the High Commissioner be informed of the 
official correspondence and preparations for Imperial 
Conferences. He was hesitant to have the High Commissioner as 
any more than an observer in the imperial relations, 
particularly foreign affairs, between Canada and Britain. 
This position reflected more on King's limitations than 
Larkin's because if anyone could have won King's confidence 
with loyalties exclusively Canadian it was Larkin. King 
himself was pleased with the strong stance that Larkin took in 
defending Canada's image and the steady supply of information 
from the High Commission.44 But even with this ideal 
personnel, King, like all his predecessors, was incapable of 
relinquishing the Prime Minister's exclusive jurisdiction over 
the direction of foreign policy. This inability to extend any 
role to the High Commissioner in foreign matters was as 
influential as his fear that Larkin's participation in 
informal meetings or informal briefing sessions on foreign 
policy was a threat to Canadian autonomy. This lack of 
imagination and faith in the High Commissioner on the part of 
King seems to have escaped the attention of Whitehall, who 
tried again, in vain, to resurrect the scheme of utilising the 
High Commissioners to solve the problem of consultation.
Locarno treaties; exception or precedent
The peace settlement of 1919 did little to alleviate the 
struggles between Germany and France. The slight advantage 
enjoyed by France immediately after the First World War 
remained precarious as France continued to fear German
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aggression. French apprehension was not relieved by post-war 
British policy. Not only did isolationism prevail in many 
British quarters, but more disturbing was growing British 
sympathy for Germany and the belief that the threat of German 
aggression across its western borders had receded. These 
British sentiments produced an unwillingness to enter into an 
alliance with France against Germany. It was against this 
landscape that the Entente Cordiale between France and 
Britain, under strain since 1919, collapsed altogether in
1923.
Tension in Europe continued to mount through the early 
1920s and reached a pitch when France marched into the Ruhr to 
extract war reparations which Germany had been unwilling to 
make. While action had to be taken to restore stability and 
alleviate France's fears of German aggression, Britain 
remained reluctant to become involved. Efforts to ease 
tensions occurred in 1924 with the proposed Geneva Protocol, 
where members of the League of Nations agreed to submit 
disputes to arbitration, when negotiations failed, and to aid 
the victim of an aggressor. The Protocol was not approved by 
the British Parliament before the MacDonald Government left 
office and it soon collapsed against a wave of opposition in 
the second Baldwin ministry. The continuing difficulties in 
Europe thus passed to the new Foreign Secretary, Austen 
Chamberlain.
Chamberlain, who was pro-French, favoured a pact with 
France to protect it against Germany. This scheme met strong 
opposition in the Cabinet. For some ministers this stemmed 
from isolationistic tendencies, for others, it came from pro- 
German leanings. It was the German Foreign Secretary, Gustav
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Streseman, encouraged by the British Ambassador at Berlin, 
D'Abernon, who proposed an accord whereby Britain, Germany and 
France could enter a non-aggression pact. Although it took 
considerable debate to secure agreement in Cabinet, in time, 
approval was given and negotiations eventually produced the 
Locarno treaties of 1925. The treaties were limited since 
they covered only the western part of the German borders. But 
they were regarded as a victory by the British pro-German 
camp, who regarded them as ideally suited for Britain in that 
they encouraged peace and stability with minimum commitment.45
On the imperial side, Whitehall regarded the treaties as 
a victory because they evaded commitment to France and kept 
Britain's obligations in Europe minimal, thus allowing Britain 
to concentrate on its imperial interests. As events unfolded 
in connection with the Locarno treaties, the treaties damaged 
imperial interests. They are regarded as the final blow to 
attempts to maintain imperial unity.46 What is particularly 
devastating was that the British Government negotiated and 
signed the treaties without involving the Dominions. The 
failure of Chamberlain and the Foreign Office to attempt to 
involve the Dominions seemed to suggest that Chamberlain and 
the Foreign Office too had abandoned all pretence of 
maintaining imperial unity, or, that they had deliberately 
ignored the Dominions as they no longer believed in the 
viability of imperial unity.
Explaining the matter is not easy, given the 
contradictions in the Foreign Office's thinking. On the one 
hand, the Foreign Office consciously excluded the Dominions. 
But it is difficult to infer from this that the Foreign Office 
broke with, or indeed abandoned the idea of the unity. Both
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during the negotiations, and even more so in the aftermath of 
the signing, the Foreign Office fought to counter any 
supposition that it had compromised or forsaken imperial 
unity. These were exceptional circumstances, officials 
reasoned, and not precedent-setting. More important, though, 
the argument began to turn more directly on the issue of war 
and the role of the Dominions.
Exclusion of the Dominions from the Locarno negotiations 
was almost the natural corollary to events surrounding the 
Geneva Protocol. When Chamberlain took over at the Foreign 
Office he was encouraged by Lord Robert Cecil, Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster, who had a long-standing involvement in 
the League of Nations, to explore fully the Dominions' views. 
Cecil was apprehensive since he knew the Dominions would 
'never accept the Protocol', and that to pursue the issue 
would 'cause a breach in the unity of the Empire'. He 
recommended that a special committee, with Dominion 
representatives, should consider the Protocol in order to 
prevent a breach in unity.47 While Chamberlain agreed that 
the Dominions should be kept informed, he saw this as Amery's 
duty. In the months which followed, as the details of a 
military pact were worked out, Chamberlain was annoyed that 
the Foreign Office was being portrayed as indifferent to the 
Dominions because of the Colonial Office's inefficiency in 
forwarding the information that the Foreign Office had 
transmitted.48 In the spring of 1925, it became apparent to 
Whitehall that not all the Dominions would agree to be parties 
to a military pact. Imperialists had a growing sense that for 
Britain to enter a security pact would jeopardise imperial 
unity.49 Amery was disturbed by this, but his apprehensions
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were dismissed by Chamberlain, who was coming around to the 
view that he must go ahead without the Dominions. He believed 
that the security of Britain required stability on the 
Continent and he was anxious to secure it, with or without the 
Dominions.50
Chamberlain proceeded with the negotiations without even
attempting to include the Dominions in the process. Amery did
try to defend the rights of the Dominions to participate, but
he was singularly ineffectual in arguing his case. As Eyre
Crowe, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office,
observed, Amery,
as usual, dilated on the impossibility of 
doing anything, because the Dominions would 
never agree to anything being done. All 
that was required was to avoid the danger of 
any talk of entanglements, and to restrict 
ourselves to developing moral atmosphere by 
pacific methods, to the exclusion of 
anything to do with war, or disarmament, or 
force, or violence. I confess I have never 
heard even Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in his most 
wooly-headed [sic] pronouncements, talk such 
utter rubbish as Mr. Amery poured forth.51
Chamberlain, believing that time was of the essence, and that
a large delegation would jeopardise the negotiations,
proceeded alone. He considered it essential for the security
of Britain that a security pact be reached in Europe.
One reason for Chamberlain's effectiveness in executing
the negotiations without the Dominions, was that the Dominions
had acquiesced and seemed content to remain observers. To men
like King, this was the ideal arrangement and the fruition of
his dream of distancing Canada from international
responsibility. If Chamberlain went ahead without consulting
or involving Canada in the negotiations, Canada would be under
no obligation to be a party to the final treaties. For this
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reason King was able to hail the treaties as a 'great
achievement'52, and avoid ratifying them. King's counterpart 
in South Africa, General J. Hertzog, applauded the treaties as 
confirmation and recognition of the independent status of the 
Dominions.53 Thus, for those who sought to end imperial unity 
and imperial commitment without choice, the Locarno Treaties 
appeared a triumph.
This disturbing precedent was not lost on the pro­
imperialists. For men like Sir Robert Borden, the break with 
the tradition that the Dominions should be included in
negotiations, left him distraught.54 Worse still, for men 
like Loring Christie and Phillip Kerr, it seemed an abject 
betrayal. As Christie concluded, 'anyone from a Dominion must 
feel a bit of a fool when he remembers that Austen
Chamberlain, in throwing out the Protocol, seemed to invoke 
the Dominions' objections and the idea of diplomatic unity, 
and that in his next diplomatic breath at Locarno he threw the 
idea overboard.' But for all his displeasure, Christie did 
not wholly blame the Foreign Office, observing: 'I'll freely 
confess that the Dominions themselves have done little to give 
practical effect to the idea of partnership in the past few 
years.'55 Kerr placed Locarno in a different category from 
Chanak and Lausanne. Here was 'Austen Chamberlain making an 
enormous commitment to go to war, not for a year or two, but 
forever, and telling the Dominions that it really doesn't 
matter whether they agree with it or not./56
Kerr's conclusion is interesting: had Britain really been 
so bold as to break with all sense of unity? It seemed that 
Britain had broken not only diplomatic unity, but also had 
broken unity under one Crown. Previously it was agreed that
246
the Crown was one entity and as such when the Crown was at war 
all of the British Empire was at war. Was Britain now stating 
that the Crown was a divisible entity because Britain was 
prepared to go to war without the Dominions? An answer to 
this provides an insight into the boldness of the Foreign 
Office in proceeding without the Dominions. One concept which 
prevailed throughout the negotiations and the settlement was 
the Foreign Office's belief that if it came to war, the 
Dominions would come to Britain's defence. Chamberlain 
expressed this belief as early as April 1925 when he noted 
that, 'just as we should exert our whole strength to prevent 
an invasion of Australia or to protect the Canadian frontier 
if it were menaced, so we may expect the Dominions to join in 
what is equally an Imperial interest - the essential defence 
of the United Kingdom'.57 A year later, still smarting under 
criticism that imperial unity had been disrupted, the Foreign 
Office clung to its belief that nothing had fundamentally 
changed. Unity remained intact, it argued: when the King 
declared war, it committed every part of the Empire. The 
Foreign Office did admit that it fell to the discretion of 
each Dominion whether or not it actively participated, but the 
prevailing assumption was that 'moral duty' to go to war would 
bring the Dominions to the active aid of Britain.58 Amery and 
his officials considered the Foreign Office's view 
unrealistic. Chamberlain, however, was not alone in his 
conviction, as other prominent politicians, such as Lord 
Birkenhead, believed that if Britain had to go to the aid of 
Belgium or France then 'the Empire would go to war like one 
man, as they had before on a previous occasion. /59 In terms 
of maintaining formal unity, Chamberlain deluded himself that
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Locarno had not exacted a price. Yet his understanding 
reflected the beginnings of the search for informal imperial 
unity, primarily the assurance that if Britain faced a 
military threat the Dominions would come to its aid. 
Nevertheless, complete acceptance by Whitehall that formal 
unity had ended was still many months away. In the period 
leading up to the Imperial Conference of 1926, Whitehall 
renewed efforts to devise a mechanism for improved 
consultation and unity. For the moment, the Locarno treaties, 
from the Foreign Office's perspective, were an exception; it 
would take time before the precedent was acknowledged.
Preparations for the Imperial Conference: trying to keep the
pieces together
It interesting to note that throughout the Locarno 
negotiations, Chamberlain did not explore the implications 
regarding the Dominions. Suddenly once an agreement had been 
reached, officials became aware of the need to limit the 
damage the treaties might do. The top priority was to prevent 
any public display of disunity. It was primarily for this 
reason that the Foreign Office did not press the Dominions for 
ratification of the treaties. The Foreign Office concurred 
with the Australian Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, that since 
not all Dominions were prepared to ratify the treaties, it was 
best not to press the issue since this would risk open 
disunity.60 The Dominions Office sought to pass the matter 
to the Inter-Imperial Committee to suggest some 'formulas in 
descending scale of definiteness in lieu of actual adhesion 
involving Parliament ratification./61 Chamberlain opposed the 
suggestion fearing that it would expose Whitehall to more
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embarrassment if the Dominions rejected it. Instead, 
Chamberlain preferred to leave the question of Dominion 
support in abeyance until the Imperial Conference when the 
waters could be tested privately.62
While soliciting commitment from the Dominions for the 
Locarno treaties was postponed until the autumn, officials in 
Whitehall experienced a lingering feeling that the treaties 
had demonstrated, yet again, the need to improve consultation 
so as to prevent similar incidents. Such thinking was 
reflected in an extensive memorandum prepared in the Foreign 
Office in January 1926.
Post-Locarno: Renewed search for unitv
An awareness that the mechanism of consultation with the 
Dominions on foreign matters needed urgent overhauling 
constituted the prevailing theme of a memorandum prepared by 
Percy Koppel, a counsellor in the Foreign Office, in January 
1926. The memorandum, which extended to almost twenty pages, 
provoked three months' discussion in the Foreign Office and 
proved essential in plotting its strategy for the forthcoming 
Imperial Conference. It was a virtuoso performance in 
analysing past efforts and speculating upon techniques which 
might hold imperial foreign policy together, but ultimately it 
was ineffectual.
Koppel concluded that the fundamental problem of imperial 
consultation had not changed since 1921, when Lloyd George 
observed that all the telegrams in the world could not replace 
the need to 'come into contact and thresh out' foreign policy. 
First, Koppel reviewed the various schemes which had been 
contemplated since 1917: an Imperial Parliament, an Imperial
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Council, the presence of opposition parties at Imperial 
conferences, resident Dominion Cabinet ministers, an Imperial 
Secretariat, and added powers for High Commissioners. His 
summation was a depressing reminder of how little had gone 
right.63 As C.J.B. Hurst observed after having read the 
memorandum, the numerous aborted schemes evoked a feeling of 
'despair about ever getting any satisfactory steps taken in 
connection with the problem of effective consultation'.64 
Hurst may have been filled with despair, but Koppel remained 
optimistic. Acknowledging the prevailing consciousness of 
independent status as a 'bone of contention in local politics' 
in Canada and South Africa, he hoped that a solution could 
still be found if the Dominions could be convinced to place an 
agent in London to represent their views. He was particularly 
inspired by the Casey experiment.
Richard Casey had been sent to London by the Australian 
Government in 1924 as a liaison officer, to keep the 
Australian Government informed. He was located in the Cabinet 
Secretariat and given access to Foreign Office confidential 
prints, among other things. The success of Casey's 
appointment encouraged Koppel to promote the idea of each 
Dominion placing an additional representative in London, 
empowered to receive information on foreign affairs and to 
speak for each Dominion Government. Unlike those who wanted 
Dominion High Commissioners to assume these duties, Koppel 
considered the agent scheme more practicable. He had shrewdly 
gauged that the Dominions were unwilling to put trust in their 
High Commissioners. Although the duties of the Governors 
General in consultation had steadily declined, the Dominions
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had neither increased the role of their High Commissioners nor 
indicated any inclination to do so.
In many respects Koppel's preference to have the 
Dominions place agents in London suggests that he was 
following the traditional Whitehall belief that the Dominions 
should come to London, not vice versa. In fact, Koppel was 
bolder; he believed that the Foreign Office had to interact 
directly with the Dominions. This intention was revealed by 
the suggestion that while the Dominions should be encouraged 
to locate an agent in London, Britain should station 
diplomatic agents in the Dominions. Koppel's desire to have 
the Foreign Office more closely involved appeared in his 
second recommendation for a department in the Foreign Office 
that would relieve the Dominions Office of communicating 
directly with the Dominions on matters of foreign affairs.
Koppel would have recommended even closer association of 
the Foreign Office with the Dominions had he not doubted that 
the Dominions lacked sufficient trained staff for dealing with 
the complexities of foreign policy. He encouraged, therefore, 
the long-term of recruitment and training of staff in the 
Dominions to handle foreign affairs. He advocated using 
British diplomatic agents in the Dominions to assist in this 
project.65
Koppel's recommendations were double-edged. Strikingly 
similar to British attempts regarding imperial naval matters 
prior to the First World War, his proposals to increase 
consultation with the Dominions also could be interpreted as 
enhancing their autonomy. Direct communications between the 
Foreign Office and the Dominions would no doubt have improved 
consultation, but they would also have placed the Dominions
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more in the category of foreign countries in their relations
with Britain. It was this implication that drew the sharpest
reaction in the Foreign Office.
The diversity of responses from the Foreign Office
reflected the conflict which raged within the Foreign Office,
especially over the various interpretations of the current
status of imperial relations. Controversy was also stimulated
by the mixed signals being sent by the Dominions. 'Here at
once,' wrote one official,
we come up against the difficulty that 
nobody really knows where we are, or what we 
want. Each Dominion wants something a 
little different from the others, and any 
one Dominion wants different things at 
different times. Here at home we are almost 
equally at sea. Hardly two opinions 
coincide; the only common denominator is the 
feeling that all is not well and that 
something has to be done.66
The responses, as could be anticipated, ranged from one
extreme of trying to deny that unity was seriously threatened
to the other extreme of accepting it as natural that imperial
unity was disintegrating. The latter was closer to the truth.
In the middle, the majority agreed that something had to be
done, but no consensus emerged. Some officials supported more
Casey-style appointments, others rejected this as placing an
unreasonable strain on the Foreign Secretary, or attributed
Casey's success to the man who was 'one in ten thousand'.67
Few backed Koppel's recommendation for a separate department
within the Foreign Office and only one believed the 'most
important link in the chain' was for Britain to appoint a
representative in the Dominions.68 Most officials seemed
anxious that relations with Dominions should not be elevated
to the level of foreign countries. This preference meant that
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most favoured the Dominions broadening the role of their High 
Commissioners. The inability to decide a course of action 
caused William Tyrrell, the Permanent Under-Secretary, to 
establish a small committee of inquiry. The committee's 
recommendations, which appeared at the end of April, continued 
to assign the onus of initiative to the Dominions. It 
rejected the establishment of a new department, but was 
willing to create a 'nucleus' in the Foreign Office to liaise 
with the Dominions which, in time, might be expanded. The 
committee opposed appointing a British representative to the 
Dominions. It might be the 'logical corollary' to Dominion 
representatives in Britain, but it seemed best to wait until 
the matter was initiated by the Dominions before considering 
it. The committee's preferred solution, in spite of the 
perceptive comments of Koppel, was to persuade the Dominions 
to expand the roles of their High Commissioners to include 
political duties.69 With Chamberlain backing the findings of 
the report, the Foreign Office once again seemed out of step 
with reality, believing that the Dominions could be convinced 
to utilise their High Commissioners more fully - a scheme that 
King had already rejected.
Within this realm of delusion, there were signs of a 
growing school of thought in the Foreign Office that the key 
rested with that office's control of information on 
international affairs. One official, who thought it 
unrealistic to scheme for formal unity at this late juncture, 
especially considering the sentiment in Canada and in South 
Africa, believed that the Foreign Office was overlooking the 
one strong card it possessed: information. He observed that
the Dominions, while they possessed areas of special interest
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and knowledge, such as the United States in the case of 
Canada, were inadequately equipped beyond these narrow fields. 
Recognising that the ultimate goal of the British Government 
was to ensure that the Dominions stood with Britain in time of 
war, the official felt that the best method was to win the 
Dominions over, 'not by passing resolutions at Imperial 
conferences, nor by attempting the application of cut-and- 
dried rules. It can only be done by preserving the community 
of interest. For that, frank and full consultation and 
consequently the free supply of information are vital.'70 The 
concept was one to which the Foreign Office would resort to in 
the future, but it took fully two years until this became the 
prevailing view. For the moment, the Foreign Office was 
comfortable in approaching, with the support of the Dominions 
Office, the Imperial Conference set for the autumn of 1926 
with the scheme of utilising the High Commissioners for 
improved consultation.
Imperial Conference of 1926
The outcome of the Imperial Conference of 1926 offered 
little comfort to those who hoped to reverse the onslaught on 
imperial diplomatic unity. The hope that the Dominions would 
be party to the Locarno treaties was not realised. Worse 
still for supporters of unity, the conference passed a 
resolution which formally acknowledged the Dominions as 
'autonomous Countries within the British Empire, equal in 
status' to Britain.71
It is not the intention of this study to examine in 
detail the discussions regarding foreign policy and the formal 
acknowledgement of Dominion equality, as this has been already
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dealt with in several competent studies.72 The issue which, 
for this study, requires further attention concerns the role 
of Mackenzie King. In 192 6, in contrast to his assertive 
manner at the Imperial Conference of 1923, King was outwardly 
passive. Plagued by a cold, he seemed to have become 
complacent. Worse still, in comparison with the determination 
of General Hertzog, Prime Minister of South Africa, and W.T. 
Cosgrave, President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free 
State, King seemed to have lost his appetite for a fight, as 
it fell to these two men to launch an attack demanding a 
recognition of parity with Britain. In order to defuse and 
repel this attack, the matter was passed to a sub-committee 
whose membership comprised Dominion Prime Ministers and 
chairman, Lord Balfour. It was in this committee, as Hertzog, 
supported by Cosgrave, launched his determined assault on 
unity, that King was seen as the honest broker between British 
interests and those of South Africa and the Irish Free State. 
Without question, King was a prime force in aiding the passage 
of Balfour's 'high-sounding' but ambiguous definition of 
imperial relations.73
If one accepts the interpretation that the Imperial 
Conference of 1926 marked the end of all attempts at formal 
diplomatic imperial unity, and that the Statute of Westminster 
was merely a more elaborate endorsement of events at the 
conference, then it seems that by 1926 King was no longer an 
ardent anti-imperialist. He may have been content with 
matters as they stood. But this assessment collapses under 
closer examination. Mackenzie King was still working towards 
complete autonomy for Canada from British foreign commitments. 
He was doing this in a far less flamboyant fashion than
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Hertzog and Cosgrave, but in many respects in a far more 
effective way.
One comfort that Whitehall could draw from the 
resolutions at the Imperial Conference was that although 
imperial unity was discarded behind closed doors, publicly the 
image of unity persisted as the public statements on Locarno 
and on the status of the Dominions remained sufficiently 
ambiguous to sustain the illusion of unity. King, however, at 
the Imperial Conference of 192 6, laid the ground for forcing 
a public acknowledgement upon Britain which would come in 1928 
when Britain was obliged to appoint a High Commissioner to 
Ottawa. It is frequently treated by historians as a 
footnote74 that King sought and secured restrictions on the 
role of the Governor General, so that after 1 July 1927, the 
Canadian Government communicated directly with the British 
Government, thus bypassing the Governor General. Or that 
King, moreover, refused to allow his High Commissioner to be 
employed as a go-between for Canada and Britain. In these two 
instances, he set the stage for pushing Britain in a direction 
which left Britain no option but to appoint its own 
representative in Ottawa. However this appointment might be 
justified, it visibly marked the end of imperial unity. 
Britain now had to appoint someone who was, to all intents and 
purposes, an ambassador in Ottawa, just as if Canada was a 
'foreign' country.
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CHAPTER 7:
REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
In the 1920s, the greatest visible symbol of the imperial 
relationship between Canada and Britain was the Governor 
General of Canada. This link was both symbolic but practical. 
Until the changes which occurred later in the 1920s, the 
Governor General remained empowered as an active 
representative of the British Government rather than a passive 
representative of the Crown. Although this shift in 
responsibility was formalised at the Imperial Conference of 
1926, the transition evolved gradually through the 1920s in 
step with the growth of Canadian nationalism. Two key
areas of transition in the Governor's General functions were 
in the process of selecting a candidate for the post and 
communications with Britain. Canada gained increasing 
influence in the selection process throughout the 1920s, and 
this contributed to the changing responsibilities of the 
Governor General. Adjustments in the Governor General's type 
and method of communications with Britain were fundamental in 
redefining the duties of the Governor General. The Canadian 
Government was one contributor to securing changes. The 
Governors General, however, were also an important factor in 
bringing about changes in the role of the Governor General. 
Their actions in redefining the role of the Governor General 
in communications with Britain established the base for 
Mackenzie King to implement formal restrictions on the post of 
Governor General in 1926.
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The Continuation of Tradition: 1867-1916
Until the First World War, the Governor General's 
involvement in Canadian external affairs and as an 
intermediary between the Canadian and British Governments had 
not changed significantly in decades. Indeed, many of the 
responsibilities of the office had remained intact from pre- 
Confederation days in the Government of the United Province of 
Canada.
In the United Province of Canada, the Governor General 
was central to the conduct of external affairs. It fell 
within his jurisdiction to decide whether matters would be 
handled locally or be referred to London. He retained this 
discretionary power after the Confederation of 1867. He also 
retained his role as conduit of correspondence between Canada 
and Britain, and between Canada and the British Ambassador in 
Washington. One change from the pre-Confederation days was 
that the person who assumed charge of the correspondence was 
a member of the personal staff of the Governor General and not 
a civil servant. It was symbolic of the Governor General's 
pivotal position in the conduct of Canada's external affairs 
that his offices were in the East Block of the Canadian 
Parliament Buildings. The Governor General retained these 
offices until 1942.
Confederation eclipsed the role of the Governor General 
in domestic matters but not in external affairs. The 
installation of the transatlantic cable in 1865, limited the 
Governor General more than Confederation did. The new cable 
service meant speedier communications between the British and 
Canadian Governments. Faster communications restricted the 
Governor General's personal initiative in matters that had
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been possible when a time delay occurred in seeking or 
receiving British advice. Even the appointment of a Canadian 
High Commissioner to London in 1880 did little to restrict the 
function of the Governor General in communicating with the 
British Government, since all instructions from the Canadian 
Government to its High Commissioner were submitted to the 
Governor General, who sent a copy to the Colonial Office. 
Also, the Governor General insisted on seeing copies of all 
correspondence with the High Commissioner. Thus it remained 
from Confederation until the reforms of the 1920s that the 
official mechanism of communication to Britain for the 
Canadian Government was through the Governor General, who in 
turn relayed communications to the Colonial Office which acted 
as the clearing house for the British Government. Even the 
establishment of the Canadian Department of External Affairs 
in 1909 did not impede this channel of communication. In the 
bill forming the new department, however, lay the seeds which 
would undermine and, in time, limit the role of the Governor 
General.
On 4 March 1909, Charles Murphy, the Secretary of State, 
presented a bill to the Canadian House of Commons proposing 
the creation of a Department of External Affairs. The new 
department was intended primarily to improve the efficiency of 
the government. It was not intended to create a Foreign 
Office in Canada, although the bill contained terms which 
allowed for such expansion when it became appropriate. It was 
these terms, particularly those found in the third clause, 
which led to an attack by the then Governor General, Lord 
Grey.
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The third clause allowed the Secretary of State to 'have 
the conduct of all official communications between the 
government of Canada and the government of any other country'. 
Grey regarded this as an encroachment on the powers of the 
Governor General since it was Governor General's job to 
communicate with Britain. Grey obtained from the Canadian 
Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, what he believed was an 
agreement that 'conduct' would be replaced by 'care'. This 
was not done as Laurier made no efforts publicly to change the 
phrasing, so that the bill passed both the House of Commons 
and the Senate with clause three intact. Even after the 
passage of the bill, practice left the Governor General 
involved in the conduct of foreign affairs for several years 
to come. Nevertheless the failure of Grey to have the clause 
changed facilitated the evolution of the Department of 
External Affairs into the Canadian equivalent of the Foreign 
Office.
The first significant changes to limit, and then abolish, 
the active role of the Governor General in Canada's conduct of 
foreign affairs came during the First World War as a result, 
not of specific legislation, but of the increased personal 
contact of Sir Robert Borden with British politicians and 
officials. The strain of the war years meant that Borden 
spent a total of thirteen months overseas between 1915 and 
1919. The increased presence of the Canadian Prime Minister 
diminished the influence of the Governor General. This 
decline was intensified not only by the new style of the 
Canadian Prime Minister, who took the lead in communicating 
with Britain, but also with the growing sense of Canadian 
autonomy. Since no Governor General after Lord Grey sought to
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defend the duties of the office, the erosion of the powers of 
the Governor General gained momentum, and all efforts employed 
to halt it were ineffectual.1
Devonshire: Unconscious Innovator
When the ninth Duke of Devonshire2 arrived in Canada in 
1916 to serve as Governor General there was nothing to suggest 
that during his term the process for critical changes in the 
role of the Governor General in Canada would begin. 
Devonshire had extensive Parliamentary experience, having 
served as a Liberal Unionist M.P., 1891-1908, a Financial
Secretary to the Treasury, 1903-05 and Civil Lord of the 
Admiralty, 1915-16. Although Devonshire was relatively young, 
in his late forties, he did not bring much vigour or interest 
to his new post. Outwardly, Devonshire's term was uneventful. 
His successor in office, Lord Byng, regarded Devonshire as 
having made 'no impression, save opening one Stock fare 
[sic].'3 This was an accurate assessment of Devonshire's 
public image, but what Byng could not see fully was that 
during his predecessor's term imperceptible changes occurred 
which reshaped the responsibilities of the Governor 
Generalship.
Devonshire's term marked the end of many functions of the 
office. He was the last Governor General to be appointed on 
the sole advice of the British Prime Minister. His 
appointment was one of the last occasions when nobody 
'challenged the sovereignty of the British Crown and the 
Parliament over the Empire.'4 Under this form of selection 
the assumption was made that Devonshire would not only be the 
medium of communication between the Canadian and British
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Governments, but would watch over the interests of the British 
Government and keep it informed of vital developments. It was 
in this aspect, of keeping the British Government informed of 
developments in Canada, that first indicated a change in the 
role of the Governor General.
Communicating with Whitehall:
Even after Confederation, one way the Governor General 
stayed active in the affairs of the Dominion was in being the 
channel for the communications between Britain and Canada. He 
was, moreover, regarded not only as representative of the 
Crown, but more importantly, a representative of the British 
Government. In theory he was the eyes, ears and defender of 
the interests of the British Government. In this capacity he 
was expected to be in communication with the British 
Government, informing it of Canadian activities and soliciting 
British advice. These duties conjured up images of colonial 
days when Britain interfered in Canada's domestic affairs. 
But in practice, however, this was not the case, unless the 
King-Byng affair of 192 6 is explained in a one-sided manner.
From that point of view, it might be concluded that Britain
was still intervening in internal matters as late of 1926.
During the constitutional crisis of 1926, Mackenzie King 
accused Lord Byng, the Governor General, of seeking advice 
from the British Government on appropriate action about
handling the Canadian parliamentary crisis created by the 
problems with King's minority government. King's inference 
was that Byng was no more than a puppet of the British
Government, or worse still, a spy, who compromised the 
autonomy of Canada. Indeed, one of the myths which has grown
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up around Byng's Governor Generalship suggests that he was in
constant private contact with the British Government. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Byng continued a pattern
which had grown up in Devonshire's time, that the Governor
General was merely the postman who rarely, if ever, forwarded
information of his own accord to Whitehall. The difference
between Devonshire and Byng was that Byng had made a conscious
decision not to provide Britain with background information
about the official communications sent. Devonshire followed
this path more out of apathy than a conscious act. There was,
in fact, an attempt during Devonshire's term to re-assert the
Governor General's duty to keep the Colonial Secretary
privately informed.
Efforts to reinstate private correspondence between the
Canadian Governor General and the Colonial Secretary occurred
in 1917 at the instigation of the then Colonial Secretary,
Walter Long. Writing to Devonshire he noted:
I am very glad to find that Chamberlain, who 
originated the correspondence between 
Governors General and the Secretary of 
State, took the same view, so that I have 
the very best authority for the line which 
I am taking. I shall write quite frankly to 
you about everything in your Dominion or 
here, and I hope you will do the same by 
me, relying upon the fact that unless either 
of us desire for some special reason to show 
the letter or a portion of it to others, it 
will be for ourselves alone.5
When Lord Milner took over as Colonial Secretary in 1919 he
received a private letter from Devonshire enquiring if this
practice of private correspondence was to continue. The
Colonial Secretary agreed that it should.6
Good intentions by both Devonshire and Milner were not
enough to maintain private correspondence. Devonshire, more
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than Milner, pursued the practice, initially with great 
enthusiasm. During 1919, however, the Governor General wrote 
privately to Milner only three times. In 1920, just as the 
frequency dwindled, so too did the contents, and Devonshire 
wrote privately only once. Devonshire's exertions were poor, 
but they were more impressive than those of Milner.7 After 
July 1920, these letters ceased. The practice was not resumed 
when Byng succeeded Devonshire. In his final days as Governor 
General, Devonshire acted as a mere postman between the 
British and Canadian Governments.
Devonshire was prepared to keep Whitehall unofficially 
informed of events, but unintentionally curtailed information 
to the Colonial Office, primarily it seems because his energy 
could not sustain it. Devonshire's willingness to forward 
private information was known to Borden, who wrote with 
annoyance at a later date that during his premiership he was 
aware that 'from time to time that reports were sent by the 
Governor General to the Colonial Office which were not 
submitted to me'.8 Byng followed in Devonshire's footsteps 
with respect to communications.
Byng was a very different Governor General from 
Devonshire. He did not have a background in Parliamentary 
affairs, but was a professional soldier who had had an 
impressive career of successful commands which included the 
Canadian Corps, 1916-17. Although he was five years 
Devonshire's senior, he brought a vigour and enthusiasm which 
outpaced his predecessor. Byng was someone who thought 
constantly about his actions and their ramifications. Thus, 
although he followed his predecessor's example on 
communications, unlike Devonshire, he made a conscious
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decision not to send private reports to the Colonial Office. 
It is ironic therefore that of the two men, Byng should have 
been the one cast as a British informant.
King levelled the accusation of informant for the British 
Government against Byng during the Canadian election of 1926, 
and later at the Imperial Conference of 1926. This accusation 
has been endorsed to an extent in at least one study9, which 
insinuates that Byng transacted a great deal of secret 
communications with the Colonial Office and then the Dominions 
Office. A corollary of the accusation is that Byng not only 
compromised the private affairs of the Canadian Government, 
but misrepresented Canadian opinions to the British 
Government. The customary example is Byng's private note 
regarding Canada and ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, when 
Byng did cause some confusion concerning the Canadian 
position. But it is highly questionable, as was explained in 
Chapter Five, how far this evidence can be stretched to 
suggest that Byng undermined the Canadian Government or that 
he was a secret informant. The action, moreover, was highly 
out of character for Byng and is not in itself enough to 
sustain a charge which collapses under close scrutiny. 
Whether examining British or Canadian documents, Byng's 
communications with Britain are beyond reproach.
Byng operated on the principle that he was a 
representative of the Crown and communicated privately only 
with the British monarch. Canadian and British documentation 
attest to the fact that Byng remained true to his conviction. 
Entries in Mackenzie King's diary, from 1921 until the 
constitutional crisis, reveal Byng's repetitive assertion that 
he was not in private communication with the British
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Government and chose to send his reports only to the King. 
This private correspondence, moreover, was never passed to the 
Colonial Office by the King. It was a source of grievance in 
Whitehall, particularly with Amery, that Byng did not 
communicate privately with the Colonial Office, and later the 
Dominions Office, in order to keep them informed of events in 
Canada, especially since Amery was aware of Byng's 
communications with His Majesty. Amery attributed this 
unfortunate state of affairs to the failure to explain the 
Governor General's role to Byng upon taking office. Amery 
tried to convince himself that Byng's inclination to act as a 
viceregal postman was reversible and he was determined that 
Byng's successor would know that he was expected to keep the 
Dominions Office informed of Canadian developments, in order 
to assist Whitehall anticipate future rumblings from Canada. 
Amery's determination was never realised; among the 
resolutions at the Imperial Conference of 1926 was one which 
restricted the Governor General's communications with the 
British Government by establishing a new channel between 
Britain and the Dominions. Under the new arrangements, which 
came into effect in 1 July 1927, the Governor General was no 
longer the conduit of communications. King believed that he 
had pressed for this alteration and had achieved something 
entirely new in that the Governor General would now 
communicate with the British Government only under the 
direction of his Canadian ministers. King may have been 
correct in claiming credit for this change in the formal 
sense, but the arrangement developed in practice as a result 
of the passive action of Devonshire, and then the deliberate 
action of Byng. Consequently, Byng was chiefly responsible
for putting into practice the notion that the Governor General 
was a representative of the monarch, without links or 
responsibilities to the British Government, and thus 
furthering the concept that the monarch was the monarch of 
Canada and the monarch's advisers, or, in practice the 
Governor General's advisers, were his Canadian advisers.
The British Government recognised that Byng kept it ill- 
informed of Canadian affairs. The British Government, 
however, did little to seek information about Canadian affairs 
through other means. Throughout most of the 1920s,
Whitehall's knowledge of Canadian affairs came primarily from 
The Times' reports from Canada and occasionally from debates 
in the Canadian House of Commons as recorded in Hansard. 
These methods of gathering information did not appear to 
concern Whitehall in the 1920s. The inadequacies of these 
methods, however, became apparent when the first British High 
Commissioner to Canada assumed his post in 1928. The new 
British High Commissioner sent to the British Government 
reports whose contents surpassed in detail those found in 
either The Times or Canadian Hansard. From 1921 to 1921, 
therefore, the combination of Lord Byng's actions as Governor 
General and Britain's failure to respond effectively meant 
that the Britain's knowledge of Canadian affairs was limited.
Selection of the Governor General
One reason for considering the Governor General as a 
representative of the British Government derived from the 
manner in which the appointment was made. Up to and including 
Devonshire, the appointments remained the exclusive right of
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the British Government. Erosion of this exclusive hold began 
with the selection of a successor for Devonshire. Changes in 
the selection process of the Canadian Governor General 
occurred steadily but subtly through the 1920s. A decision in 
the first instance that belonged exclusively to Britain, as in 
the case the Duke of Devonshire, became the outright choice of 
the Canadian Government in 1926, with the appointment of Lord 
Willingdon. This transition was both symbolic and realistic in 
indicating further recognition of Canada's independent 
stature.
The trend in the 1920s of Canada's growing and then 
decisive voice in the selection of the Governors General 
strengthened the concept that this was an appointment at the 
pleasure of the Canadian Government. This undermined the idea 
that the Governor General was a representative of the British 
Government and made him the Crown's representative only. It 
was in communicating only with the Crown that the riddle 
surrounding the unity of the Crown was partially resolved. 
With the Governor General emerging clearly as a choice of the 
Canadian Government, and his sole advisers being Canadian, the 
concept was advanced that he was a representative of the 
Canadian, not the British monarch, and that the monarch was a 
divisible entity.
The shift in the selection process occurred over ten 
years. In 1916, the process was still firmly in the grip of 
the British Government. Robert Borden tried to boast, 
retrospectively, that he had seriously considered appointing 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier to the Governor Generalship in 1916 and 
was only dissuaded when upon reflection he decided that 'it 
would be undesirable to select a public man while actually
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engaged in political activities.'10 Borden's boast rings 
hollow. The appointment of a candidate who was the exclusive 
choice of the Canadian Government, and who, moreover, was a 
Canadian, seems unlikely to have appealed to the British even 
in the most ideal circumstances since it would have suggested 
recognition of an imperial relationship which had not yet 
begun to evolve. After all, in 1916, Herbert Asquith, with 
his proven refusal to acknowledge any advancement in the 
status of the Dominions, was still Prime Minister. Even if 
his successor David Lloyd George, who was the catalyst in 
beginning a re-examination of the imperial relationship, had 
then been in office, the appointment of Laurier or any 
Canadian was unlikely. Even in 1919 Lloyd George clung to 
tradition when he stated that he would not approve the 
appointment of a non-British resident to the post of Governor 
General of a Dominion, because this 'constituted almost the 
last remaining tie between the Dominions and the Mother 
Country.'11 So it happened that Devonshire became the last 
of a certain breed of Governors General: men appointed by the
British Government to be the representative of the Crown and 
to serve as the liaison between Britain and Canada and ensure 
that the views of the British Government were known.
Indications that some officials in Whitehall were willing 
to acknowledge changes in the Governor's General role came 
from the Colonial Secretary. In 1919, Lord Milner decided 
that a new direction must be taken in choosing Governors 
General for the Dominions. Jan Christian Smuts, the Prime 
Minister of South Africa, sparked the debate with his letter 
to Milner declaring that no appointment should be made without 
soliciting the opinion of the Dominion Government. Smuts was
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convinced that the time had come for the appointment of local 
men to the position. The Colonial Secretary termed Smuts' 
suggestion regarding local men in the post as a 'mistake', but 
he did believe that the Dominion Government should be 
consulted. In further recognition of the growing stature of 
the Dominions, Milner wanted negotiations between Britain and 
the Dominions to be conducted at a higher governmental level, 
ideally Prime Minister to Prime Minister. 'As regards the 
Governor General,' wrote Milner to Lloyd George, 'I believe - 
at any rate, it ought to be, a Cabinet appointment, not a 
Colonial Office appointment.' He stressed that inter­
governmental consultation was essential at every stage during 
the process, or better still, that the Prime Ministers settled 
the issue between themselves. Milner then opened the way to 
further changes in the selection process by supporting the 
right of the Dominion to suggest persons for consideration. 
At the very least the appointment should not be made without 
the sanction of the Dominion concerned. This suggestion 
undermined the exclusive control the British Government had 
previously possessed, but Milner did not relinquish total 
control since any appointment would still require the sanction 
of the British Cabinet. Also, Milner's suggestions implied 
that while the Dominion could suggest a name or two, most of 
the potential contenders for the post would be chosen by 
Britain.12
Lloyd George was reluctant to proceed in this new 
direction. He never became directly involved in the process. 
In 1921, Lloyd George left the appointment of a replacement 
for Devonshire in the hands of the Colonial Office. Milner, 
although opposed to his office having to make a selection,
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proceeded alone in making the appointment of a new Canadian 
Governor General. In 1926, however, Stanley Baldwin, now the 
British Prime Minister, became involved in choosing a new 
Canadian Governor General. Baldwin brought the selection 
process even further along by consulting directly with the 
Canadian Prime Minister.
Since the Colonial Secretary acted on his own initiative, 
it is difficult to identify the various names he had under 
consideration, or if indeed Byng was his first choice13. Byng 
must have ranked high at the outset as Milner had brought the 
matter up with him early in 192 0. Once Byng indicated his 
willingness to accept the post, Milner made inquiries only to 
discover a disinclination in Canada to have a military man as 
Governor General. Milner decided, on the basis of these 
soundings, not to pursue the appointment of Byng. When 
Winston Churchill replaced Milner as Colonial Secretary in 
January 1921, he agreed with Milner's strategy not to proceed 
with Byng's candidature. Even so, he kept Byng's name on the 
list of potential candidates which he sent to Arthur Meighen, 
the Canadian Prime Minister, in March 1921. Churchill 
explained that he knew of the feeling against having a 
military man such as Byng and accepted this view. Of the 
other candidates, the Colonial Secretary passed on his 
comments and made it clear that the decision rested with 
Meighen.14 By June, Meighen had reversed his stance on Byng 
and decided that he would be appropriate.15 Churchill was 
pleased to waive his earlier reservations and the appointment 
went forward.16
The reluctance of the Colonial Secretaries, first Milner 
and then Churchill, to appoint Byng because of the suspected
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ill-feeling toward military men in Canadian circles reveals a 
new change in the selection process. It was significant what 
weight the views of the Dominion now carried. No longer was 
the British Government willing to appoint a Governor General 
without the approval of the Dominion concerned. Another 
aspect revealed during the selection of Byng was Milner's 
fear, felt as early as 1919, that Canada would press for a 
local man to be appointed, or at least to have a much stronger 
voice in the selection process.17 These fears, Churchill was 
delighted to discover, were groundless. An editorial in the 
Toronto Globe— and a speech by Sir James Lougheed in the 
Canadian Senate19, both early in 1921, conveyed the impression 
that Canadians accepted that the choice of their Governor 
General remained a British prerogative. The caution which the 
Colonial Office exercised in the appointment of Lord Byng, 
without prompting from Canada, is impressive. British 
ministers, largely due to Milner, were yielding more power to 
Canada in the selection of a Governor General without being 
subjected to pressure. This initiative set the stage whereby 
Canada's control over the process in 1926 seemed an almost 
natural, frictionless progression.
Choosing Bvng's successor
Unlike previous selection processes, the process of 
selecting Byng's successor, Lord Willingdon, is extremely well 
documented. The appointment of Willingdon, although it was 
not obvious to the Canadians at the time, established the 
precedent that the Canadian Government dictated who would be 
appointed. Initially it seemed that the established selection 
process would be followed, whereby the British submitted a
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list of names to the Canadian Government from which it stated 
a preference.20 Accordingly, Willingdon's name was on the 
list from which the Canadians selected their preference. The 
vital difference was that Whitehall had never wished to 
include Willingdon and only did so because Canada wished 
Willingdon's name on the list. Britain, furthermore, did its 
best to dissuade the Canadian Government from selecting him. 
In the end, the British Government accepted the appointment of 
Willingdon only because it felt powerless to block the 
Canadian Government's wishes. Willingdon was the first 
Governor General who was very much a Canadian appointee.
By the latter part of 192 5, once Byng indicated that he 
would not be willing to extend his term as Mackenzie King 
desired, both the British and the Canadians began 
independently to take soundings to find a successor. It was 
during that summer that Willingdon first emerged as a possible 
successor. John Buchan, the author and future Governor 
General of Canada, who had been a friend of King's since their 
meeting during the Imperial Conference of 192 3, wrote that he 
had heard Lord Willingdon's name mentioned. Buchan, like many 
others, considered Willingdon 'very pleasant and tactful', but 
since his experience was in colonial administration, serving 
as Governor of Bombay, 1913-19, and of Madras, 1919-24, he was 
'not very able' and 'had no knowledge of self-governing 
Dominions. '21
Amery began giving consideration to the appointment in 
November 1925. It was Amery's practice to cultivate various 
reliable Canadian contacts to give an insight into Canadian 
opinion. In this instance, it was a conversation with Sir 
Campbell Stuart, a director of The Times. which assisted
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Amery. Stuart predicted that King would remain in office 
until the following summer and therefore would have the 
deciding voice in appointing the new Governor General*. Amery 
resigned himself to this fate and concluded that King was 
'determined not to have anyone who has any connexion with the 
Unionist Party here which would I fear put Sam Hoare out of 
consideration, his leaning being towards Willingdon or 
somebody from the Liberal camp.'22 It is interesting that 
Amery should have the impression that King was so anti­
conservative. Amery had hoped to be rid of King, thereby 
excluding him from the selection of the next Governor General. 
Amery's desire was not kept from King. In February 192 6, Lord 
Beaverbrook informed King that Amery had been irritated by the 
Canadian election results of the autumn of 1925 when King held 
on with a minority government. Amery was distressed because 
he had wished to secure the new Governor General through 
Meighen. Beaverbrook, encouraging the already strained 
relations between King and Amery, played on King's suspicions 
regarding a British Conservative plot by claiming that Amery 
possessed the prejudice where 'only a man labelled 
Conservative anywhere in the Empire can be really safe.'23
In early February 1926, Amery began the process of 
compiling a list of candidates which he sent to Baldwin. 
Again Amery mentioned his hope that an official statement 
could be avoided 'long enough to give Mackenzie-King [sic] a 
chance of falling out when he meets Parliament again in six 
weeks time.' Of the various names put forward, Amery believed 
that Canada neither wanted nor 'ought to have another 
soldier.' He concluded that whoever was chosen the person 
must have 'political experience, with a power of getting
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interested in the development of Canada and of inspiring them 
with confidence in themselves and belief in the Empire.' 
Amery thus suggested the names of the Duke of York, later 
George VI, Samuel Hoare, the Marquess of Londonderry and the 
Marquess of Linlithgow.24 The Dominions Secretary predicted 
that none of these would be acceptable. 'All the four just 
mentioned are of course tainted in Mackenzie-King's [sic] eyes 
by their association with our Party and he will probably try 
hard to get someone of his persuasion or non-party. The only 
Liberal of sorts who is possible for the job is Willingdon who 
would love it and do it tolerably well...'.25
Within a few days of Amery's letter, Baldwin received a 
note from King requesting a list of potential candidates in 
order to start the 'necessary machinery in motion' for 
appointing a new Governor General. King felt the need to lay 
the ground rules for the appointment. 'It has,' wrote King, 
'become pretty generally accepted that any appointment should 
have the cordial approval of both governments and, should a 
difference of view arise, that regard should be had for the 
wishes of the government of Canada.'26 Amery received 
Baldwin's permission to compose a response to King. Amery 
considered it essential to phrase the reply in such a way as 
'to enable Mr. Mackenzie-King the pleasure of thinking that he 
is initiating the arrangements necessary for the appointment 
of a successor to Lord Byng.'27 Amery's comforting assumption 
that he was taking the lead in the matter was short-lived. He 
could not have known that King had been contemplating the 
matter regularly since December or that in the end the matter 
would be settled between Baldwin and King to the exclusion of 
the Dominions Secretary.
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In mid-December 1925, King discussed this matter with 
Byng. Conversation focused both on traits desired and on 
specific names. The two men were not of like mind. While 
Byng approved of Lord Cromer, the Lord Chamberlain, King did 
not. Where King favoured John Buchan, Byng dismissed him as 
being from the 'wrong social set'. This stimulated King's 
ever-present apprehensions and led him to observe: 'there was 
a danger of government House becoming [sic] to be regarded as 
a preserve for Tory social set'. This suspicion was enhanced 
when King suggested Edward, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, the 
Liberal statesman who served as Foreign Secretary from 1905 to 
1916, only to have Byng respond that the 'other side' might 
not approve. King leapt to the conclusion that the priority 
was obviously to pick someone 'to suit the Tories'. The name 
of Willingdon did come up in this early conversation and was 
the only one on which the two men agreed; even if Byng was 
lukewarm, he regarded Willingdon at least as having diplomatic 
experience. In his diary, King also recorded that Byng 
believed there should be no royalty, no Canadian and no 
military man. King felt it crucial that the person selected 
should have parliamentary experience and knowledge of the 
British Constitution. He disagreed with Byng's interpretation 
that a Governor General was an umpire and instead perceived it 
as a more limited role. King believed Byng failed to 
understand that the House of Commons governed and Byng's role 
was 'to give expression only to its will as expressed in 
constitutional way./28
Discussion between Byng and King resumed in January 1926. 
It continued to focus around Buchan, Willingdon and Cromer as 
candidates.29 Cromer, although mentioned, was by and large
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dismissed by this time, leaving Willingdon and Buchan. 
Willingdon was the focus of consideration, which was due in 
part to his presence in Ottawa while on a private trip with 
his wife. With Buchan the only other one discussed, 
Willingdon was no doubt favoured by Byng because at least he 
possessed the social background that Byng considered so 
essential. King noted with satisfaction that Byng accepted 
King's choice of Willingdon 'of his own volition'.30
After a discussion in February, even after a few more 
names were contemplated, Willingdon remained the favourite. 
Byng then encouraged King to write to Baldwin for a list of 
candidates,31 a suggestion very much in keeping with King's 
own opinion. This action reveals King's own awareness of his 
destiny to forge ahead in the imperial relationship with 
Britain. He believed he was establishing a precedent by 
requesting Whitehall's list of candidates,32 though this had 
already been established at the time of Byng's appointment. 
King failed, however, to realise that he was breaking new 
ground by negotiating directly with Baldwin. It fulfilled 
Milner's desire from 1919 that selection of a Governor General 
occur at the Prime Ministerial level establishing imperial 
relations between peers, instead of being left, as previously 
in the hands of the Colonial Office or the Dominions Office.
When King's request was received in London, a list of 
names had still not been finalised nor had the appointment 
procedure. After discussion with George V, Amery notified 
Baldwin that the monarch felt it best to submit four or five 
names to King and wait for a response before sounding out the 
individuals concerned. Baldwin was not keen to include 
Linlithgow's name and Amery inquired whether Londonderry's or
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Willingdon's might be added.33 In the correspondence 
exchanged between Buckingham Palace and Downing Street, 
Willingdon's name was not in the original list from Downing 
Street.34 Willingdon was added only after George V, hearing 
that the Canadians wanted Willingdon, suggested that Baldwin 
should consider including Willingdon on the list.35
Baldwin responded to King's inquiry by the end of March. 
It was at this juncture that Amery was excluded from the 
process. Baldwin forwarded to King four names, one of which 
was Willingdon's, and commented on each, making it clear that 
Willingdon was included only because the Canadian government 
had mentioned him. Baldwin remarked that Willingdon was 
'neither in general ability, knowledge of affairs, nor in the 
appeal which he would make to the public . . . quite in the same 
class as the others whom I have mentioned./36
Unaware that decisions were being made without him, Amery 
wrote to Baldwin inquiring if a response had yet been sent to 
Canada. If it had not gone, then Amery was anxious to plead 
that at all costs Willingdon not be included on the list. 
'Quite apart from any Party considerations he [Willingdon] is, 
I think, definitely inferior to what is required for Canada. 
But Mackenzie-King [sic] is so susceptible to flattery and in 
his heart is so indifferent to the importance of having a good 
Governor General that I do not know what influence Lady 
Willingdon may not have had over him during her recent visit 
to Ottawa.' Amery hoped that if Baldwin had felt it necessary 
to include Willingdon, that he expressed disapproval in his 
letter so that Whitehall was able 'to negotiate still further 
if by any chance Mackenzie-King asked for him'.37 Even at 
this stage Amery failed to discover that he had been excluded
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from the appointment process. In fact on 16 April 1926 King 
wrote to Baldwin that he had decided on Willingdon. Baldwin 
went ahead with the necessary arrangements, such as consulting 
with the King. As these arrangements were being made, Amery 
pursued the rumour that King wanted Buchan and sent a letter 
to Baldwin arguing against the appointment.38 So complete was 
Amery's exclusion from the process that it was only during his 
casual conversation with the King's private secretary, Lord 
Stamfordham, three days before Willingdon's name was submitted 
to George V for formal approval, that the participants 
realised that Amery knew nothing of the impending 
announcement. Measures were hastily taken to ensure he was 
briefed.39
The appointment of Willingdon signified a vital 
development both in the status of the Governor General and the 
relations between Canada and Britain, indeed more significant 
than even King appreciated. Two new changes in the selection 
process had occurred. First the negotiations were conducted 
between Prime Ministers with the exclusion of the Dominions 
Secretary, thus signifying a recognition that these 
discussions were government to government, equal to equal, not 
superior to inferior. King never knew that the negotiations 
had been exclusively confined to himself and Baldwin? to the 
end, he discerned Amery's interference.40 Second, what King 
did not realise fully was that Willingdon had not been 
Whitehall's choice and would not have been included at all 
except for the British supposition that he was favoured by 
King. King believed he had established a precedent by 
requesting a list from the British. This precedent already 
stood. What King failed to appreciate was that he had
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progressed beyond the established practice of Canada's 
selecting a name from a British list, to directing what names 
would be on that list. For the first time, without King's 
awareness of the novelty, the Governor General was truly the 
man of the Canadian Government, not a man of the British 
Government. This point was better grasped in Whitehall where 
ministers showed a degree of recognition that no longer was 
the Canadian Governor General their representative. Of 
course, tied up in this curious acknowledgement by 
politicians and officials in Whitehall was the ill-founded 
assumption that until the appointment of Willingdon the 
Governors General in Canada had been representing and 
responsible to the British Government. As time proved, 
Willingdon was the final stage in making the Canadian Governor 
General a part of the Canadian Government with no 
responsibilities to represent the British Government. Also 
ill-founded were reservations that Willingdon would be 
ineffective in a self-governing Dominion. Willingdon became 
an active promoter of Canadian autonomy. He refused to 
participate in any inter-governmental communications and 
supported King's assertion that the Governor General had no 
role in Canada's communications with Britain.
With his successor selected, the final months of Byng's 
term as Governor General should have been quiet and satisfying 
ones as he paid farewell trips and received tributes. This 
was not to be. What neither Byng nor King could have 
predicted was that a constitutional crisis would dominate 
Byng's final weeks in the summer of 1926. The events of this 
crisis, which produced one of the gravest rifts between a 
Governor General and his prime minister in Canadian history,
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was the making of Mackenzie King and the breaking of Lord 
Byng.
Constitutional Crisis of 1926: The King-Bvng Affair
It is necessary to touch briefly on the Canadian 
Constitutional Crisis of 1926, which has been named the King- 
Byng affair. It is, after all, from this dispute that many of 
the myths concerning the actual role of the Governor General 
and much of the legend which surrounds King as the great 
defender of Canada's autonomy stems. Ranked as one of the 
great Canadian constitutional controversies,- the affair is 
often portrayed as the occasion when the Governor General 
overstepped the boundaries of discretion and attempted to 
manipulate Canadian politics by denying Mackenzie King the 
right to dissolution only to grant it within days to his 
political opponent and brief successor, Arthur Meighen.
Many competent studies have been written about the King- 
Byng affair.41 It is not the intention of this study to 
duplicate these works, except to recall the essential details 
of the crisis and to assess the affair in the broader context 
of the era. The controversy tends to be studied in a vacuum 
and under the illusion that Byng was caught unprepared for the 
tactics which King would employ. While Byng has been absolved 
from charges of wrongdoing, it is difficult not to question 
his ability to learn from previous encounters. In fact, Byng 
had had an opportunity to gain insight into King's thinking 
and tactics as early as 192 3 when he came into conflict with 
King over the publication of private correspondence. Even if 
the Constitutional Crisis of 1926 could not have been avoided 
nor the tactics King used prevented, Byng's personal
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devastation in 192 6 could have been prevented if he had learnt 
from his experience in 1923.
Sladen Affair: test run for a crisis
The Halibut Treaty, discussed earlier, was a landmark in 
the relations between Canada and Britain. One consequence of 
the treaty, not already discussed, is how it brought Lord Byng 
into dispute with King. This conflict was the first to occur 
after Byng became Governor General and the most serious until 
the Constitutional Crisis of 1926. The two men clashed as the 
result of King's publication of the secret correspondence 
relating to the treaty without the permission of Britain and 
without consulting the United States. King's action involved 
two issues. First, King challenged the role of the Governor 
General and indeed the right of Britain to censor the Canadian 
Government as to what information could be made public. 
Second, King and Byng disagreed for the first time since King 
served as Byng's first minister. The wrangling between the 
two men was a foretaste of their 1926 conflict.
The conflict began modestly. Meighen, as leader of the 
opposition, accused King of pursuing secret diplomacy over the 
Halibut Treaty. King, wishing to exonerate himself, asked 
Byng to request permission from the British Government to 
publish the private correspondence in the affair. Byng sent 
his request to the Colonial Office,42 but King chose to 
proceed with publication before approval came. Byng was 
irritated by this breach of accepted procedure. King, in 
Byng's view, had no right to release this information, and in 
a letter to Devonshire, now the Colonial Secretary, he wrote 
that he was seeking a full explanation from King. Byng's good
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will towards King remained intact as he sought to defend 
King's action to Britain by explaining that Meighen had 
applied great pressure on King. Byng also believed that King 
was 'extremely ignorant of the amenities that are always 
observed between governments,' and that this in part might 
explain King's 'amazing indiscretions'.43
Another person annoyed by King's action was Sir Auckland 
Geddes, the British Ambassador at Washington. Among the 
correspondence published was some exchanged with the United 
States Government. Geddes condemned this breach of convention 
and feared the damage it would cause to Anglo-American 
relations. He concluded that the only course of action was 
for Canada to apologise to the United States Government.44 
The Foreign Office supported his recommendation.45 The 
Colonial Office delayed its response to Byng for two months.46 
In the interim, Byng took matters into his own hands by 
demanding an explanation from King.
King defended himself by explaining that the 
correspondence had to be released in order to defend himself 
against false allegations from Meighen. While he accepted 
responsibility for his action, he denied that he had 
consciously transgressed any rule or customary practice. He 
would not address the potential damage caused, particularly in 
relations with the United States, but tried to concentrate on 
the question of the publication of correspondence. He 
believed such a decision must rest wholly with the Canadian 
Government. Had any other policy been pursued it would have 
been:
'increasingly difficult to avoid the charge that 
the Administration is lending itself to a species of 
secret diplomacy with respect to public 
business...[which] were the impression permitted to
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be fostered, would be most unfortunate for our
inter-imperial and international relations.'47
A.F. Sladen, Lord Byng's private secretary, made it clear 
that he had taken particular pains to inform King's 
secretaries of the proper course of proceeding. Not wanting 
to accuse King unfairly, Sladen suggested that these 
secretaries had obviously failed to convey this information.48 
King persisted in justifying his action. 'There are few 
replies,' he wrote to Byng, 'calculated to arouse stronger 
resentment with respect to Canada's inter-imperial and 
international relations than that "permission is being asked 
of the Colonial Office to bring down certain of the 
correspondence"; or that "correspondence cannot be made 
public". Every time such admissions have to be made by the 
government in the House of Commons, a weapon is handed to 
those who are in search of arguments wherewith they can 
ridicule the so-called national status of Canada, or raise a 
question concerning existing relations between the governments 
of the Dominion and of the United Kingdom./49
King successfully obscured the issue of normal procedures 
in publishing correspondence with other governments, without 
permission, by opening the question of publication of 
correspondence and the jurisdiction of the Governor General. 
The same issue appeared again at the time of the Treaty of 
Lausanne. The dispute intensified when Joseph Pope prepared 
a memorandum for King stating the Canadian Government had the 
right to publish correspondence, without permission, so long 
as it was not 'secret or confidential'.50 Sladen took it upon 
himself to refute Pope's assumptions. He argued that since it 
was the role of the Governor General to communicate with the
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British Government, his name went on the telegrams and 
therefore he held the right to permit publication or not. In 
this capacity, the Governor General consulted the Colonial 
Office, but never refused publication unless it placed either 
government in a difficult position. Regarding confidential 
correspondence, the Governor General was obliged to seek 
permission from the Colonial Secretary. Since Sladen was not 
aware that there had been any change in the procedure, Pope
was wrong in his statements.51 When King heard of Sladen's
interpretation that no correspondence could be published 
without permission, he was annoyed, commenting that 'Sladen 
goes too far./52 Thereafter, King nurtured a grudge against 
Sladen. Also, whenever an action from Rideau Hall occurred 
which King did not like, King always attributed the action to 
Sladen.53
Curiously, while Byng in 1923 observed and disapproved of 
King's behaviour, of King's obscuring the main question by 
tossing in another, Byng seems not to have learned from the 
experience. In 1923, Sladen fell victim to King's ability to 
avoid the true issue. Byng might have guarded himself much 
better in the crisis of 1926 if he had profited from his 
encounter with King's tactics in 1923, and put less faith in 
King's verbal agreements.
The King-Bvnq Affair:
The crisis began with the Canadian General election of 
1925, when King once again failed to secure a majority
government. On 29 October 1925, the Canadian electors
delivered a verdict of a 'hung jury': the Conservatives won
the largest group of seats with 116, five seats short of a
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majority government. Both the Liberals and the Progressives 
suffered loses. The Liberals retained only 99 of their 
previous 117 seats, while the Progressives fell from 61 to 21 
seats in the House of Commons.54 Byng encouraged King to give 
way and allow the Conservatives to form a government. King 
initially favoured this course but he then decided to remain 
in office. King shaped his policies with the hope of gaining 
support from the Progressives in the House of Commons.55 King 
chose to justify his action by saying that the Parliament had 
the right to decide whether a government had the confidence of 
the House to carry on. Although not pleased with King's 
decision, Byng acquiesced after he was convinced that he had 
extracted a verbal promise from King that if his government 
collapsed he would permit Meighen and the Conservatives to 
form a ministry. Believing that King would honour this verbal 
agreement, was Byng's gravest misjudgment, particularly after 
the Sladen Affair of 1923. King's refusal to do so at a later 
date left Byng devastated.
In the early months of 192 6, when Parliament convened and 
King's Government secured the confidence of the House, King 
appeared justified in his belief that the government could 
carry on. It was not until a scandal in the Customs 
Department that the King Government became unstable. A large 
smuggling scandal emerged. One Member of Parliament, H.H. 
Stevens, estimated that $200 millions worth of goods were 
involved.56 In the investigation conducted, many officials 
in the department were implicated including the Minister. 
Events unfolded quickly, and with more revelations, the 
Progressives slowly withdrew their support for King. After 
heated debate, King faced a motion of censure. With the
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withdrawal of the Progressives' support, it appeared certain 
that the ministry would lose the vote. It was at this point 
that Byng was drawn into the crisis. In an attempt to avoid 
the vote of censure, King requested that Byng grant him 
dissolution and call a general election. Byng did not refuse 
King a dissolution outright, but agreed to grant it on one 
condition, that King first face the vote of censure. King 
refused since it was clear that he would lose the vote and 
this devastating condemnation would damage his standing with 
the electorate. When Byng refused to grant an immediate 
dissolution, King indignantly resigned believing that he was 
the victim of British interference.
Byng then asked Meighen and the Conservatives to form a 
government. This ministry was to be short-lived as King 
proved masterful at undermining the confidence of the House in 
the legitimacy of the government. In a vote of confidence, 
only days after assuming power, the Conservative Government 
collapsed. Meighen then sought and received a dissolution 
from Byng. For King this was the final treacherous act: that 
Byng had refused him a dissolution, only within days to grant 
it to Meighen. Byng defended his action on the ground that he 
was justified in trying to avoid another general election so 
quickly on the heels of the last. Once it was evident that 
neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives commanded the 
confidence of the House, he had no choice but to call a 
general election. King did not regard Byng's action in this 
light but instead saw it as gross insult to the self-governing 
autonomy of Canada, that an outsider would dare to manipulate 
the Canadian political system. Byng's action provided King 
with the ideal campaign issue - British interference in
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Canadian affairs which must be stopped once and for all. Lost 
in the fervour of this argument, to the advantage of the 
Liberals, was the Customs Department scandal. While scholarly 
investigations, including Eugene Forsey's landmark study57, 
have supported Byng and ruled that he did not overstep the 
bounds of his powers nor compromise Canada's autonomy, King 
was the immediate winner as the Canadian electorate gave him 
his first majority government.
Within a month of the result, both Byng and King were in 
London, the former at the end of his term of office and the 
latter to attend the Imperial Conference of 1926. The moods 
of the two men sharply contrasted. While King was riding the 
tide of victory, possessing a new sense of confidence, Byng 
was broken and disillusioned. He felt that King had unfairly 
misrepresented the facts, and had attacked him knowing that in 
his position he could not speak out either in defence or 
clarification. Worse still, Byng was shocked that King had 
reneged on his earlier verbal agreement. Privately, Byng's 
side was taken in British circles.58 Publicly, however, 
Whitehall knew that it still had to contend with King as 
Canadian Prime Minister, and it braced itself for what it 
predicted would be an awkward and demanding encounter. The 
surprise was that King was not as difficult as had been feared 
nor were this demands so pressing. As had been anticipated, 
King sought changes in the Governor General's status. But 
while King believed that he had secured a great victory in 
limiting the role of the Governor General, he had in fact only 
formalised what was already practice. The crisis, seen in 
light of the developments which evolved during the 1920s, was 
not instrumental in effecting change. It was an anti-climax,
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and if anything a smoke screen which distracted and obscured 
what had occurred. Historically, the crisis, was, in many 
ways, more of an exception than a true portrayal of the status 
of the Governor General. In the context of the times, it 
appeared to spur King's push for a redefinition of the 
Governor General's role at the Imperial Conference of 1926. 
King no doubt regarded his success at the Conference of 1926 
in limiting the powers of the Governor General as a great 
coup. King believed that he had relegated the Governor 
General to the role of a figurehead who took instruction from 
his Canadian ministers. This interpretation fails on many 
counts, as King had already made it clear in his diary59 and 
correspondence60 as early as April 1926, long before the 
crisis erupted, that he was determined to restrict the 
communications between the Governor General and Britain. The 
crisis did not alter his intentions, but it strengthened his 
bid. In retrospect, the crisis is regarded as a turning point 
in the status of the Governor General since, whether 
technically correct or not, this was the last time a Governor 
General came into such public conflict with his Prime 
Minister. Never again would a Governor General dare to invoke 
his power to act against the wishes of his Prime Minister.
The King-Byng affair precipitated the general election of 
1926 which was a watershed in British-Canadian relations. 
British hopes of having a Canadian Prime Minister who would 
support the holding together of the last strands of diplomatic 
unity were lost when Meighen was defeated. King's majority 
government, his first one, meant that Whitehall could no 
longer dream of eliminating this Canadian nationalistic 
nuisance nor escape dealing with him. For King, victory in
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the crisis strengthened his mandate to restrict the role of 
the Governor General. It, moreover, boosted his confidence as 
he attended his second Imperial Conference. Here, he was far 
more comfortable than he had been in 1923, but he was equally 
determined not to relax his guard over suspicions that Britain 
was still attempting to lock Canada into a centralised system. 
King was not wrong. Although King used different tactics in 
1926, than he had in 1923 when he had been confrontational, 
his firm resolve in securing formal restrictions on the role 
of the Governor General forced Britain down the last path that 
led to ending formal diplomatic unity.
The changes in the Imperial Conference of 1926 adopted 
were not new but the result of trends which had been 
developing since Devonshire assumed office. They were trends 
to which King had been a contributor, but not a dominant one. 
This is, of course, not to undervalue what he did achieve. 
King could not take credit for the alterations to the 
appointment procedure of a Governor General or for the 
Governor General ceasing to keep the British Government 
unofficially informed. King did, however, exclude the 
Governor General from official communications between Britain 
and Canada. King's action extinguished Whitehall's hope to 
work within the old structure of communications. King also 
ended Amery's desire to have the Governor General provide more 
information, especially unofficial, to Britain.
If King cannot legitimately take the credit for limiting 
the Governor General's role to one of acting exclusively on 
behalf of his Canadian advisers, who can? Surprisingly the 
credit must go to Devonshire, Byng and Baldwin. The Governors 
General, first Devonshire and then Byng, distanced the
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Governor General's office from Whitehall and ended the 
obligation of keeping London informed. Baldwin confirmed that 
by 1926 the Governor General was no longer a representative of 
the British Government but an exclusive component of the 
Canadian Government. Baldwin did this by negotiating directly 
with King about appointing a new Governor General, and then by 
accepting the candidate whom the Canadians wished to have. It 
was the efforts of Devonshire, Byng and Baldwin which allowed 
King to make the final step of formally limiting the role of 
the Governor General in 1926. King's successful efforts to 
secure formal recognition of these restrictions extinguished 
any British hope of using this avenue to preserve diplomatic 
unity.
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CHAPTER 8
1926-1928; THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA:
THE APPOINTMENT OF A BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER TO CANADA
The appointment of a British High Commissioner to Canada 
in April 1928 is a watershed in Anglo-Canadian relations1, 
since it relegated formal imperial unity to the history books. 
It also showed the awareness that ahead lay the task of 
constructing a new version of unity in foreign policy. 
British recognition that its interests in Canada could be 
protected only by its own representative elevated relations 
with Canada to that of one foreign nation to another. Britain 
would have gladly avoided the appointment, but events 
permitted no escape from it. This was a conclusion forced 
upon Britain in part by the Imperial Conference of 1926, in 
part by the appointment of an American Minister to Ottawa, but 
primarily by Mackenzie King who stood his ground so firmly 
that the representation of British interests in Canada became 
a British problem. Because the British were so reluctant to 
take this step, it took eighteen months before a High 
Commissioner was appointed. The delay, moreover, revealed the 
continuing delusion within the British government about 
imperial relations and conflicting approaches to securing 
future unity.
The~ British and the Appointment
The possibility of appointing a British High Commissioner 
to Ottawa arose first in the Foreign Office in January 1926. 
The almost unanimous rejection of the idea at that time acts 
as a gauge to measure the remarkable evolution in thinking
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which occurred by November 1926, when the Foreign Secretary 
embraced the idea. Equally significant was the foresight of 
one official in January 1926 to be bold enough to suggest the 
plan to a department which was still searching for unity 
through more traditional means. The first examination of the 
appointment of a British High Commissioner in the Dominions 
stemmed from a memorandum by P.A. Koppel in January, 1926.2
The Koppel memorandum, which has already been extensively 
discussed in Chapter Six, explored many of the familiar 
options for improving consultation: increasing the powers of 
the Dominion High Commissioners, appointing permanent Dominion 
Ministers for London to attend Cabinet, or expanding the 
Australian Casey experiment. As previously mentioned, the 
minutes in response to the Koppel document were numerous and 
from the most senior members in the department. Interestingly 
enough, the memorandum provoked the first proposal in 
Whitehall to place a British representative in the Dominions. 
Miles Lampson, an official in the Foreign Office, recommended 
that the time had come for Britain to take such a bold step, 
which would be 'the most important link in the chain' in 
establishing solid consultation with the Dominions. He 
favoured a man with experience in the diplomatic service, 
whose post would be separate from the staff of the Governor 
General and who would be empowered to give his views on any 
subject to the Dominion Prime Minister.3
This memorandum provoked such discussion and conflicting 
approaches that an internal committee4 was struck in the 
Foreign Office to deal with the issue. The committee 
unanimously rejected even contemplating the appointment of a 
British representative to the Dominions. Such appointments
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might be a 'logical corollary' to the Dominion representatives 
to Britain, but the matter was best left until a Dominion 
specifically raised the question. This conclusion received 
wide approval including Chamberlain's.5 But time showed 
Lampson a most perceptive commentator.
Unknown to Lampson, he had an ally in Esme Howard, the 
British Ambassador at Washington. In the spring of 1926, 
Howard informed Chamberlain of a discussion with Mackenzie 
King on the possible appointment of a British representative 
to Canada. King had decided to remove the Governor General 
completely from the realm of politics by ensuring that he did 
'not receive orders from any political party which happened to 
be in power'. King intended to make sure that the Governor 
General no longer took instructions from or represented the 
British Government. In order to achieve this end, King 
envisaged two developments. First, the High Commissioner in 
London would have direct access to the British Prime Minister 
or the Secretary of State and would no longer work through the 
Dominions Office. Second, a British representative should be 
appointed to Canada, either under the title 'High 
Commissioner' or 'Minister Plenipotentiary', who would 
communicate directly with the Canadian Prime Minister. As a 
result, 'any mistakes the British Government might make would 
then be fastened' on the British representative and not on the 
Governor General.6
Howard fully supported King's proposal. He told 
Chamberlain that the time had come for the British Government 
to accept the fact that Canada must be treated as an equal, in 
order to dispel the conviction among Canadian nationalists 
that 'London is always trying to keep them under'. Howard was
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motivated to a great extent by his experience in the United 
States. He was concerned with the high profile that the 
United States enjoyed in Canada and was unsettled by the 
increased Americanization of Canadian society. He considered 
that the chance of annexation of Canada by the United States 
remained remote. He acknowledged that the shift of Canadian 
allegiance away from Britain and the Empire and towards the 
United States was already occurring and would continue unless 
Britain countered the trend. 'We cannot pretend indefinitely 
to keep a country the size of Canada, with ten million 
inhabitants and vast potential resources, in a condition of 
political inferiority.' Howard was astute, too, in realising 
that the crucial attraction for King of a British 
representative was that no Canadian official would be 
responsible for conveying the views of the British 
Government.7 There is no indication that Howard's letter made 
much initial impact on Chamberlain. The Foreign Office still 
believed that it was through the enhancement of the role of 
Dominion representatives in London that the best consultation 
would be achieved.8 Reversal of this opinion came during and 
after the Imperial Conference of 1926.
Cabinet exerts itself:
One of the proposals Mackenzie King successfully promoted 
at the Imperial Conference of 1926 was ending the Governor 
General's role as the channel of communication between the 
Dominions and Britain. In an astute move, King extended the 
point by asserting that it was in Britain's interest to 
appoint its own representatives to the capitals of the 
dominions. The first opportunity King had to advance this
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scheme was in an informal meeting with Chamberlain.9 The 
meeting had originally been intended by Chamberlain to sound 
out and secure King's agreement to allow Canada's High 
Commissioner to take over as an intermediary between Canada 
and Britain. King rejected this suggestion, but used the 
occasion to urge Britain to appoint a representative to 
Canada. He argued that this was the best plan if Britain were 
worried about the lack of representation of British interests. 
In one respect, the proposal appeared to be solicitous of 
British interests since now they lacked an effective 
spokesman. As a political tactic, however, King's suggestion 
was a brilliant stroke. By rejecting completely all notions 
of exploiting the High Commissioners in London as the means of 
defending British interests, King placed the onus on Whitehall 
to find a solution to this problem. It was as a good friend, 
therefore, that he recommended what he saw as the only viable
option: the placement of a British representative in
Canada.10 The impression he conveyed that Canada was not
going to budge on the matter persuaded Chamberlain that a
British representative was the only possibility.11
In the Inter-Imperial meeting at which King voiced his 
comments, the British representatives decided that many of the 
questions had to be reserved for discussion by the British 
Cabinet. In typical Amery fashion, the Dominions Secretary 
took it upon himself to write to the Governors General 
soliciting their private views on the matter. In his summary 
of events, Amery regarded King's proposal as two-fold: first,
that the Governor General would cease to be the channel of 
communication; second, and consequently, that Britain should 
appoint a representative to the Dominion capitals. He judged
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that the first suggestion would be implemented at an early 
date. The second had been accepted in principle but there 
seemed insufficient sense of urgency to suggest that early 
action was contemplated.12
Diverse views were expressed by the Governors General. 
Those of South Africa and Canada accepted both plans. Lord 
Willingdon, only months into his new position, considered it 
inappropriate that Amery should choose to describe the 
proposals from King as two separate matters. 'To my mind', 
wrote Willingdon, 'it must stand as a whole. If Governor 
General is to cease to be the official channel of 
communication I consider it essential that a High Commissioner 
should be appointed at the same time as the Governor General's 
position is altered.'13 A counter view was expressed by the 
Governors General of New Zealand and Australia. The strongest 
opposition came from the Governor General of New Zealand, who 
opposed both suggestions. His counterpart in Australia 
accepted the new channel of communication, but rejected such 
an appointment of a British High Commissioner. Both men 
regarded such an appointment as undermining the role of the 
Governor General and reducing it to little more than 
'artificial ceremonial'.14 This stance was distinctly old- 
fashioned and it was the South African Governor General who 
rightly observed that, 'with development of the status of the 
Dominions it was to be expected that the functions of Governor 
General should undergo some change, and there is no doubt his 
position as the King's representative and also in some sense 
agent of the British Government is liable to lead to 
difficulty.'15 While the South African Governor General was 
shrewd in his forward vision, his counter-part in New Zealand
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summed up the crucial meaning of placing a British High 
Commissioner in the Dominion capitals. 'The appointment of 
High Commissioners for Great Britain would, of course, place 
the Dominions in much the same category as foreign countries 
and presupposes the same relations with frequent conflict of 
interests between the centre of the Empire and its component 
parts as now exists between Great Britain and a foreign 
nation.'16
Amery brought the responses of the Dominion Governors 
General to the British Cabinet meeting of 10 November. Amery 
proposed to the British Cabinet King's suggestion of placing 
British High Commissioners in the Dominions. Although the 
scheme had the support of the Foreign Secretary, the Dominions 
Secretary, and the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, in a 
surprising move, chose to reject it. The Cabinet's decision 
caught Amery and Chamberlain off-guard because it went against 
the pattern firmly established in the 1920s. Since the 1920s 
the British Cabinet took little interest in Dominion affairs 
leaving details to the Dominions Office and the Foreign Office 
and gave virtually rubber-stamp approval to their 
recommendations. Both Chamberlain and Amery were disturbed 
about how Cabinet's new exertions might hinder changes in 
imperial relations. Baldwin, however, was not alarmed with 
the Cabinet's decision. He concluded that the opposition 
'which showed itself in certain quarters' was not a sign that 
the Cabinet would impede changes in imperial relations. 
Baldwin believed that the Cabinet's reaction was due 'to their 
being taken by surprise by a novel proposition which they had 
imperfectly comprehended and not at all considered.' Baldwin 
believed that once the Cabinet understood the developments in
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Britain's relations with the Dominions then all opposition to 
appointing British High Commissioners to the Dominions would 
end.17
The question must be asked why the Cabinet suddenly 
decided to intervene and block the appointment at what might 
seem to be the closing phase of the break-up of imperial 
foreign policy. One explanation might be that the Cabinet 
reflected a wider range of political opinion which had not yet 
come to embrace the more informed views of a select minority 
of ministers and officials involved in the evolution of the 
relationship between Britain and the Dominions. In the 
preceding chapters emphasis has been placed on understanding 
the interactions between the Foreign Office, the Colonial 
Office and later the Dominions Office, and to a lesser extent 
the Prime Minister's Office. While this concentration of 
attention is required and justified since it was in these 
departments that the key decisions were made regarding the 
break-up of imperial foreign policy, it can lead one into the 
false impression that the precedent-setting events were being 
watched and understood by a much larger audience. As the 
Cabinet's rejection of the appointment of a British High 
Commissioner shows, however, many of the substantial changes 
which had occurred in imperial relations remained the 
knowledge of a select few. The belief of the Cabinet that 
blocking the appointment of British High Commissioners could 
prevent the break-up of the imperial unity in foreign policy 
was not only naive, but also hopelessly out of step with the 
new realities of the imperial relationship.
The Cabinet delayed the appointment of a British High 
Commissioner by eighteen months. This was a delay which the
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British Government could ill afford since agreement had been 
reached that as of July 1927 the Governor General would cease 
to be the channel of communication. Thus, from July 1927 
until April 1928, when the first British High Commissioner was 
appointed to Canada, Britain was effectively without a voice 
in Canada. During the eighteen months it took to resolve the 
matter, the initial accord between the Dominions Office and 
the Foreign Office quickly gave way to tensions. Yet again the 
two departments were at loggerheads, with Amery and 
Chamberlain taking an active part. Curiously, it was 
Chamberlain who took the progressive lead. He had the clearer 
understanding of what Mackenzie King in particular sought, and 
so strong were Chamberlain's convictions, that he stood his 
ground not only against Amery, but also at times against 
opposition from within his own office.
Conflict between Amerv and Chamberlain:
Within two days of the Cabinet's decision Amery conceived 
a new proposal to get around the objections of his colleagues. 
He decided the answer was to have one person act as a liaison 
on imperial policy between the Foreign Office and other 
British Government departments. This person would defend 
British interest in public through speeches and commercial 
matters. It was essential, Amery concluded, that 'the high 
sounding title of High Commissioner' should be avoided as it 
'may perhaps create the danger of seeming to compete with the 
Governor General's position.' Under this scheme, Amery 
favoured appointing two officials with two lesser titles. One 
to be given the title Agent General, who 'would be rather what 
the High Commissioners used to be over here before their
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functions were exalted and their status approximated that of 
Ministers.' The other was to be a liaison officer, either 
similar to a first secretary of legation or a good standing 
civil servant from either the Foreign Office or the Dominions 
Office. Since Canada was the only Dominion forcefully urging 
the issue, Amery predicted that Britain might have to appoint 
the two men only to Canada, whereas an Agent General might be 
sufficient in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the 
Irish Free State.18
Chamberlain did not respond favourably to Amery's 
proposal. He believed that it ignored the opinion of 
Mackenzie King who had made it clear that 'so far as liaison 
at the Canadian end is concerned . . . there should be an 
official competent to give him considered advice as to the 
policy of HMG in foreign affairs.' Chamberlain noted that the 
critical point in King's view was that 'he did not wish 
whatever Agent he had in London to bear the responsibility of 
repeating to him what HMG here might say. He wished these 
communications to be made by an official of our Government and 
the responsibility for their accuracy and completeness to rest 
with us and not with any Canadian official.' Finding Amery's 
proposal totally inappropriate, Chamberlain forwarded his own 
proposal that the official should come from the Diplomatic 
Service and should rank no less than a Counsellor 'if he is to 
carry such responsibility as Mr. Mackenzie King indicates.' 
Thus, instead of a more junior official, Chamberlain saw the 
only recourse was the appointment of an individual who 'must 
at least be such a man as I would place in charge of a minor 
Mission abroad, or in the case of one of the greater Missions, 
be ready to leave in charge when the Ambassador was absent.
309
I do not quite see how this would be reconcilable with the 
idea of his being a subordinated or at any rate an inferior 
official to a Trade Commissioner or Agent General.'19
Not content to leave his point there, Chamberlain wrote 
to Lord Balfour, Lord President of the Council, to stress that 
Amery's proposal was misguided as it opposed Canadian wishes 
that no Canadian representative accept the responsibility for 
communicating the British view to the Canadian Government.20 
It is interesting that Chamberlain felt the need to convey 
this view to Balfour so quickly and with such determination. 
The conflict between Chamberlain and Amery was beginning.
Relations between them further deteriorated as the 
Dominions Secretary continued to press the matter. In early 
December, he attempted to skirt the issue of appointing a 
British High Commissioner, or some form of a liaison officer, 
by trying to enhance the role the Dominion High Commissioners 
in London. He renewed pressure on the Dominion Prime 
Ministers, without consulting Chamberlain, to allow their High 
Commissioners to receive Foreign Office telegrams. When 
Chamberlain heard of the matter he was enraged. The 
controversy deepened when Chamberlain learned that Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada had reversed their earlier stances at 
the Imperial Conference and were now willing to let their High 
Commissioners receive the material. Chamberlain accepted that 
he must support Amery but he did so in such a way that he left 
the Dominions Secretary in no doubt of his dissatisfaction. 
'You have', wrote Chamberlain on his Christmas holidays to 
Amery, 'committed me without consultation, and I must submit; 
but I respectfully but very decidedly protest against your 
assumption that you had a right to take action so intimately
310
affecting me without consultation with me. ' Chamberlain 
admitted that prior to the conference he had shared with Amery 
a preference for the Dominion High Commissioners to act as the 
channel of communication between Britain and Canada on matters 
of imperial foreign policy. But the views expressed by the 
Dominion Prime Ministers at the conference proved to him that 
they preferred a British liaison officer in their capitals as 
the channel of communications on foreign policy. Chamberlain 
concluded that Amery 'had made a mistake'21 in pursuing the 
avenue of the Dominion High Commissioners.
Within two days, 2 3 December 192 6, Amery wrote to say 
that he was 'distressed' with Chamberlain's accusatory letter 
and could only conclude that it arose from the Foreign 
Secretary's misunderstanding both his actions and the 
attitudes of the Dominion Prime Ministers. Amery tried to 
defend himself by arguing that both he and Chamberlain had 
attended the Imperial Conference with the hope of convincing 
the Dominion Prime Ministers to permit their High
Commissioners to be able to 'deal with us on matters of common 
Imperial concern', which meant allowing access to documents to 
be forwarded to their governments. Although the Prime
Ministers had concurred in principle to liaison officers, he
disagreed with Chamberlain that, with the exception of 
Mackenzie King, they were anxious to have this plan
implemented. Amery acknowledged that King was 'timid' about 
High Commissioner meetings, but attributed this to King's 
being 'afraid that someone at this [a High Commissioners 
meeting] might be consulted fairly frequently and so implicate 
him rather more than he might wish.' Amery, however, tried to
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draw comfort from the fact that King in the end agreed that 
his High Commissioner should receive documents.22
Missing in Amery's letter of defence was the matter that 
Chamberlain saw as the number one priority: resolving the
pending loss of a channel of communication to the Dominions on 
British policy. Amery rectified his oversight and within 
twenty-four hours, without prompting from the Foreign 
Secretary, a companion letter was sent to Chamberlain 
addressing the matter of British High Commissioners in the 
Dominions, or at least some form of liaison officer.
In his further communication of 24 December, Amery 
briefly mentioned a note from Chamberlain which contained a 
list of potential candidates for British High Commissioners in 
the Dominions. Apart from Canada, Amery felt that neither the 
Dominions nor the Cabinet was ready for such a step, although 
the Cabinet might be convinced of its necessity if the United 
States appointed a representative to Canada. When the time 
did come for such an appointment, Amery believed Britain had 
'to be very careful to avoid . . . the impression that our 
relations with the Dominions are of the same character as our 
relations with foreign countries.' As reluctant as he was to 
discuss the appointment of British High Commissioners, he 
began to explore how such appointments might be done. The 
Dominions Secretary was anxious that the arrangements should 
be made in such way that they would give stature to the 
Dominions Office. At this point, Amery still envisioned a 
partnership with the Foreign Office and he had not yet begun 
his campaign to have the appointment made through the 
Dominions Office. Instead, he was willing to contemplate two 
courses of action. If the High Commissioner was a Foreign
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Office man, he hoped that his chief assistant would be from
the Dominions Office, or if the High Commissioner was a
Dominions Office man, his assistant would come the Foreign
Office. If the decision was to appoint only a liaison
officer, Amery was willing to allow him to come from the
Foreign Office, with the hope that he spent some time in the
Dominions Office before assuming his post.23
The matter weighed with Chamberlain enough that he
composed a response the day after Christmas. He summarised
his understanding of the matter, beginning with the Imperial
Conference of 1926. He agreed that he, Amery and the Cabinet
had attended the Imperial Conference with a view to improving
consultation with the Dominions in foreign matters and he
regarded the Dominion High Commissioners and their staffs as
the best solution. What had become apparent to him at the
conference, however, was that a liaison officer was badly
needed, especially with both King and Bruce, the Prime
Minister of Australia, since no longer could a Governor
General be used for this purpose. No one except Bruce
supported the High Commissioner scheme; the other Dominion
Prime Ministers were unwilling to give their High
Commissioners that kind of confidence. Recalling his informal
meeting with King during the Imperial Conference of 1926,
Chamberlain stressed that King had
stated clearly and repeatedly that he was 
not prepared to allow his High Commissioner 
to assume responsibility for conveying the 
mind of HMG or reporting what we desired him 
to have conveyed to him. This
responsibility, he said, must rest with us, 
and he urged, at first strongly, that it 
should be discharged by an officer appointed 
by us to Ottawa. It is true that the latter 
hedged somewhat after the results of the 
Cabinet discussion had been reported to
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him...and then said that he did not wish to 
press upon us a proposal which we did not 
approve and which was his; but he added that 
if anything went wrong in the future he 
should point to his proposal as 
justification and as having offered the 
means of avoiding such dangers had we chosen 
to act upon it. He further stated that had 
such a liaison existed in 1925, we might 
well have succeeded in getting the Treaty of 
Locarno negotiated in consultation with and 
approved by the Dominions and by Canada in 
particular - a view which I myself share.
Chamberlain noted that Hertzog, the South African Prime
Minister, and Kevin O'Higgins, Vice-President and Minister of
Justice of the Irish Free State Prime Minister, had supported
King. Balfour, and even Amery, contended the appointment of
a High Commissioner was required: '1) as position of Governor
General has developed, we have no mouthpiece or agent in any
Dominion, and 2) it was evident that effective liaison could
only be established through a man of our own in their own
capitals.' This proposal was brought to the Cabinet which
unfortunately rejected it. Chamberlain attributed this
decision to surprise and inadequate explanation. Given the
support of Baldwin, who both approved and continued to
encourage the appointment, it was only a question of time
before the Cabinet was brought around to the idea.
Chamberlain was therefore 'puzzled to account for the change'
in Amery's approach since the Conference. 'I own I do not now
see my way clear before me as regards liaisons with the
Dominions, but I think it is impossible to admit that the
United States shall have a Minister in Ottawa and Dublin and
we continue without representatives in either capital - a new
development as regards for representation in the Dominions to
which you make no reference. '24 There matters were left for
the next three months. In the lull, a new factor entered the
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equation with the appointment of American missions to Ottawa 
and Dublin.
The Appointment of an American Ambassador to Ottawa
The appointment of an American Ambassador to Ottawa in
1927 increased the pressure on Britain to have a
representative in Ottawa. The British tried at first to
prevent the appointment. They accepted it, however, once they 
realised it could not be blocked. Since the United States 
Government appointed an established, well respected diplomat 
and supplied him with a large budget, this gave the American 
Ambajssador a prominent profile in Ottawa which added to
Britain's difficulties.
In early December 192 6, the United States requested 
British permission to place a Minister in Ottawa. This 
overture suggested that it was Britain which handled Canadian
matters, despite the fact that Canada had already announced
the appointment of its own representative to Washington. The 
United States also sought the placement of a minister in 
Dublin. Initially, one Foreign Office official regarded this 
an attempt, not by the legislative branch of the United 
States, but by President Coolidge and his advisers to 'give a 
wrong "twist" to the decisions of the recent Imperial
Conference. /25
The United States' request created an interesting 
disagreement between junior and senior officials within the 
Foreign Office. The former were keen to prevent the
appointments to Ottawa and Dublin, but once the issue moved 
through to more senior ranks the prevailing view was that the 
British Government could not block the appointments. When one
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official tried to argue that all Dominions must agree before 
any changes could be made in the relations of the Empire to 
foreign powers, Herbert Malkin and Cecil Hurst, two of the 
department's Assistant Under-Secretaries and Legal 
Secretaries, rejected the argument. In theory, they concluded 
that since Canada and the Irish Free State already had 
representatives in Washington, it was only right that the 
United States be permitted to reciprocate. As Malkin noted, 
'from the point of view of principle there was no very 
material difference between foreign representation in Dominion 
capitals and Dominion representation in foreign capitals.'26 
In practice, however, Hurst and Malkin had objections to the 
appointments and sympathised with the view that all Dominions 
should agree before the appointments proceeded. They feared 
that American diplomats in the Dominions would become involved 
in the internal affairs of the British Empire and cause 
disruption to imperial unity. Hurst and Malkin suggested that 
while Britain could not refuse the request, the Canadian and 
Irish governments might be persuaded to reject the request.27 
Other Foreign Office officials shared Hurst's and Malkin's 
fear that the appointment would encroach upon imperial matters 
because American diplomats would take the side of the Dominion 
on any issue.
It is of course highly important that 
the conduct of any question with the United 
States Government which has, or may easily 
develop, an imperial aspect should remain 
the responsibility of HMG in Great Britain 
—  or at all events that they should know 
what is going on. This can be arranged 
without much difficulty at Washington; at 
Dublin and Ottawa it would be another 
matter, particularly when one remembers the 
tendency of American diplomatists to yield 
rather too easily to the influence of 'local
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atmosphere' and to take on an 'independent 
line' on the slightest provocation.
It would unquestionably be in the 
ultimate interest of relations between the 
Empire and the United States if the
Dominions could be induced politely to turn 
down the proposal —  at all events the
appointment of Ambassadors.28
Eventually, these objections were overruled by the Committee
on Inter-Imperial Relations. This committee, which was
dominated by the Foreign Office, (there were six members from
the Foreign Office to three members from the Dominions
Office), decided that it was 'impossible to suggest these
objections' to Canada and the Irish Free State.29 Amery,
acting on this decision, telegraphed the two governments
concerned about the request from the United States Government
and asked their response. He did not offer any opinion of the
British Government.30 Canada responded positively within
twenty-four hours to an appointment it regarded as
'appropriate' in view of its representation in Washington.31
The Irish Free State also welcomed the appointment.32
The stationing of an American Ambassador in Ottawa
increased the pressure on the British Government to place its
own representative, but this did not become irresistible until
an accomplished American diplomat, William Phillips, was
chosen. The Foreign Office highly approved of the appointment
and one official acknowledged that Phillips was 'even
better'33 than the new American Ambassador in Dublin,
Frederick Sterling. During the next year, an attempt was made
in Whitehall to underplay the significance of the American
appointment, particularly in the Canadian context. Whether
British politicians and officials wished to admit it or not,
this appointment did affect them. Phillips' popular style
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became an influential consideration in resolving the issue of 
appropriate British representation in Canada.
Resolving the issue: Amery versus Chamberlain
One key element of the American appointment was the 
expectations it raised not only in Britain but also in Canada. 
Although Mackenzie King announced to the Canadian House of 
Commons on 13 April 192734 that Britain would shortly be 
appointing a High Commissioner to Ottawa, who would act in a 
similar capacity as the recently appointed American and be the 
medium of transacting official business between the 
governments in Ottawa and London, there was little action in 
Whitehall. In May 1927, the matter was once again brought to 
the attention of the British Cabinet. A memorandum35, 
prepared in the Dominions Office and endorsed by Chamberlain 
and Balfour, argued that with the Governor General no longer 
a representative of the British Government, 'not even to act 
as a post office'36, Britain lacked representation in the 
Dominions. This created a 'weakness' in the inter-imperial 
system which was further strained by the appointment of United 
States diplomatic representatives of 'high and marked ability' 
at Ottawa and Dublin. The memorandum stressed that it was 
essential that Britain 'take the initiative'.37 Acknowledging 
that something had to be done, the Cabinet appointed a 
committee to examine the issue. It fell to five ministers, 
Chamberlain, Amery, Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Lord Salisbury, the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Philip 
Cunliffe-Lister, the President of the Board of Trade, and 
several others including Balfour to hammer out an agreement.38
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Those in the Dominions Office, especially its Secretary, 
Amery, were reluctant to abandon recourse to the Dominion High 
Commissioners. Recognising that Britain must move with the 
times, if it were to protect its interests, Amery presented a 
plan at the first meeting of the committee in late June. In 
the absence of Chamberlain, he was able to dominate the 
meeting and field few questions or comments from his Cabinet 
colleagues.39 Under the new scheme, Amery proposed that 
placing a liaison officer in New Zealand, a liaison officer in 
Australia, and a minor representative in South Africa. 
Britain would wait for the Irish Free State to express an 
interest before proceeding there. It was only in the instance 
of Canada that anyone of fuller stature was contemplated, but 
even here the Dominions Office was careful to define a 
minister of limited status. Keen to appoint someone who would 
counter the favourable impression that the new American 
minister was making in Ottawa, Amery was equally concerned to 
avoid the impression that the relationship between Canada and 
Britain was now one similar to that between two foreign 
countries. Shifting away from the earlier suggestion that the 
Foreign Office control the appointment, Amery recommended that 
the British minister be appointed by and be responsible to the 
Dominions Secretaries. The minister, furthermore, would be 
granted the powers to speak for the British Government on all 
matters including foreign affairs. Amery was now anxious that 
the first office-holder not be a diplomat in order to prevent 
the suggestion in that 'the relations between Great Britain 
and Canada were those of foreign countries' but he was willing 
to accept an assistant from the Foreign Office. Regarding the 
actual title, he settled upon High Commissioner for Great
Britain in Canada 'in default of better'. Amery wished to 
avoid a title which in everyday use could be reduced to 
'British Minister' or any variation on Minister.40
Amery's proposal opens up a number of questions. On the 
surface he appears to have been motivated by the desire to 
protect the imperial ties and prevent creating any impression 
to the world at large that the Britain's relations with Canada 
had changed, particularly to a relationship that resembled the 
one between foreign countries. At the same time, it is 
tempting to regard the move as a bid by Amery for enhanced 
power. The Dominions Office's involvement in Dominion 
relations would have diminished if the British representative 
came under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office.
At the first meeting of the committee, the Foreign 
Office, as represented by William Tyrrell, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary, opposed Amery's policy. Tyrrell found the 
proposal unacceptable because it failed to conform with the 
wishes of the Dominion Prime Ministers, particularly those of 
Australia and Canada, who had expressed a wish to have 
representatives with whom they could confer and from whom they 
could receive advice on matters of foreign policy. Even in 
this first meeting, it became evident that the Foreign Office 
was concerned only with representation in Canada, as Tyrrell 
did not press for the sending of representatives to other 
Dominions. Regarding Canada, he stressed the need for a 
diplomat with the rank of minister. Anything less, he 
countered, would leave Britain at a disadvantage, since the 
United States appointed a Minister who was 'a trained expert 
fully acquainted with all the problems which were likely to 
rise between the United States and Canada.'41 In his
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assessment of Amery's proposal for his 'chief', Chamberlain, 
Tyrrell dismissed the scheme as 'mainly shop-window dressing'. 
He argued that if Britain was trying to respond to the 
Dominions' desire to obtain knowledge of foreign affairs and 
thus improve their eventual share in directing it, Amery's 
plan was inadequate. Tyrrell feared that the scheme ran 'a 
grave risk of the Dominions rejecting it as a sham'. 
Furthermore, it failed to promote 'the unification of the 
Empire as regards foreign policy'.42
In defining their perspectives, the Foreign Office and 
the Dominions Office were pointing out their differences in 
motivation. Whereas the Foreign Office broadly defined the 
demands of the post, the Dominions Office adopted a narrower 
scope, being almost exclusively concerned with foreign 
affairs. Accordingly, the Foreign Office advocated a proper 
minister of diplomatic stature in order to assist Canada with 
the increasingly difficult questions, such as fisheries, in 
her relations with the United States. The Foreign Office also 
thought that Britain must balance any gain that the United 
States made with the appointment of the distinguished 
diplomat, Phillips, to Ottawa. Another factor, of greater 
significance, was the Foreign Office's belief that the 
Canadian Government sought improved consultation in foreign 
matters because it wished to be involved in imperial policy as 
an active participant. Tyrrell was the first to raise this 
issue, but it echoed Chamberlain's opinion since, at the 
subsequent committee meeting, he brought up the example 
suggested to him by King that had such a structure been in 
existence Canada could have ratified the Locarno Agreement. 
The sincerity of this profession on King's part is
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questionable, but Chamberlain, and those in the Foreign Office 
who were seeking such comforts, accepted it. Chamberlain 
admitted that he 'did not wish to lay too much stress on this 
last point, but it was not one which could be altogether 
disregarded'.43 Consequently, the Foreign Office pitted 
itself against the Dominions Office and stood its ground that 
it wanted a diplomat appointed to Canada. It is curious that 
the argument of the appointment and the refinement of the 
credentials had now come to centre on satisfying Canada. 
Certainly from the Foreign Office's point of view, the main 
consideration was Canadian wishes and on this it concentrated 
its energies. Ironically the Foreign Office correctly 
recognised that a diplomatic appointment was the only suitable 
one for Canada, but this decision was reached for the wrong 
reason. The Foreign Office was clearly deluding itself if it 
thought this step would ensure Canada's commitment to imperial 
foreign policy. The Dominions Office, too, was pursuing its 
proposal on ill-founded assumptions. What it sought was a 
much broader arrangement whereby representatives from the 
Dominions Office would be located in each Dominion thus 
strengthening imperial ties.
Support on the committee for Amery's scheme waned 
primarily because of financial considerations. The Treasury, 
under Churchill's leadership, fussed over the funds involved. 
At the second meeting, Chamberlain took advantage of this by 
claiming that Amery's proposal was too ambitious and not 
necessary. Following Tyrrell's suggestions44 closely, 
Chamberlain proposed that no new emissary be sent to South 
Africa as the official already there could have his title 
extended to being the British representative. With no
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pressure or interest coining from Australia or the Irish Free 
State, no representatives needed to be sent there. Finally, 
New Zealand had indicated that all it required was a junior 
member from the Foreign Office. Thus with a clean stroke, 
Chamberlain reduced the requirements in South Africa, 
Australia, the Irish Free State and New Zealand to just one 
junior minister for New Zealand. Cleverly, however, he did 
not modify the arrangements he envisioned for Canada and 
continued to argue that an experienced diplomat should be 
appointed. Churchill, pleased with the savings, endorsed 
Chamberlain's proposal.
The scheme almost went ahead except for the objections of 
Lord Salisbury. Salisbury, a staunch member of the school of 
thought that all imperial foreign policy must be based in 
London, found the implications of appointing a diplomat to 
Canada unsettling. He feared this would undermine the unity 
of the Empire and play 'into the hands of the Canadian 
separatist element'. Salisbury grudgingly accepted, after 
hearing further arguments, that 'it was no longer practicable 
to insist on such an arrangement'. He qualified his support 
but stressed that where possible policy should be formulated 
in London. Balfour backed Salisbury expressing the not-so- 
progressive argument 'that any formal reconstitution of the 
Empire ought to be avoided'. This compromise, which appeared 
to keep a vestige of imperial unity intact, was endorsed by 
the majority of the committee. In the end, the committee 
accepted all the suggestions by the Foreign Secretary, except 
those arrangements for Canada. In the latter case the
committee decided that Baldwin should discuss the matter with 
King on his Canadian trip.
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On the issue of the title for the minister in Canada, 
Balfour stated the belief, which Chamberlain supported, that 
the title 'High Commissioner' be avoided. The Foreign 
Secretary favoured at best 'Senior Counsellor'. Amery again 
voiced misgivings that skirting around the title 'High 
Commissioner' opened the way for slang such as 'British 
Minister' which implied division. The committee declined to 
make a recommendation on the title, but agreed with Amery that 
the impression must be avoided that a British representative 
to Canada constituted a new path in British-Canadian 
relations, or that it was a response to the appointment of an 
American minister to Ottawa.45 Here ended the involvement of 
the committee as the final stages were settled by Baldwin, 
Amery and Chamberlain.
The Foreign Office was unwilling to leave matters as 
decided by the committee. Chamberlain resolved in the autumn 
of 1927 to take his case to Baldwin.46 In arguing his case, 
Chamberlain relied upon a lengthy memorandum prepared by Percy 
Koppel and Henry Maxse of the Dominions Information 
Department, an agency the Foreign Office established after the 
Imperial Conference of 1926. The memorandum returned to the 
theme of adequate consultation and then to imperial unity in 
foreign policy. Beginning in 1917 and tracing events to 1926, 
the document found the common thread in the need for 
consultation and adequate communication. Although MacDonald 
failed to resolve the matter in 1924, because the intended 
meeting never convened, the matter remained a priority as 
reflected by the deliberations of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee. This committee, preparing for the Imperial 
Conference of 1926, suggested the appointment of Dominion
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representatives in London, a scheme which proved unacceptable
to some Dominion Prime Ministers. King, though, indicated
that a British representative in Canada was the answer.
Underlying the Foreign Office's response to this idea was the
assumption that the key role of the British representative
would be foreign policy. Optimistically, the memorandum
predicted this form of representation would satisfactorily
provide the long-overdue consultation needed to ensure unity.
Apart from its introductory comments, the memorandum focused
on Canada, devoting two-thirds of its space to the Canadian
case. Canada was a special case, because it was the only
Dominion on the League of Nations' League Council, because of
its 'propinquity to the United States', and the exchange of
Ministers between Washington and Ottawa, and finally, because
of all the Dominions it had been the most independent in
breaking with imperial foreign policy. Again, optimism was
expressed that if the appointment occurred as the Foreign
Office envisaged, such breaches in unity such as Chanak and
Locarno could be avoided. Chamberlain's belief that this was
the best course reflected its endorsement by Mackenzie King.
But the Foreign Office was keen to avoid the impression that
this was a rupture in imperial relations. The memorandum
concluded that the appointee should be
a member of the Diplomatic Service with the 
necessary experience acting as personal 
representative of the Prime Minister with 
the Canadian Prime Minister. This would 
give no colour to the idea that inter­
imperial relations were on the same footing
as foreign relations, but at the same time 
allowed the most urgent problems to be 
discussed adequately at Ottawa without delay 
and that the closest liaison be assured in 
those day-to-day matters, where it is most 
essential .A7
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These arguments failed to convince Baldwin. Even more 
disastrously, by giving such weight to King's opinion, the 
Foreign Office had set the stage for its defeat on the issue.
The unravelling of the Foreign Office's proposal came in 
two stages. First, during Baldwin's visit to Canada for the 
country's Diamond Jubilee celebrations in the summer of 1927; 
and then during Amery's visit to Canada in early 1928. 
Baldwin's visit to Canada, together with his conversations 
with King and Lord Willingdon, had impressed upon him the need 
for a British representative in Ottawa. Lord Willingdon 
expressed his concern about the growing American influence, 
believing it was the intention of the United States to lure 
Canadian loyalties away from Britain. Given the limitations 
placed upon him as Governor General, Willingdon felt it was 
essential that Britain appoint a representative. Moreover, 
argued Willingdon, this representative ought to be able to 
'compete favourably with Mr. Phillips'.48 While the Cabinet 
committee examining the issue attempted to play down the 
American factor, clearly it was influential. When Baldwin 
instructed Amery to collect more information on his Canadian 
trip, he stressed that, 'in particular I would ask you to give 
special attention to the activities, personality and standing 
of the United States representative.'49 Baldwin had returned 
to Britain realising that it was essential to appoint someone 
who could hold his own with the impressive stature of Phillips 
in Ottawa.50
The exact qualification and status of the representative 
was hammered out further during Amery's trip to Canada. Under 
Baldwin's instructions, he enquired what would be considered 
a suitable appointment. In the final settlement of
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qualifications for the appointment, the Foreign Office was 
once again trumped. As early as January 1926, the Foreign 
Office wanted the appointment to come from the ranks of the 
diplomatic service.51 As the matter received more prominence, 
Chamberlain and his Foreign Office officials urged the 
appointment of a diplomat and opposed the appointment of a 
politician.52 Amery, however, changed his view on who would 
make a suitable appointee. He agreed with Chamberlain that an 
ex-politician was unacceptable. He withdrew his support that 
the appointment be made from the junior ranks of the Foreign 
Office.53 In an attempt to protect the Dominions Office 
stature, Amery wished the appointment to come from his office. 
The fatal blow to the Foreign Office came when Mackenzie King 
sided with Amery and opposed the appointment of a diplomat.
Mackenzie Kino: A distant but potent influence
King's opinion regarding the qualifications required for 
the British representative was the decisive factor in deciding 
whether the appointee would be a diplomat. It is ironic that 
King's opinion was so valued since King had, during much of 
the episode, tried to distance himself from the process. He 
took the position early on that it was a British not a 
Canadian matter. Even with a detached pose, however, King 
remained a potent force in hastening the process towards the 
appointment of a British representative to Canada.
Before his clash with Byng in the summer of 1926, King 
was already considering eliminating the Governor General as a 
representative of the Dominions Office, or more precisely as 
a representative of the British Government. In February 1926, 
King asserted that restricting the Governor General would
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force the British to have 'High Commissioners or Ministers' in 
Ottawa.54 This would be a highly congenial step to King, 
because it would define the Governor General in a purely 
Canadian context as one having only Canadian allegiance. More 
importantly for King, a British representative in Ottawa would 
resolve the issue of responsibility. He was anxious to 
prevent a Canadian minister being responsible for conveying or 
misrepresenting the intentions of the British Government. 
These views he expressed to Esme Howard in May 1926 and then 
again in his informal meeting with Chamberlain during the 
Imperial Conference of 1926. 'I put forward the suggestion', 
wrote King of their meeting,
that the time had come when there 
should be a complete separation between the 
Office of Governor General as the 
representative of the Crown and that of 
representation of the Government being 
distinct from representation of the Crown.
I suggested the logical course seemed to be 
development with the Empire of an inter­
imperial organization for diplomatic 
purposes similar to that which exists 
between nations; instead of having 
ambassadors and ministers, so called, some 
other distinction could be given them. ...I 
pointed out that the British Government 
should send their communications through 
their own representative direct to myself 
and I could immediately get in touch with 
Cabinet and give a reply; we would be 
quickly and authoritatively informed; also 
we would do away with despatches fsic] which 
were a matter of record which might be 
called for by parliament and which had to be 
framed with a possible view to having them 
published later.
Both Chamberlain and [Sir William]
Tyrrell seemed to view this development very 
favourably. My own belief is that it is 
constructive and will mark a point of 
departure which will further emphasize the 
equality of status between the self- 
governing Dominions and Mother Country, and 
will round out the national ideal in a 
manner which will preserve Empire unity.55
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King's message was clearly understood by Chamberlain, who 
gave it considerable weight. The conversation left 
Chamberlain with two strong impressions: first, that King
'wished these communications to be made by an official of our 
Government and the responsibility for their accuracy and 
completeness to rest with us and not with any Canadian 
official'; and, second, that King attached 'particular 
importance as far as liaison at the Canadian end is concerned 
. . . that there should be an official competent to give him 
considered advice as to the policy of HMG in foreign 
affairs. ,56 Chamberlain used King's apparent desire for 
advice on foreign affairs as the chief reason for arguing that 
a British representative to Canada should come from diplomatic 
ranks.
After the Imperial Conference of 192 6, King maintained a 
low profile in the discussion except for a prediction to the 
Canadian House of Commons in April 1927 that the appointment 
of a British High Commissioner was imminent.57 Thereafter, 
King volunteered an opinion only when prompted by the British. 
During a visit to Canada in the summer of 1927, Baldwin 
pressed him further. King vaguely referred to the 'advantage 
of personal contacts and interviews as against despatches 
[sic] and the need for keeping Governor General out of [ word 
illegible but appears to be of] all agency work for the 
British Government and keeping him solely as the 
representative of the King./58 He declined, however, to 
comment further believing his position was already clear. 
Amery tried to renew discussion during his tour of Canada in 
1928. In his diary, King expressed annoyance at being asked 
an opinion on an issue of purely British concern, but he did
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exchange words with Amery.59 He expressed the apprehension 
that Britain was risking alienation of public opinion if it 
did not place someone of comparable status with the newly 
appointed American Ambassador to Canada.60 He also remarked 
that the British representative should be a man with wide 
general knowledge of Dominion affairs and able to discuss 
British interests on several questions, including foreign 
affairs; but, he did not think 'a diplomat as such would meet 
the case.' He surprised Amery by recommending E.J. Harding 
for whom he held the 'very highest opinion after the Imperial 
Conference and Baldwin's visit.' If not Harding, King 
suggested, someone, 'possibly an M.P., with administrative 
knowledge. '61
This was a fatal blow to the Foreign Office's argument 
that King preferred not to appoint a diplomat and the fact 
that King went so far as to name someone from the Dominions 
Office as entirely suitable was a shock. Where previously the 
Foreign Office had exploited the views of King, it now tried 
to disown them. Having heard the outcome of the meetings with 
Amery, the Foreign Office now decried King as unreasonable. 
Attributing his views to 'personal idiosyncrasies'62 and being 
no more than 'a faithful disciple of Sir Wilfrid Laurier' who 
'fears the responsibility for foreign policy'63, Foreign 
Office officials advocated overriding King's views. They 
could see that what was needed, even if King was blind to it, 
was an appointment rooted in foreign affairs, namely a 
diplomat.64 Despite the fact that officials tried to dismiss 
King's set of requirements as unrealistic, since he sought a 
'universal genius'65 or a 'superman'66, the damage was done. 
The Dominions Office was able to have its way since it
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appeared to best fit King's wishes to have an appointment 
which covered a much broader scope. While Chamberlain agreed 
with his officials, he had grown weary of the dispute. 
Although Chamberlain's father, Joseph, himself a great 
statesman, groomed Chamberlain to be the gentleman politician, 
Joseph Chamberlain also taught his son to be pragmatic. This 
pragmatism gave Austen Chamberlain the ability to fight a good 
fight, but it also enabled him to force a conclusion when a 
matter was dragging on. This capacity to conclude matters 
showed itself in the final stages of the High Commissioner 
issue. While his officials wanted to fight on, Chamberlain 
recognised the need to end the debate and hoped 'the matter 
may be soon settled and I trust that the settlement may be on 
wise lines.'67 Since Baldwin sided with Amery's proposal, 
thus it was, in the months of February and March 1928 that 
Baldwin, Amery and Chamberlain hammered out the details of the 
appointment without returning to consult Cabinet.
Once King had indicated that he preferred a man with a 
background in Dominion affairs, and not in diplomacy, the last 
outstanding question was on the issue of title. The Dominions 
Office and the Foreign Office now found themselves in 
agreement on the fundamental principle that, whatever the 
title of the representative, it should not suggest that Canada 
and Britain were now behaving as two foreign countries. 
Chamberlain, for his part, initially favoured a form of 
variation of 'High Commissioner' along the lines of 'High 
Commissioners ambassadors',68 but later backed a title such 
as Senior Counsellor. Similarly, by 1928, King had shifted 
his initial support away from 'High Commissioner'69 believing 
that this title did not sound terribly impressive. Amery
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attributed King's view to the fact that the title was 
originally conferred on Dominion High Commissioners when the 
Dominions did not have full status in the Empire and the work 
of the Dominion High Commissioners was limited,70 Amery 
himself, however, continued to promote the title 'High 
Commissioner' as it was the least suggestive of a new 
relationship between Canada and Britain. In the end, Amery's 
recommendation prevailed.
Still hoping to attach significance to the appointment of 
a British representative to Ottawa, King offered him 
precedence over other foreign representatives. Amery decided 
this would be unwise because again it suggested that Canada 
and Britain enjoyed the relationship found between two foreign 
countries. To grant the British High Commissioner any
diplomatic status suggested that the British representative
represented the British Crown in Canada. Following the 
example of the Canadian High Commissioner in London, who 
represented the Canadian Government, the British High
Commissioner in Ottawa, who represented the British
Government, came after foreign representatives but above Privy 
Councillors.
Ultimately, among the various players, Amery was the most 
successful in getting his own way, when in April 1928, Sir 
William Clark was appointed the first British High 
Commissioner in Canada. King had failed to secure either E.J. 
Harding or a more impressive title. Likewise, Chamberlain had 
failed to secure the appointment of a diplomat or a mechanism 
to secure better consultation in foreign policy.
The appointment of Clark, with his background at the 
Board of Trade and Comptroller-General of the Department of
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Overseas Trade, drew criticism in some quarters. P.C. Larkin, 
the Canadian High Commissioner in London, told King of his 
reservation that Clark 'was not in the same class' as the 
American Minister.71 After meeting and working with Clark for 
several months, King refuted this, noting 'I have gathered 
from a number of sources, the selection of Sir William 
Clark... is a good one. He has the kind of training which 
should enable him to understand the workings of our several 
departments of Government, as well as the relations which 
should govern between himself and Ministers of the Crown, and 
the Government officials.'72 King may have been a little 
generous in overlooking the fact that in the matter of 
qualifications, the American Minister's exceeded those of the 
British High Commissioner's. But King could afford to be 
generous. He was able to look beyond the man and his 
qualifications to grasp the significance of the appointment.
Whether the representative from Britain was under the 
Foreign Office or the Dominions Office, or whether Whitehall 
attempted to undermine the significance through a lesser 
title, the reality remained that matters had changed 
drastically. Britain had been forced to place its own 
representative in Ottawa in order to protect her interests. 
If Whitehall chose not to acknowledge this, its implication 
was not lost on King who saw it as the beginning of a new era. 
King wrote of the significance to Willingdon: 'we have
regarded the High Commissioner as wholly the representative of 
the British Government. as distinct from the Crown./73
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CONCLUSION
The passage of the Statue of Westminster by the British
Parliament in 1931 established in law a new constitutional
settlement between Britain and the Dominions. The foundation
of this new relationship was the Balfour Report of 1926. This
report, a product of the Imperial Conference of 1926, defined
the relations between Britain and the Dominions:
They [the Dominions and Britain] are 
autonomous communities within the British 
Empire, equal in status, in no way 
subordinate one to another in any aspect of 
their domestic or external affairs, though 
united by a common allegiance to the Crown, 
and freely associated as members of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations.1
As Nicholas Mansergh wrote of this definition of the new
imperial relationship:
In this sentence four important 
characteristics of membership of the British 
Commonwealth, which comprised the United 
Kingdom as well as the dominions, were 
identified. The dominions were 1.
autonomous communities 2. within the 
British Empire 3. freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations 4. united by a common allegiance 
to the Crown.2
The Statute of Westminster ended the sovereignty of the 
British Parliament over the Dominions and ended that imperial 
unity which can be described as formal unity or unity in form. 
The legislation confirmed the authority of each Dominion to 
legislate on matters previously within the jurisdiction of the 
Parliament of Westminster, and to legislate with extra­
territorial effect. In this manner, the Dominions' autonomy 
was confirmed. At the same time, the Statue of Westminster 
protected the unity of the Dominions and Britain under one 
Crown.3 This development meant that the burden of imperial
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unity shifted to other supporting structures, principally that 
of a shared Crown.
Recent historians have dwelt on the continuity of 
imperial unity after 1926.4 This interpretation is valid when 
applied to the new imperial unity which, apart from imperial 
unity under one Crown, was based on function. The actual 
practice flowing from the constitutional settlement, in the 
early years, meant that Britain assumed leadership for the 
Dominions in many areas. This new imperial unity, with its 
emotional and cultural undertones, was always liable to 
erosion. The unravelling of the juridical links at the heart 
of the Balfour Report of 192 6, not least in the international 
dimension, was a vital departure which recent writers have 
perhaps underplayed. Emphasis on continuity, however, can 
mean overlooking the significance of the genuine severance 
which occurred between Britain and Canada with respect to 
foreign policy. In this regard, the constitutional settlement 
was a turning point particularly for Canada and the course of 
its foreign policy. Even though at this time, and in the 
immediate years which followed, Canada's foreign policy might 
be more precisely defined as an evolving 'personality' in 
international affairs, the constitutional settlement was, 
nonetheless, a moment when a genuine severance occurred 
between Britain and Canada in the area of foreign policy.
This study has concentrated on an analysis of British- 
Canadian relations and, specifically, Canada's break from 
formal diplomatic unity with Britain during the 1920s. The 
manner in which this unfolded has a significance especially 
for the study of Canada's emergence as an autonomous country. 
The interactions and dynamics which existed between Britain
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and Canada during this process were in many ways unique. Each 
Dominion went through its own struggle to define its 
relationship with Britain. These struggles shared some 
similarities with the Canadian experience, but were not 
necessarily identical with it. Canada, therefore, must be 
analysed as something related to, but capable also of being 
abstracted from, the general run of Commonwealth developments. 
That has been the aim of this thesis.
The constitutional settlement reached over these years 
did not mean that imperial unity was consigned to the past. 
An intimate, even unified, relationship continued to exist 
between Britain and Canada. However these imperial 
continuities may be described for other Dominions, in Canadian 
terms the unity which existed between Britain and Canada took 
on an informal bias with a tendency to become a purely 
conventional link between close partners. The years 1926 to 
1928, therefore, retained a radical and even dramatic 
significance as a moment of separation between Canada and 
Britain, in terms of Canada's development as an independent 
state shaping its own destiny with its own distinctive outlook 
on the world. No longer could the British Government 
formally, or as a matter of status, exert control over 
Canadian affairs. Once British authority ceased, then Canada 
truly became autonomous and governed all its decisions and 
commitments. Imperial unity in status was over. The 
constitutional settlement critically modified imperial unity 
and placed it on a more permanent footing through the 
establishment of the Commonwealth. This new unity was one of 
function, in which Britain retained, for some time at least,
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a substantial influence and leadership in how Canadian 
commitments were decided.
It is also important to recognise that this study 
purposefully examined one factor in the complex relationship 
between Britain and Canada. Emphasis was placed on the 
Foreign Office as opposed to other state departments involved, 
such as the Colonial Office and Dominions Office. Although 
this accentuation narrowed the scope of analysis, it enabled 
the study to highlight the particular pattern of evolution in 
the strictly diplomatic field. This approach also allowed 
close exploration of the Foreign Office, the department most 
directly affected by changes to imperial diplomatic unity. It 
was upon this foundation, laid during the 1920s, that Canada 
would build in time its independent foreign policy and 
subsequently expand its overseas legations.
Many years passed, however, before Canada exercised its 
right to have a plethora of separate legations and its 
associated authentic foreign policy of its own. In 1928, the 
growth of Canada's Department of External Affairs acquired 
apparent momentum with the establishment of two legations in 
Tokyo and Paris. No further expansion occurred, however, 
until after the Second World War. The department, moreover, 
did not gain full stature until 1948, nearly forty years after 
its establishment, when the Prime Minister ceased to act as 
the Minister of External Affairs and assigned the 
responsibilities to a separate minister. This belated 
emergence of Canadian diplomatic machinery, after having 
fought so persistently to control its own foreign policy, left 
Canada dependent upon the British Government's judgement in 
foreign affairs. It was in this de facto capacity that
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Britain continued in practice, though not in law, to be the 
determining factor in Canadian external affairs. This 
informal diplomatic unity between the two countries - while 
modified by Canada's growing orientation towards the United 
States after 1940, as symbolised by the Ogdensburg Agreement5 
- continued virtually uninterrupted through the Second World 
War. It may be said not to have completely collapsed until 
the Suez Crisis of 1956.
Canada's retreat back into the imperial fold in foreign 
affairs, after its efforts of the 1920s, meant that, until its 
expansion after the Second World War, Canada's foreign policy 
adopted more the aspect of a gradually evolving 'personality' 
than a full-fledged independent diplomacy. In function, 
during these years, Canadian and British foreign policies 
remained intrinsically linked. The autonomy that Canada 
secured by shaping its own international personality was a 
pre-condition for the development of an integrated, self­
standing Canadian foreign policy.
The manner in which Canada became involved in the Second 
World War illustrates how in status Canada was distinct from 
Britain while in function the two countries remained closely
linked. In 1914, when Britain declared war, it committed the
Empire to war. Britain's declaration of war on Germany on 3 
September 1939, however, did not automatically commit Canada 
to the conflict. The Canadian Parliament emphasised 
independence from Britain's announcement of war by delaying 
its own declaration of war on Germany by several days. The 
Canadian Parliament did not assemble to decide Canada's role 
until 7 September 1939. When the vote was taken, only five
Members of Parliament opposed Canada's participation. On 9
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September 1939, His Majesty, George VI, on the advice of his 
Canadian ministers, declared a state of war between Canada and 
Germany.6 Canada's action reflected Canada's legal
independence from Britain. In function, however, Canada's 
action maintained the modified imperial unity established 
under the Statute of Westminster. In 1939, Britain was under 
threat from Germany. Canada was under no immediate physical 
threat and yet chose to go to Britain's aid immediately. 
Canada's decision represented not an imposition, but rather a 
rational and considered assessment by Canada's political 
leaders of national interests and national convictions.
Apart from the declaration of war in 1939, Canada's close 
involvement with the British war effort appeared to differ 
little from Canada's extensive participation in the First 
World War. When British-Canadian relations are examined from 
this perspective, it shows that following the constitutional 
settlement, Canada retreated back to the British diplomatic 
fold for almost two decades, and that while the two countries 
were independent of each other in status, they could be 
described as foreign countries in their dealings only in the 
narrowest sense.
As has been mentioned at various points in this study, 
one of the common threads to the developments of imperial 
relations in the 1920s was that at no point did events unfold 
in such a fashion that it became clear that the old imperial 
relationship had ceased and a new relationship had begun. 
Rather, while the new relationship was evolving it carried 
with it many aspects of the old imperial union. Nevertheless, 
in the sphere of politics and constitutions, more than in most 
areas of human relations, forms are vitally important, and
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this account has emphasised that by 1928 the forms of Anglo- 
Canadian relations had changed in vital ways. British 
ministers no longer communicated with the Canadian Government 
through the Canadian Governor General. If Britain wished to 
present its interests to the Canadian Government then it was 
through the newly-appointed British High Commissioner. Also, 
in contrast to 1914 when Britain's declaration of war 
committed all of the British Empire, including Canada, to war, 
Britain no longer had this supreme quality of direction. By 
1928, Canada was committed to British foreign policy, or 
indeed any international commitment, only when Canada chose to 
be committed. In this sense of international obligations, and 
above all in Canada's ability to make political choices of its 
own, Britain and Canada had become as foreign countries, in 
that it fell to each country to make its own decisions 
respecting its international involvement. Nevertheless, 
beyond the realm of international commitment and inter­
governmental communications, the strong links and interactions 
in economical, political and cultural terms meant that Canada 
and Britain were unconventional foreign countries because 
their ties in function, though not in status, remained so 
close.
This study has, chiefly for the sake of clarity, labelled 
those who supported Canada's break from imperial diplomatic 
unity as nationalists and their opponents as imperialists. 
The label of nationalist remains clear with respect to 
examining Canada's break from imperial diplomatic unity. But 
the goals of nationalists did not extend specifically to the 
larger field of British-Canadian relations. In the broader 
context, Canada's sense of itself as a nation remained largely
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undefined and is best characterised as fragile and complex. 
Two large cultural groups, one which drew a sense of identity 
from its French heritage and the other from its British 
heritage, had yet to reach a consensus on how Canada defined 
itself as a nation. Canada's still largely confused self­
definition as a nation continued through the 1920s and beyond. 
For most of the English-speaking Canadians, Britain continued 
to be a strong cultural link, which was reinforced by 
political ties since the Canadian political structure was 
fashioned after the British model. Furthering the ties 
between Britain and Canada were economic links. These links 
kept the interactions extremely close for many Canadian 
regions such as the western provinces. These provinces had a 
predominantly agrarian-based economy which relied upon Britain 
in this period for their livelihood. Furthermore, this 
dependence increased during the depression of the 1930s.7 
While in status Canada had complete control of all its 
affairs, internal and external, in substance the Canadian 
economy and foreign concerns still showed a heavy bias towards 
influence and guidance. In the rather hackneyed, but not 
perhaps inappropriate, metaphor of the family so often used in 
the Commonwealth context, Britain and Canada during the 1920s 
were like mother and daughter. After the constitutional 
settlement, they still remained extremely close but were now 
like two sisters, with the elder sister still assuming the 
leadership role when it mattered most.
It is only appropriate that a final word be said about 
the senior British figures whose participation in the events 
of the 1920s have dominated this study. Hindsight shows that 
Canada's severance from British imperial foreign policy
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constituted a turning point in British-Canadian relations. 
Canada's gain of independent status in this respect was a 
prerequisite for the expansion of Canadian legations and 
foreign policy which later occurred. The gains which Canada 
made, however, were achieved with surprising ease and 
cooperation among senior British politicians such as Austen 
Chamberlain and L.S. Amery. The support of such British 
figures was not given in the belief that they were encouraging 
Canada's departure from the imperial fold. Not only would 
they have discouraged such an outcome, but the political 
opponents of these men would not have allowed such a policy to 
go unchallenged. The polemical debate which occurred in the 
British House of Commons at the time of the Statute of 
Westminster illustrated that British politicians were prepared 
to fight hard against any threat to imperial unity. The 
backing that men such as Chamberlain and Amery gave, in their 
capacities as Foreign Secretary and Dominions Secretary 
respectively from 1924 to 1929, was based on the conviction 
that they were assisting in the strengthening of imperial 
relations with Canada, and with other Dominions, by placing 
imperial unity on a new footing. These men recognised that 
the developments of the 1920s meant that Canada, and other 
Dominions, were assuming control in matters of status over 
what had once comprised imperial unity. They believed, 
however, that a new version of imperial unity was emerging, 
that of function, in which Britain would remain the leader 
upon whom the Dominions would rely and whose guidance they 
would follow. These senior British politicians distinguished 
between status and function and concluded that though unity in 
status might be lost, the continuance of unity in function
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meant that in practice imperial unity would continue with 
little change. Senior officials in Whitehall also shared the 
conviction that imperial unity continued on, albeit under a 
different form. One strong supporter of the new form of unity 
was Maurice Hankey.
Hankey, Secretary to the British Cabinet, assisted Lord 
Balfour in reaching the necessary consensus required between 
Britain and the Dominions to produce the Balfour Report of 
1926. Hankey, suggestively, regarded the report as a great 
success for the cause of continued imperial unity. Hankey was 
also showered with congratulations by many, including L.S. 
Amery, for his role in what was viewed as a great 
achievement.8 Publicly, Amery praised the Balfour Report, but 
in his diary he gave a more guarded view as to the 
ramifications of this report and the Imperial Conference of 
1926. Amery concluded that much of what constituted imperial 
unity had been conceded to the Dominions. He believed, 
however, that the report and the conference had established a 
new imperial unity which possessed a promising future:
It [the Imperial Conference of 1926] really 
has been a great clearing up of outstanding 
points on the basis which eliminates 
friction and leaves the way clear for future 
co-operation. It is true it leaves the way 
equally clear for dissolution. That is a 
risk we have got to run and if the will to 
unity is there we shall overcome it. After 
all the best proof of the new spirit seems 
to be the fact that while the main committee 
of Prime Ministers was framing the new 
status policy all the various sub committees 
[sic] were hard at work, and not 
unsuccessfully, on detailed projects of 
closer co-operation, making up in sum total 
a far more effective series of bonds of 
Empire than the formal one we may have 
dropped.9
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Staunch British opponents to this line of thinking stated that 
it was impossible to disentangle status and function. These 
critics, as characterised by Winston Churchill's subsequent 
attack on the Statute of Westminster, argued that if status 
was conceded, then it always entailed the eventual loss of 
substance as well.10
In the years immediately after the constitutional 
settlement, British politicians who supported the settlement 
seemed to have disproved the gloomy predictions of their 
opponents. Canada did not expand its legations and it 
remained intrinsically linked with British foreign policy. 
Moreover, the ultimate test of unity - that of assistance at 
a time of war - was met by Canada's declaration of war on 
Germany soon after Britain's own declaration. Indeed, the 
unity which British supporters of the constitutional 
settlement envisioned between Canada and Britain continued in 
the realm of foreign policy until the Suez Crisis of 1956. In 
other areas, such cultural links, Britain and Canada preserved 
a unity for many years after 1956. In the longer view, of 
course, Canada's separation from Britain in foreign policy in 
status during the 1920s laid the foundation for Canada's 
ultimate emergence as a 'middle power', the definition and 
practice of which bore a vicarious relationship to the older 
imperial connection, and was even capable (as at Suez in 1956) 
of rejecting it outright. This study has sought to show that 
in so far as this branch of Empire-Commonwealth relations is 
concerned, Winston Churchill, and those who supported his line 
of thinking, were accurate in predicting that loss of status 
would eventually mean a loss of function as well.
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